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ACCUMULATING CHARACTER: TIME AND ETHOS IN RHETORICAL THEORY 
“Accumulating Character” develops a theoretical framework that highlights the rhetorical 
and interrelated workings of character and time. In rhetorical scholarship, character—or ethos—is 
typically construed as either fleeting or fixed. This dissertation makes explicit the links between these 
two temporal extremes, identifying the ways that ethos accumulates rhetorical force over time.  
To attend to the temporal dimensions of ethos, I first construct a rhetorical model of 
accumulated time. Here, I conjoin Aristotle’s definition of chronos in the Physics with the scholarship 
of Karen Barad to craft a complex picture of accumulated time as a rhetorically significant material-
discursive force that emerges from the deep entanglement of nonhuman and human ecologies. In 
Chapter 2, I sketch a framework for understanding how a rhetorical sense of accumulated time 
underscores the temporal dynamics of ethos. To make visible the ways that this cumulative ethos 
operates, I analyze multiple classical texts concerning the trial of Socrates and demonstrate the 
cumulative rhetorical effects of Socrates’ ethos on the city of Athens.  
In Chapter 3, I examine how the accelerated circulation of online media disrupts the 
temporal regularity that often governs the evolution of cumulative ethos. To account for these 
temporal complexities, I develop the paired concepts of rhetorical saturation and rhetorical rupture and 
explain how they function in dialectical tension with each other. I then elucidate how these twin 
ideas contribute to the irregular accumulation of character by analyzing Kanye West’s ethos as it 
circulates across a variety of online platforms. In Chapter 4, I investigate how cryptocurrencies test 
the limits of rhetorical character by disrupting the timeline for its accretion and decentering 
cumulative ethos from human subjects. By studying Bitcoin through the lens of cumulative ethos, I 
foreground the centrality of both character and time to commerce as well as the consequences of 
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Introduction: Rhetoric, Time, and Character 
Sometimes, as Sarah Koenig explains in the opening monologue of her Peabody-winning 
podcast Serial, “[i]t’s really hard to account for your time” (“The Alibi”). And as she recounts the 
story of the convicted Adnan Syed, it becomes increasingly clear that the stakes of failing to account 
for your time can have a life-altering impact on your character.  
For many podcast fans, Serial Season 1 represents the archetype of the true crime genre. 
Together with co-producer Julie Snyder, Koenig investigates a clandestine high school relationship, a 
grisly murder, and a botched trial, all complicated by the sticky web of gender bias, racial inequality, 
and religious discrimination in the United States. In each episode, Koenig explores some new piece 
of evidence. She sifts through legal affidavits, hand-written notes, recorded interviews, and call logs, 
weaving them all together into a gripping audio story aimed at discovering who killed eighteen-year-
old Hae Min Lee in Baltimore in 1999. Serial, however, only masquerades as a whodunnit. Despite 
Koenig’s obsession with the nitty gritty details of alibis and cell phone records, Serial does not have a 
neat set of irrefutable evidence that leads listeners to an indisputable conclusion. In fact, in the final 
episode, “What We Know,” an exasperated Koenig admits, “All we’re left with is, ‘Jay knew where 
the car was.’ That’s it.” After searching and mapping and questioning and listening and musing for 
months on end, she is left with one inconclusive and unsatisfying shred of knowledge. The question 
of who murdered Lee remains frustratingly unresolved. New Yorker columnist Sarah Larson is right 
therefore when she claims that “[e]pisode twelve conclusively proved that what we’ve been listening 
to is not a murder mystery.” It is, instead, a character study.  
In place of rock-solid facts and definitive resolutions, the driving narrative force at the core 
of Serial is the convoluted portrait of Lee’s former boyfriend, Adnan Syed. The podcast portrays 
Syed as a high school kid who is, on one hand, a trusted friend and respected community member 
and, on the other hand, a liar, a thief, and a convicted murderer serving a life sentence for the alleged 
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murder of Lee. And yet, while Syed’s complexity makes him a compelling central figure, Serial seems 
less concerned with Syed as a real-life character and more interested in Syed’s moral character. For 
instance, in a climactic moment in the final episode, “What We Know,” Koenig offers listeners her 
own definitive verdict on Syed’s case. But rather than justifying her decision based on a reasoned 
account of the facts, she simply says, “the guy I knew…there’s no way he could have done this.” 
Faced with a dearth of conclusive evidence, her logic falls back on Adnan’s moral character. He just 
seems like too good of a person to have killed Lee.1 With Syed’s moral character at the core of this 
narrative, then, the question of who killed Lee becomes ancillary to the more essential question of how 
could Syed—the young man we have come to know throughout the podcast—have killed her? The 
former question is that of a murder mystery. The latter question, however, identifies Serial as a 
character study invested in the moral character of its protagonist.  
What makes Syed’s moral character particularly perplexing is its complicated relationship 
with time. In the opening moments of the first episode, “The Alibi,” time already proves so crucial 
to Syed’s story that Koenig articulates the primary aims of her investigation in terms of minutes, 
hours, days, and years. “For the last year,” she explains, “I’ve spent every working day trying to 
figure out where a high school kid was for an hour after school one day in 1999. Or, if you want to 
get technical about it—and apparently I do—where a high school kid was for twenty-one minutes 
after school one day in 1999.” As with most murder cases, Koenig describes how accusations of 
guilt and claims of innocence both hinge on where the defendant was at the time of the crime. But 
when authorities questioned Syed a month and a half after Lee’s murder, he could not recall exactly 
where he was on the day of her death. When coupled with the lack of physical evidence, Syed’s 
fuzzy alibi begins to sound more like the convenient amnesia of a criminal than the unfortunate 
                                                      
1 Although Syed’s initial jury clearly thought differently, many others subscribe to Koenig’s character-based 
belief in Syed’s innocence. An abridged list of those who express a similar belief in Syed’s good character 
includes Rabia Chaudry, Saad Chaudry, Laura Estrada, and Asia McClain.  
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forgetfulness of a teenager. Before, it seemed unthinkable that the former homecoming king could 
be capable of murder; but Syed’s inability to account for his time on the day of crime casts doubt on 
his seemingly good character.  
And yet, the relationship between time and Syed’s moral character runs deeper than his 
(in)capacity to recount his actions at a single moment in time. In the penultimate episode of Serial, 
“Rumors,” Koenig summarizes an eighteen-page single-spaced letter that Syed sent her regarding his 
integrity. In this document, he first describes how the murder trial, especially the prosecuting 
attorney’s attacks on his character, destroyed his integrity. Syed then narrates how he worked for the 
past fifteen years to reconstruct his credibility from prison by building lasting relationships based, in 
part, on community service. But Koenig’s podcast, he laments, has reopened the question of his 
integrity. Now, the character he has worked to build and rebuild over time is jeopardized anew. With 
this letter, Syed underscores the ways that his character is defined less by a single moment in time—
where he was on the afternoon of January 13, 1999—and more by the cumulative impact of his past 
actions on present and future moments.  
The accretion of Syed’s character over time, however, is not a strictly linear phenomenon. 
Serial, as its title indicates, is told in episodic form, with each of the twelve episodes released one 
week at a time in late 2014. While this sequential format creates the illusion that Syed’s integrity 
accumulates or erodes in a steady progression from week to week, the temporalities that give rise to 
his character are, in fact, far less streamlined. The overall structure of Serial, for instance, is topical 
rather than chronological. Instead of recounting the events surrounding the murder, its subsequent 
investigation, and the ensuing trial in order of their occurrence, Koenig skips around. She begins 
with Syed’s ambiguous alibi, then jumps back to his relationship with Lee, then moves forward to 
the discovery of the body, then slides back to the day of the murder, then leaps forward to the day 
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of the trial, and so on. Each of these moments in Syed’s life—and, by extension, in the accrual of his 
character—becomes recycled and re-situated in the ever-evolving timescape of his life.  
This complex relationship between time and character is further complicated by audiences’ 
divergent temporal experiences of Serial. Original listeners, for example, followed along as Koenig’s 
story unfolded week by week in the waning months of 2014. These spectators had seven days 
between each episode’s release to debate Syed’s integrity in office lounges, on message boards, and 
even on other podcasts.2 Later audiences, on the other hand, could binge the entire series in a few 
days or less. In addition to this compacted timeframe, these subsequent listeners could also filter 
Syed’s character through the lens of current events regarding his case, including his re-trial appeals 
and subsequent hearings. Syed’s integrity, in other words, emerges and circulates differently 
depending on others’ temporal relationship to his narrative. Koenig, in fact, articulates this peculiar 
temporal phenomenon in the final episode when she bemoans her inability to paint a consistent 
picture of Syed’s character. “Inevitably,” she explains, “I learn something that I didn’t know before, 
and I’m upended. Sometimes the reversal takes a few weeks. Sometimes it happens within hours.” 
Time shapes and re-shapes Koenig’s understanding of Syed’s character. And although her views 
shift with varying speeds, the new information that she learns never totally erases her prior 
understanding of him. In this sense, the development of Syed’s character functions less like a 
palimpsest and more like a process of sedimentation. Prior versions of his character are not wholly 
effaced to make place for subsequent instantiations; rather, like stratified rock, the good is layered 
atop the bad. And just like deposited substrates, Syed’s character is also vulnerable to timely 
eruptions. Sometimes, an instance of Syed’s honesty will gloss over other deceitful interactions; 
                                                      
2 Shortly after the release of Serial Season 1, Slate began a podcast called Slate’s Spoiler Special that rehashed key 
moments in that week’s episode of Serial that often centered on issues of Syed’s character. The evolution of 
texts like this that circulate about and around Serial underscores the complex temporalities that collectively 
impact our ongoing understanding of Syed’s character.  
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other times, moments of duplicity may burst through this image of truthfulness. In this way, the 
structure of Serial and its digital dissemination create a complex temporal framework that unsettles 
the ways that Syed’s character emerges from this context.  
In sum, Serial foregrounds precisely the questions that this dissertation addresses. What is 
time’s relationship to character? How do time and character together rhetorically impact the world? 
And how does that impact matter to the study of rhetoric? Although the connection between 
character and time may seem intuitive, Serial highlights how the relationship between these twin 
ideas is often more complex—and more difficult to articulate—that it initially appears. This 
dissertation therefore seeks to craft a rhetorical framework that more explicitly articulates the 
interrelated workings of character and time. Whether good or bad or somewhere in between, the 
rhetorical impact of character is fashioned by time. And in more closely attending to the relationship 
between ethos and time, this dissertation seeks to explicate the complicated ways that moral 
character can accrue cultural influence as it negotiates shifting temporalities. Without such a 
temporally-attuned model of ethos, we risk overlooking how narratives like Serial Season 1 are 
actually stories about how the public accumulation of character over time rhetorically impacts 
individuals, their communities, and the culture at large.  
 
The Cultural, Rhetorical, and Temporal Aspects of Character 
The concept of character, as I will explain, has a storied history in rhetoric. But that history 
is knit up with both popular and philosophical notions of character. I therefore begin to sketch this 
rhetorical understanding of character and time by briefly outlining its imbricated relationship with 
cultural assumptions and philosophical postulations about the nature of character.  
In Western culture, the notion of ‘building character’ over time is a commonly held belief 
that reaches back at least as far as ancient Greece. In the Nicomachean Ethics, for instance, Aristotle 
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describes virtue in terms of hexis, or habit.3 According to him, a person cultivates good character 
over time by repeatedly practicing virtuous actions. Although Aristotle’s model has been rightly 
critiqued for its elitism, scholars of virtue ethics have since revised his framework in ways that still 
maintain the important relationship between time and character.4 Philosopher Julia Annas, for 
example, argues that acquiring virtue is similar to learning a practical skill.5 For her, developing virtue 
is an elongated process that takes time to master. Furthermore, such temporally situated views of 
character are not limited to academia; they also appear in mainstream culture. In 2015, New York 
Times columnist David Brooks published the best-selling book The Road to Character, a paean to 
humility. As his titular metaphor of the “road” suggests, Brooks employs a series of case studies that 
explicate how specific leaders develop character over time as they navigate the serpentine paths of 
life.6 According to him, aspiring souls must first “descend into the valley of humility to climb to the 
heights of character” (13). Brooks’ perspective illustrates that, whether in both popular discourse or 
in philosophical inquiry, time’s relationship to character is often considered axiomatic.  
Many of these popular and academic accounts also more or less implicitly position character 
as something that resides within a single individual, a view that makes it difficult to comprehend 
temporally-complex displays of character like Syed’s in Serial Season 1. Brooks, for instance, describes 
character in terms of “inner cohesion” and “inner integration” (xvi), suggesting that virtue is some 
                                                      
3 For more information about Aristotle’s understanding of the relationship between habit and virtue, see 
Book II of Nicomachean Ethics.  
4 For two overviews of the field of virtue ethics, see Anscombe’s landmark essay “Modern Moral Philosophy” 
as well as the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on “Virtue Ethics.” For examples of cultural studies 
critiques of Aristotelian virtue ethics, see Doris and Harman. See also Rosalind Hursthouse’s astute response 
to these criticisms in On Virtue Ethics.  
5 Here, Annas draws on Aristotle’s description of virtue as akin to techne, a practical skill. Annas is careful, 
however, to maintain that virtue is only analogous to a skill. Virtue cannot actually be a techne because skills can 
be used for good or for ill, but virtues can only be used for good.  
6 Although Brooks astutely identifies the relationship between character and time, his focus on 
humility above all other virtues—even above material concerns such as the financial security of 
debt-laden college students—limits the breadth of his argument. For incisive critiques of Brooks’ 
book, see Roberts and Mead.  
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kind of intangible human interiority.7 And although philosophical studies of character, including the 
Nicomachean Ethics, sometimes situate virtuous action within a larger community, or polis, they also 
typically tie virtue to the soul, or psyche, of a single human subject.8 Viewing moral character as a set 
of incorporeal traits that belong to a discrete individual highlights the role of a specific human agent 
in the crafting of character. But the story of Syed in Serial Season 1 (like many other narratives about 
character) sheds light on other forces that also prove central to the construction of character over 
time. For example, Syed’s character emerges differently when he interacts with different people; and 
in many cases, these other people—including the prosecutor from fifteen years ago and Koenig as 
the contemporary podcast narrator—play a larger role in crafting his character than he does. Rather 
than being the discrete property of an isolated individual, Syed’s character is therefore an 
intersubjective, co-constructed, emergent, and evolving entity that is deeply entangled with issues of 
power, culture, media, materiality, and time. Together, all of these factors create a vast web that 
constitutes our sense of Syed’s ever-shifting character. Regardless of whether listeners believe Syed is 
an honest man wrongly convicted or a manipulative criminal, understanding his character as 
something primarily ‘internal’ and ‘individual’ risks eliding the other elements that make Syed’s 
character such a powerful cultural force.  
In an extension of popular and philosophical accounts of character, the field of rhetoric 
offers a framework for conceiving of character as something more than the internal possession of an 
individual. In particular, the ancient Greek concept of ethos—a word often translated into English as 
“character”—provides a useful starting point for thinking more broadly about character. While 
                                                      
7 Late in Serial Episode 11, “Rumors,” Koenig also tacitly gives voice to this cultural assumption about 
character. While in the process of weighing whether or not she would have voted to acquit Syed if she had 
been on the jury, she exclaims, “No way could Adnan do it. Not the Adnan that I knew. He didn’t have it in 
him.” Rather than leaning on factual evidence from the case, her logic reverts to notions of character and 
specifically to the idea that character resides “in him.”  
8 For an example of a philosophical text that, like Aristotle, views virtue as a characteristic of an individual, 
see Hursthouse.  
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Aristotle, in the Rhetoric, offers a narrow description of ethos as a linguistic display of character that 
only exists in the words of a specific text, subsequent scholars have since complicated this vision of 
rhetorical character. Rosalind J. Gabin, for instance, acknowledges that rhetorical character “includes 
the ethos of the audience along with that of the speaker” (107); and Stephen Yarbrough asserts that 
ethos is best understood “interactionally,” as the “set of social relations we project upon a situation 
that determines how we interact with things” (499). Building on these definitions, Karen Burke 
LeFevre argues that ethos “appears in that socially created space, in the ‘between,’ the point of 
intersection between speaker and writer and listener and reader” (45-46). Together, these researchers 
highlight the interactive and sociocultural dimensions of ethos. This rhetorical perspective 
underscores the ways that character functions less like a quality that resides within an individual 
person and more as a force that arises from that person’s ongoing interactions with the world. 
Rhetoric, in short, paints a picture of ethos not as internal and individualized but rather as emergent 
and collective.  
Nevertheless, while rhetoric makes visible the more elaborate workings of character, the 
concept of ethos only implicitly addresses the temporal aspects of character—the building and the 
accumulating of character over time—that philosophical and everyday discourses take for granted. 
And when rhetorical scholarship about ethos does address time, it tends to focus on two temporal 
extremes: the timely ethos and the timeless ethos. On one hand, for instance, rhetoricians 
understand ethos as part of rhetorical invention and a product of discourse. Aristotle calls this ethos 
“artistic” or “technic” because it is crafted by the rhetor and, as Ruth Amossy explains, “built at the 
level of uttering” (20). Similarly, Sharon Crowley and Debra Hawhee give this timely display of 
character the term “invented” (197) ethos because it is created anew for each subsequent 
engagement. In terms of time, therefore, this invented ethos is only temporary. On the other hand, 
this same body of scholarship also identifies a second kind of ethos that is, as Aristotle describes it, 
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“inartistic” or “atechnic,” meaning that it is not part of rhetorical invention. This inartistic ethos 
precedes the speech act and, Aristotle suggests, is beyond the control of the speaker. Crowley and 
Hawhee describe this phenomenon as a “situated” ethos that necessarily invokes power relations 
(197). Race, class, gender, sexuality, ability and authoritative roles give shape—unjustly, in many 
cases—to a rhetor’s situated ethos even before communication occurs. Amossy’s notion of a “prior 
ethos” similarly highlights the importance of social status and pre-figured authority in ethos. She 
assigns this kind of rhetorical character the adjective “prior” because this ethos exists before any 
single rhetorical engagement. In terms of time, therefore, rhetorical theories of ethos typically 
position character as either fleeting or fixed. Despite this apparent dichotomy, this body of 
scholarship does not suggest that these two aspects of ethos are unrelated or independent. In fact, 
they appear to assume a foundational connection between invented ethos and prior ethos; and it is 
precisely this relationship between one’s short-term and long-term ethos that I seek to further 
investigate in this dissertation. Thus, while the concept of ethos brings sociocultural and 
interactional richness to the idea of character, rhetorical notions of ethos could still be further 
expanded to more fully attend to the ways that the fluid force of character unfolds over time.9  
In this dissertation, therefore, I aim to augment understandings of character by casting in 
high relief the temporal dimensions of ethos that emphasize how much of character’s rhetorical 
power derives from its ongoing relationship with time. To do so, I complicate culturally accepted 
notions of character as an internal set of qualities by using the rhetorical idea of ethos to underscore 
the ways that character emerges from a deep and active entanglement with self, other, culture, 
history, materiality, and technologies. At the same time, I leverage the intuitive cultural assumption 
that character builds over time to expand rhetorical notions of temporality in an effort to better 
                                                      
9 See Chapter 2, “Accumulating Character Over Time,” for a more detailed discussion of rhetorical theories 
of ethos and their implications for understanding the relationship between character and time.  
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articulate how character accomplishes some of its most potent cultural work over time. And 
although the sociological concept of ‘reputation’ might similarly sketch the basic shape of character 
as it grows over time, I demonstrate how a more temporally attuned rhetorical model of ethos can 
make visible the cumulative dynamics that make reputations such a suasive cultural force.10 In this 
way, what I call cumulative ethos broadens rhetorical notions of time in an effort to deepen our cultural 
understanding of character and, ultimately, to highlight the complex temporal dynamics that make 
ethos such a rhetorically significant force in the world.  
 
Defining the Rhetorical Language of Character and Time 
To understand character and time through the lens of rhetoric first requires defining 
rhetoric’s key terms for temporality and character. While subsequent chapters offer a more thorough 
exploration of these ideas, this section outlines the rhetorical features that give these ideas their 
conceptual richness and therefore make them well suited for this investigation.  
 
Rhetorical Terminology for Character 
In rhetoric, the term most closely linked with character is ethos. Although rhetorical 
scholarship has identified many different facets of ethos, two key attributes distinguish it from 
related concepts such as persona, identity, and subjectivity. Unlike these other terms, ethos is always 
both rhetorical and ethical. Of the extant Greek texts, Aristotle’s Rhetoric provides the earliest and most 
detailed articulation of ethos.11 Along with logos and pathos, Aristotle positions ethos as one of the 
                                                      
10 For more information the sociological concept of reputation, see Fine (Difficult and Sticky). For a more 
thorough discussion of the overlapping relationship between reputation and cumulative ethos, see Chapter 2 
“Accumulating Character Over Time.” 
11 While the concept of ethos was certainly important to classical thinkers prior to Aristotle, most remaining 
texts from earlier periods only gesture implicitly toward theories of ethos. Plato, for instance, never uses the 
term ethos in a rhetorical context. And yet, in the Phaedrus, Socrates’ recitation of Lysias’ love speech with a 
towel over his head raises important questions about the relationship between the speaker and his ethos 
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three pisteis, or proofs, for rhetorical argumentation. For him, ethos is the fabricated product of 
discourse, unmoored from the speaking subject. Accordingly, even if a speaker’s ‘real’ character 
exists, Aristotle suggests that only the discursive ethos crafted by the rhetor seems to have a 
rhetorical impact on its audience. While many other thinkers, past and present, disagree with this 
manufactured conceptualization of ethos, they all nonetheless agree that ethos arises from a 
rhetorical tradition. Isocrates, for instance, believes in a much closer relationship between a 
discursive ethos and the speaker’s self, but his model is still situated in the context of rhetorical 
education. And in a more contemporary example, Kristie S. Fleckenstein complicates traditional 
assumptions about the boundaries of ethos with the help of Batesonian cybernetics, but she too 
views ethos as something that emerges from the crucible of rhetorical negotiation.12 In sum, 
although ethos may be a contested concept, the plurality of ways that it has been theorized, 
analyzed, and practiced under the banner of rhetoric affirms its unequivocally rhetorical nature.  
In addition to being rhetorical, ethos is always ethical. The link between ethos and ethics 
derives from their shared etymological history. The Oxford English Dictionary traces ethics to the 
Latin ethicus, a word which likely derives from the Greek ἠθικός (ethikos) and, by extension, ἦθος 
(ethos). According to the Liddell-Scott-Jones Greek-English Lexicon, ἦθος (ethos) denotes one’s 
“moral character.” While scholars have subsequently expanded this definition to include the “social, 
ethical, and located dimensions” of ethos, “moral character” nevertheless remains central to the 
understanding of ἦθος (ethos) and its connection to ethics (Ryan, Myers, and Jones, 6).13 But ἦθος 
                                                      
(Baumlin and Baumlin). Isocrates, too, does not provide a comprehensive discussion of ethos despite the fact 
that ethos is crucial to his understanding of paideia, the classical educational system that, in his view, builds 
character. For more historiography about ethos, see Baumlin (“Ethos”).  
12 For more information about the relationship between Kristie Fleckenstein’s provocative concept of 
“cyberethos” and my notion of “cumulative ethos,” see Chapter 2 “Accumulating Character Over Time.”  
13 Hereafter, I refer to Kathleen J. Ryan, Nancy Myers, and Rebecca Jones—the editors of Rethinking Ethos: A 
Feminist Ecological Approach to Rhetoric—as RMJ. Together, the editors and authors in this collection highlight 
the many different ways that hegemonic authorities and discourses limit the ethical positions available to 
women and marginalized populations in contemporary American culture. 
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(ethos) is not the only etymological root of the rhetorical concept of ethos; it also stems from the 
similar Greek word ἔθος (eethos). While ἦθος (ethos) clearly points to morals and ethics, ἔθος 
(eethos), as Arthur B. Miller explains, “is not character, but ‘an accustomed place’” (310). Michael J. 
Hyde further describes ἔθος (eethos) as a “custom and habit” or as “haunts or abodes,” none of 
which necessarily imply ethics.14 At first glance, then, these two etymological antecedents—ἦθος 
(ethos) and ἔθος (eethos)—appear to offer discordant views of rhetorical ethos. Most researchers, 
however, see rhetorical ethos as a capacious term that embraces and even evokes the plurality of 
denotations and connotations implied in both ancient Greek words.15 In Rethinking Ethos: A Feminist 
Ecological Approach to Rhetoric, for instance, the editors claim that “[s]cholars generally agree that these 
two etymologies (of ἔθος and ἦθος) are consubstantial with each other” (6). In their view, both 
Greek terms are important to crafting a rich understanding of rhetorical ethos. And although 
scholars sometimes disagree about which valences of rhetorical ethos are most important, they all 
appear to operate from a baseline understanding that ethos involves ethics.16 Or, as Judy Holiday 
succinctly puts it, “the study of ethics (ethos+ikos) [might be] understood as ‘that which pertains to 
ethos’” (389). In short, while ethos may, at certain times, evoke different facets of its etymological 
history, ethics is always principal among them.  
Together, the rhetorical and ethical aspects of ethos comprise its most important features. 
These twin elements can, moreover, help to distinguish between ethos and other related concepts 
                                                      
14 Leaning on Heidegger’s understanding of ontology, Hyde characterizes rhetorical ethos as “dwelling 
places” (xiii). For more information about Hyde’s complex ontological-theoretical picture of ethos, see the 
introduction to his edited collection, The Ethos of Rhetoric. 
15 Miller, in fact, provides a clear explication of the relationship between ethos and eethos and its implications 
for rhetoric. He writes: “Such courses of action repeated become habits, and habits repeated until well 
ingrained become states or dispositions. It is thus that habitual behavior or ἔθος is indicative of a man’s 
character or ἦθος” (313). Although Miller does not explicitly invoke chronos, his argument suggests that ἔθος 
(eethos) and ἦθος (ethos) are linked by a rhetorical theory of time that positions ἦθος (ethos) as the product 
of repeated displays of ἔθος (eethos). 
16 For an example of researchers who foreground different aspects of ethos but still embrace an underlying 
sense of ethos as ethical, see the many contributors to RMJ. 
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such as persona, subjectivity, and identity. Although each of these terms overlaps in certain ways 
with ethos, they are also distinct from ethos. Spelling out the similarities and differences between 
these imbricated ideas can illuminate not only the concept of ethos but also its relationship to other 
key concepts in the humanities.17 Nedra Reynolds echoes this sentiment when she argues for “the 
potential of ethos to open up more spaces in which to study writers’ subject positions or identity 
formations, especially to examine how writers establish authority and enact responsibility from 
positions not traditionally considered authoritative” (326). Rather than conflating subject position 
and identity formation with ethos, Reynolds highlights how researching one of these terms could 
elucidate the others through their collective proximity. In that spirit, I further delimit the notion of 
ethos that informs this dissertation by clarifying its relationship to other concepts that also guide 
rhetoric’s understanding of the human person as a factor in persuasion.  
 
Persona, Identity, and Subjectivity in Understanding the Rhetoric of Character 
While ethos and persona are sometimes used interchangeably in everyday discourse, from a 
rhetorical perspective, they have distinct points of convergence and divergence. In his analytical 
comparison of these two terms, Roger D. Cherry laments that “ethos and persona are often conflated, 
despite the fact that there are good historical and conceptual grounds for maintaining a distinction 
between them” (385).18 Ethos, he explains, comes from a rhetorical tradition in ancient Greece, 
while the Latin word persona derives from the Roman literary and theatrical tradition. Similarly, R. 
C. Elliot’s research reveals how persona “refers originally to a device of transformation and 
                                                      
17 The relationship between ethos and other similar terms changes over time as those ideas circulate 
in different historical-cultural contexts. For a detailed historiography of ethos and its near synonyms, 
see Baumlin.  
18 Edwin Black, for instance, blends “ethos” and “persona” with Wayne Booth’s notion of the implied author. 
For an abridged list of other authors who merge these concepts, see Cherry (393).  
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concealment on the theatrical stage” (21). A persona is, in brief, a theatrical mask.19 It is wholly 
fabricated and marks the difference between fiction and reality. In this sense, a fictitious and 
deliberately crafted persona seems to align with Aristotle’s view that ethos is an artistic and 
discursive product of rhetorical invention. Yet despite this similarity, a persona demarcates the 
creation of a fictional subject who is distinct from the actor who plays that character. An Aristotelian 
ethos, on the other hand, seeks to conflate, for rhetorical effect, the speaker with the speaker’s 
ethos. This difference points to the subtle but important ways that persona and ethos have an 
uneven relationship to rhetoric. Insofar as literary characters or texts function rhetorically in culture, 
a persona may be rhetorical, like ethos.20 But ethos and persona are rhetorical in different ways: the 
mask of a persona marks the boundary between art(ifice) and artist, whereas the techne of ethos 
deliberately blends artist and art(ifice).  
The more significant distinction between these two terms, however, involves ethics. Persona 
only sometimes engages ethics, while ethos, on the other hand, is always ethical. Unlike the ethics 
implied by the etymology of ethos, the act of donning a mask and inhabiting a fictional persona does 
not necessarily invoke ethics. Sometimes adopting a persona may have ethical consequences, but 
other times it may only be a form of entertainment. Likewise, the term “personality”—an 
etymological cousin of persona—does not always imply an ethics. In colloquial English, personality 
often refers to behavioral and linguistic markers of something akin to an individual’s character. But 
having a funny or shy personality is not an ethical act; it is simply a trait that an individual exhibits. 
And while a speaker’s personality may—like their persona—be rhetorical, it is not necessarily 
                                                      
19 For more information about other meanings of persona, including an actor’s “role” (e.g. dramatis personae) 
and a citizen’s “social role,” see Cherry (390). 
20 For more information about rhetorical aspects of fictional narratives, see Booth and Phelan (Living and 
Narrative). 
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ethical.21 In sum, while ethos and persona overlap to a certain extent in their relationship to rhetoric, 
the ethical implications of ethos mark the primary difference between it and persona or personality.  
Like persona, the concept of identity also articulates salient human aspects of rhetorical 
practice, and it too shares subtle similarities and differences with ethos. Communal identities, for 
example, are important to constitutive rhetoric. While other thinkers—especially twentieth century 
rhetoricians Wayne Booth, Kenneth Burke, and Edwin Black—anticipated constitutive rhetoric in 
their work, James Boyd White first used the term in 1985. He describes constitutive rhetoric as “the 
art of constituting character, community, and culture in language” (37). Accordingly, constitutive 
rhetoric denotes the idealistic process of uniting a speaker and a heterogeneous audience around 
shared interests. But it doesn’t always take a village to constitute a rhetorical identity. In Identity’s 
Strategy: Rhetorical Selves in Conversion, Dana Anderson contends that “first-person identity 
constitution” is also rhetorical. Although philosophy often positions an individual subject’s identity 
as an ontological state, Anderson argues for identity as “a kind of persuasive strategy, as a means of 
moving audiences toward certain beliefs or actions” (4). For him, “identity matters as something that 
one does to an audience through the expression of who or what one is” (4). In short, Anderson’s 
articulation of individual identity is irrefutably rhetorical, just like ethos.  
And yet, despite their shared rhetorical roots, identity and ethos do not have quite the same 
relationship to ethics. For instance, Anderson offers examples of identities by asking, “Are you a 
father, a Croat, a Christian, or aren’t you?” (98). While each of these nouns clearly sketches an 
identity, they do not immediately imply an ethical position. The father, the Croat, and the Christian 
could be good or bad; the noun alone does not indicate an ethical position. On the other hand, the 
                                                      
21 Like persona and personality, the term “charisma” refers to an ineffable yet potent rhetorical force 
that some individuals possess, but it does not necessarily refer to a set of ethical characteristics. For 
more information about “charismatic authority,” see Weber.  
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adjectives used to describe someone’s ethos clearly signal ethical positions. Words such as 
“dishonest” and “trustworthy” all point toward ethical positions that the father, Croat, or Christian 
might inhabit. And while some identities, such as ‘neo-Nazi,’ may be so thoroughly marked by 
culture that they connote an ethical position, they are the exception rather than the rule.22 In short, 
the primary difference between these terms involves ethics: ethos always involves the ethical, 
whereas identity only sometimes has ethical implications.  
 Similar to persona and identity, the concept of subjectivity also overlaps with and deviates 
from ethos in ways that are important to rhetoric. For example, although subject formation and 
ethos construction are distinct activities, they are both deeply intertwined with rhetoric. In ancient 
Greece, the educational system, or paideia, played an important role not only in rhetorical training 
but also in constituting masculine subjectivity. Since then, researchers have made visible the ways 
that rhetorical activity is not wholly controlled by autonomous human subjects. Rather, rhetors are 
also shaped—or “hailed,” Althusser would say—by the same cultural forces that impact 
subjectivity.23 Indeed, generations of feminist and critical theorists have demonstrated how unequal 
power relations restrict the ethotic possibilities available for marginalized subjects. Race, class, 
                                                      
22 Wars can also mark certain identities with ethical implications. The balkanization of Yugoslavia, for 
instance, tinged Serbs, Croats, Bosnians, and Albanian Kosovars alike with different ethical markings. Over 
time, war crimes began to stick like brands to these different ethnic groups, blurring their identity and ethos 
in ways that have lasted long after the conflict ended. Serbs, for example, are—depending on your point of 
view—alternatively viewed as victims or villains. This sedimentation of ethos and identity did not, however, 
occur instantaneously. It accrued over time; and its rhetorical results linger into the politics of today. This is, 
in fact, my aim in this dissertation: to provide a model for tracing the ongoing ossification and erosion of 
ethos over time so that researchers and practitioners alike can better understand the ways that ethos, like 
identity, evolves and has a trans-situational rhetorical impact that extends beyond a single moment.  
23 Sensing this symbiotic rhetorical relationship between subjects and their rhetorical contexts, Kendall Philips 
coins the phrase “rhetorical maneuver” to describe how subjects negotiate their ongoing encounters with 
hegemony. He explains that a rhetorical maneuver locates subjects’ agency “in the space between the subject 
position and the subject form” (325), a phrasing that highlights how humans operate in a perpetual rhetorical 
dance between our own attempts at self-positioning and the ways that external forces attempt to position us 
against our will. In sum, Philips’ “rhetorical maneuver” underscores the ways that the complex negotiation of 
subject formation, like ethos construction, is central to rhetoric. For more information about the push and 
pull of rhetoric, subjectivity, and cultural forces, see Bitzer; Vatz; and Consigny.  
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gender, sexuality, ability, language, and other factors influence the construction and interpretation of 
a subject’s ethos.24 This scholarship underscores both the damaging ways that ethos is constrained 
by subjectivity and the creative ways that marginalized subjects subvert hegemonic structures of 
power with their ethos.  
Despite the ways that ethos and subjectivity overlap in terms of rhetoric, they each have a 
slightly different relationship to ethics. For instance, the power relations that govern subject 
formation give rise to a binary ethical system that draws on Foucault’s definition of ethics as “the 
conscious practice of freedom” (284). According to this description, the ability to act freely is good, 
and the inability to act freely is bad. Because structures of power delimit degrees of freedom, this 
ethical model can be stated even more simply: equal power is good; unequal power is bad. 
Admittedly, power relations are often more complicated than ‘good guy’ and ‘bad guy’ caricatures, 
but the underlying ethical logic nonetheless remains bifurcated based on positions of power and the 
concomitant ability to act freely or not. Of course, ethos too can be reduced to simplistic notions of 
good and bad character, but ethos must additionally contend with the nuanced differences between 
virtues. Honesty and loyalty, for example, are both good qualities, but they are also distinct concepts 
with different relationships to society and culture that, in turn, impact rhetorical activity in subtle—
but no less important—ways. Thus, while power inequalities undoubtedly shape ethos construction, 
ethos also addresses ethical issues in excess of power relations. In other words, subjectivity informs 
                                                      
24 In Rethinking Ethos, Ryan, Myers, and Jones collect contributions that thoroughly interrogate this 
relationship between power, subject position, and ethos. They identify and explicate the ways that 
“women—particularly those who are not white, middle class, and heterosexual—face countless 
challenges in constructing an authoritative Aristotelian ethos” (vii). In response, they offer the 
concept of “feminist ecological ethos” as “an alternative ethos construction that can be used by a 
variety of rhetors” (8) who seek to resist dominant cultural paradigms. For other examples about the 
ways that marginalized women wrestle with ethos formation in cultural contexts that subvert them, 
see Pittman and Skinner. 
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the concept of ethos, but ethos also reaches beyond subjectivity to account for additional ethical 
concerns that emerge from rhetorical interactions.  
In sum, subjectivity, identity, and persona all make important contributions to an 
understanding of the human aspects of rhetoric. And although these ideas overlap with ethos in 
striking ways, ethos ultimately speaks to rhetorical and ethical issues that, in one way or another, 
extend beyond the scope of these ideas. Of all these terms, then, ethos is the concept best equipped 
to shed light on the rhetorical implications of character as it evolves over time.  
 
Rhetorical Terminology for Time 
In rhetorical scholarship, the dominant time-related term is kairos. Often translated from 
ancient Greek into English as “right timing” or “the opportune time” (Sipiora and Baumlin, 1), 
kairos has long proved a concept integral to rhetorical theory. Among all of the concepts that 
comprise rhetorical practice, Phillip Sipiora and James S. Baumlin argue that “kairos was the 
cornerstone of rhetoric in the Golden Age of Greece” (3). Kairos is significant to rhetoric because 
rhetoric has always resisted prescription. Without a fixed set of rhetorical rules to follow, the 
concept of kairos helps rhetors—whether in ancient Greece or today—respond prudently to the 
nuanced exigencies that emerge from each unique rhetorical situation. And although the popularity 
of kairos may have waned from the Renaissance into the early twentieth century, James Kinneavy’s 
1986 article, “Kairos: A Neglected Concept in Classical Rhetoric” sparked a renewed scholarly 
interest in rhetoric’s most important time-related idea.25 Since then, the concept of kairos has played 
                                                      
25 For a detailed description of the shifting significance of kairos across different cultural moments, see 
Kinneavy (79-85). To read subsequent discussions of kairos involving Kinneavy and other scholars, see 
Kinneavy and Eskin as well as Thompson.  
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an essential role in many subfields of rhetoric, suggesting that kairos is again central to rhetorical 
understandings of time.26  
And yet, the emphasis that kairos places on the here-and-now of temporality struggles to 
account for the ways that rhetorical forces, such as ethos, sometimes unfold over time. While kairos 
provides a flexible way of thinking about rhetorical responses to individual moments in time, it is 
limited by its privileging of the immediate context. But another concept of time—chronos—co-
existed with kairos in ancient Greece, even though it historically played a less obvious role in 
rhetorical practice. Sipiora and Baumlin explain that chronos refers to “linear time” that can be 
measured in length or age (2). Unlike kairos, chronos suggests duration and regularity, and its 
measurability means that chronos is often assigned a numerical signifier. A four-hour graduation 
ceremony, weekly meetings, and the rings that delineate the age of a tree: these all demarcate the 
accumulation of time and distinguish chronos from the momentary and subjective nature of kairos. 
Despite these differences, John E. Smith identifies a crucial relationship between rhetorical 
understandings of kairos and chronos. According to Smith, if kairos refers to the ability of a rhetor 
to respond to the unique exigencies of one specific moment, then it also implies that the rhetor can 
distinguish ‘this one moment’ from a series of ‘previous moments’ or from an array of possible 
‘subsequent moments.’ This leads Smith to provocatively claim that “kairos presupposes chronos” 
(48). But even more than a presupposition, this example suggests that chronos is the sine qua non of 
kairos.  
Although chronos may not be the only non-kairotic concept of time with implications for 
rhetoric, I use it here because of its clarity in speaking to the same rhetorical concerns that concepts 
such as kairos and ethos have long foregrounded for rhetorical study. I also employ chronos because 
                                                      
26 For an excellent example of the contemporary importance of kairos to rhetorical scholarship, see Rhetoric 
and Kairos: Essays in History, Theory, and Praxis, edited by Sipiora and Baumlin.  
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of the clear opportunity that exists to bring this idea into conversation with scholarship that, while 
also concerned with temporality, leaves undiscussed much of what makes time so interesting and so 
complex in the suasive workings of character. Using chronos as a starting point for crafting a 
rhetorical understanding of time can, for instance, help account for precisely the kinds of rhetorical 
temporalities that make Syed’s character in Serial such a complicated and powerful rhetorical force. 
Kairos alone cannot explain the ways that his character ebbs and flows from one situation to the 
next. Syed’s story begs for a temporal framework that makes visible the evolving imprint of Syed’s 
character on the world around him. Without chronos as an additional way of understanding the 
relationship between rhetoric and time, we risk overlooking the subtle yet profound ways that 
rhetorical forces like ethos often linger from moment to moment, sometimes accreting slowly and 
other times erupting dramatically but always with poignant stakes for rhetorical activity. This 
dissertation therefore aims to articulate a concept of chronos that magnifies the crucial temporal 
dimensions of ethos.   
 
Widening the Time of Ethos for Rhetoric 
Tracing the rhetorical implications of character as it evolves over time first requires better 
understanding how the accumulation of time matters to rhetoric. I begin therefore in Chapter One, 
“Accumulated Time” by examining Aristotle’s description of chronos in the Physics. Not only does 
the Physics offer the earliest and most detailed extant account of chronos, but it also functions as a 
productive counterpoint to Aristotle’s discussion of kairos in the Rhetoric. Although the concepts of 
kairos and chronos certainly preceded Aristotle’s writing, his thorough discussion of them both 
suggests that they may have shared an equally prominent role in ancient Greek culture even if kairos 
now appears to be the more salient temporal term in rhetoric. And while the Physics—a text often 
associated with natural philosophy—may seem like an unlikely site for rhetorical inquiry, my analysis 
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emphasizes how Aristotle’s definition of chronos in terms of both dunamis and kinesis implicitly links 
this cumulative notion of temporality to rhetorical activity. Indeed, as it is described in the Physics, 
chronos functions as so much more than its typical depiction as a quantitative measure. Rather, it is 
a dynamic and subjective temporality that arises from, and rhetorically impacts, worldly interactions. 
Working within the historical context in which these twin concepts of time were developed, I then 
show how the public use of Athenian water clocks, or clepsydra, elucidates the important role that 
chronos played in everyday rhetorical activity in ancient Greece. Finally, I use Aristotle’s surprising 
ambivalence toward anthropocentric views of chronos as an opportunity to extend his views on time 
with the scholarship of Karen Barad and other contemporary scholars who are concerned with 
materiality and nonhumans. Integrating their ideas of matter with Aristotle’s perspective on time 
crafts a more complicated picture of accumulated time as a rhetorically significant material-discursive 
force that emerges from the deep entanglement of nonhuman and human ecologies. Altogether, this 
first chapter sketches a theory of time that makes visible the cumulative impact of rhetorical forces 
over time.  
To flesh out the intricate ways that this model of accumulated time casts light on less 
obvious but no less essential temporal aspects of ethos, I turn in subsequent chapters to a collection 
of sites where the temporal dimensions of character are vital to comprehending the suasive power of 
ethos. Though the temporalities that I examine in each example fluctuate from linear to accelerated 
to abbreviated, they are all nevertheless cumulative. And it is precisely that flexible and shared sense 
of cumulative time that makes these instances uniquely positioned to underscore how variations in 
the accumulation of character alter the tenor and timeline of its persuasive impact. Together, then, 
these case studies offer an especially focused look at occasions when the most compelling rhetorical 
work of character is made legible by the temporal dynamics at play therein.  
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In Chapter Two, “Accumulating Character Over Time,” I layout the basic framework for 
understanding how a rhetorical sense of accumulated time expands understandings of ethos. 
Rhetorical scholarship traditionally describes ethos as either a product of discourse or a 
contextualized authority granted by social position; together, these complementary perspectives 
emphasize the temporal extremes of ethos as either a momentary kairotic element or a static 
background component. A rhetorical theory of accumulated time, on the other hand, illuminates the 
linkages between these two temporal poles and, in so doing, illustrates how the rhetorical imprint of 
an emergent ethos in one moment can linger, accrete, and bleed into other situations. To make 
visible the ways that this cumulative ethos operates, I examine a depiction of character that only makes 
sense when viewed through the lens of accumulated time: the trial of Socrates. Like criminals today, 
malefactors in ancient Greece were typically prosecuted for crimes committed at one specific 
moment in time. Socrates’ accusers, however, fail to identify a single isolated instance when the 
philosopher engaged in lawless behavior. Instead, they allege that, over the years of teaching at the 
Lyceum, Socrates had “corrupted the youth of Athens” (Apology). Through an analysis of multiple 
classical texts concerning the trial of Socrates, I demonstrate how rhetorical notions of time and 
character interact and, in so doing, foreground the cumulative rhetorical effects of Socrates’ ethos 
on the city of Athens. The trial of Socrates also displays how the idea of cumulative ethos overlaps 
to some extent with sociological notions of “reputation.” While these two concepts have much in 
common, Socrates’ trial highlights the ways that rhetorical aspects of time and character—those 
made visible by cumulative ethos—function both within and beyond the idea of reputation. In the 
end, viewing the trial of Socrates through the lens of cumulative ethos underscores the potent 
rhetorical impact that character can have over time on an individual’s life and on a larger 
community. 
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In Chapter Three, “Accelerating Character and Time Online,” I investigate how theories of 
circulation enhance this understanding of cumulative ethos. While oral and written accounts of 
character, like Socrates’ ethos in ancient Greece, often invite linear models of accumulation, the 
accelerated circulation of digital media on the Internet disrupts the temporal regularity that often 
governs the evolution of ethos over time. After first providing a detailed discussion of scholarship 
that outlines existing temporal understandings of rhetorical character in online environments, I then 
develop the paired concepts of rhetorical saturation and rhetorical ruptures. These two ideas that function 
in ongoing tension with each other and shape the irregular accumulation of ethos over time in 
networked ecologies. To explicate how these twin ideas influence the online circulation of ethos, I 
examine rapper and celebrity Kanye West’s character as it circulates through a series of digitally 
mediated moments surrounding the staggered 2016 release of his song, “I Miss the Old Kanye.” 
Here, West’s ethos makes a particularly compelling case study because of its temporal complexity. In 
some situations, the online archive of West’s rhetorical character resembles a top-down model of 
circulation akin to traditional print distribution. In these instances, his ethos slowly but surely 
saturates these digital networks. Other times, West’s ethos whirls around the Internet in unexpected 
yet significant ways facilitated by dense networks of social media users liking, re-posting, and re-
tweeting content in ways that disrupt the steady accretion of West’s online ethos. These 
decentralized and nearly instantaneous interactions in a social network lead to ruptures in West’s 
ethos. Together, these paired concepts of saturation and rupture form a rhetorical dynamic that helps 
makes sense of the uneven ways that ethos accumulates over time as it moves through some of 
today’s fastest-moving rhetorical ecologies.  
As an extension of this accelerated consideration of cumulative ethos, Chapter Four, 
“Approximating Character Without Time in (Crypto)Commerce,” investigates what happens when 
certain rhetorical situations require such a quick response that they do not allow enough time for 
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character to accumulate. Twenty-first century commerce, for example, often operates so fast that 
participants do not have sufficient time to build their cumulative ethos. This, in turn, makes it 
difficult to generate trust in commercial exchanges with strangers. To accommodate the shortage of 
time to develop character, fiat currencies such as U.S. dollars usually provide a baseline level of 
confidence necessary to make possible commerce between people who are short on time. Sellers, for 
example, may not trust buyers who they do not know, but when both parties trust in the value of the 
dollar, they are still likely to engage in commerce. Currencies, in this way, function as credible 
surrogates for cumulative ethos. The advent of cryptocurrencies, however, tests the limits of 
rhetorical character by decentering cumulative ethos from human subjects and also disrupting the 
timeline for its accretion. Bitcoin, for instance, fosters credibility by using encryption techniques and 
the blockchain technology as proxies for rhetorical character. Despite the innovation of this 
solution, my analysis reveals how cryptocurrencies reduce the nuances of rhetorically inflected 
human interactions—including the concept of cumulative ethos itself—to binary economic 
outcomes. Without seeing Bitcoin through the lens of cumulative ethos, therefore, we risk not only 
overlooking the centrality of both character and time to commerce but also missing the 
consequences of attempting to replace a complex rhetorical figure like ethos with a mechanical 
facsimile like Bitcoin. My investigation in this chapter thus highlights the rhetorical and ethical 
implications of circumventing temporal constraints in commerce by relying on cryptocurrencies to 
mimic the work of cumulative ethos.  
In sum, this dissertation emphasizes the importance of accumulated time to rhetorical 
activity, and especially to the concept of ethos. More specifically, it sketches both the challenges and 
possibilities of using accumulated time as a lens through which to view the rhetorical work of 
character. I hope, moreover, that the cumulative weight of my analysis makes a compelling case for 
the merits of understanding ethos as a force that accomplishes some of its most potent rhetorical 
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work across a collection of interrelated moments. After all, rhetoric—like ethos—never operates on 
a temporal island. Instead, time stitches together the rhetorical implications of our interactions, 
lending them significance in their accumulation.  
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Chapter One 
Accumulated Time: Theorizing Chronos for Rhetoric  
 
Judicial courts in ancient Athens often featured outstanding displays of oratory, but the 
humble machine that shaped these speeches is often overlooked. Called a clepsydra, this device had 
two large reservoirs, one perched above the other (Figure 1).27 Before a trial began, a randomly-
selected juror filled the top tank with a predetermined amount of water. When the defendant started 
his speech, the juror removed a wax plug from a hole at the bottom of the top container, allowing 
the water to flow into the lower basin. The defendant was required to complete his speech by the 
time the upper chamber was empty. The use of water clocks like these in Athenian courts indicates 
that the Greeks understood a simple but important fact about rhetoric: persuasion takes time. 
The water clock marks one way that accumulated time played an integral role in the 
rhetorical activity of Athenian trials. Although a defendant’s speech may be partly fashioned by 
kairotic exigencies knit up in the politics of the moment, the flowing water of the clepsydra gives the 
same speech a predefined duration that necessarily impacts its content and arrangement. The 
amount of time allotted for a defendant’s speech depended on the perceived severity of the alleged 
crime and also on certain material costs (Hill 6). The Athenian jurors, for instance, were 
compensated two or three obols per day for their labor; and the number of trials that could be 
conducted in a single day depended on their length and the amount of daylight that time of year.28 In 
                                                      
27 For more information about water clocks and Athenian trials, see Hill; Lang; and Landels.  
28 See Lang for a short but clear description of Athenian democracy. See MacDowell for an incredibly 
thorough articulation of the Athenian legal system. See Buckley for a larger picture of Athenian political and 
social life.  
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this way, the time allotted for a judicial speech in ancient Athens was not just a subjective human 
judgment; it was also determined by the physical conditions of its delivery.29  
 
Figure 1: The top vessel of a Greek clepsydra from the fifth century BCE. 
 
The relationship between accumulated time and rhetoric in Athenian courts, however, 
extends beyond water clocks. Certain aspects of a defendant’s previous rhetorical engagements with 
the Athenian citizenry may also influence the jury’s decision in a particular vote. For instance, 
previous displays of a defendant’s ethos as a farmer, soldier, or juror might sway—in excess of the 
discursive ethos that he crafts in a particular speech—the audience’s decision. In this way, the 
persuasive impact of a defendant’s oratory is influenced by the cumulative force of his prior 
                                                      
29 Word limits in contemporary print publications offer another example of spatio-temporal lengths impacting 
suasive content. Like Athenian trials, word limits in print journals are both subjectively determined and 
shaped by material costs. Editors sometimes grant more space to more important articles, but as a whole, 
these publications are still limited by the economics of paper, ink, binding, shipping, and so on. Digital 
publications, too, have important albeit less conspicuous material costs, including servers, electricity, and so 
forth.  
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rhetorical interactions from days, weeks, and years past. Put differently, and in a rephrasing of John 
Donne: no rhetorical event is an island. Rather, time links them together. 
Still, scholarship has yet to fully account for the complexities of time’s relationship to 
rhetoric. In Book 1 of the Rhetoric, Aristotle offers his well-known three species of rhetoric based 
largely on temporality. Forensic rhetoric, he explains, speaks to the past; epideictic rhetoric addresses 
the present; and deliberative rhetoric considers the future (I.3.4). While this system for categorizing 
rhetorical temporalities may seem fruitful for rhetoric, it is nevertheless limited in at least two ways. 
First, it delineates rhetorical time based only on the content of a speech; and second, it relies primarily 
on discursive representations of time. In short, Aristotle’s emphasis on language obfuscates the 
extra-textual ways that time works rhetorically in a given situation.30  
Even the powerful sophistic concept of kairos, a critical component of rhetorical practice, 
only highlights certain aspects of the complicated relationship between rhetoric and time. Sipiora 
and Baumlin—echoing James Kinneavy (80) before them—identify kairos as the “cornerstone” of 
rhetoric (3). Indeed, the non-prescriptive nature of rhetoric means that its practitioners must be 
equipped to identify exigencies and to recognize the “right time” (Sipiora and Baumlin 1) to respond 
to them. But privileging the here-and-now of temporality risks obscuring the ways that persuasive 
forces also accumulate over time, waxing and waning as they slip from one moment to the next. 
Kairotic moments, after all, do not exist in a vacuum. They are preceded by a series of other kairotic 
moments, and those collective histories seep—with varying degrees of rhetorical strength—into the 
present. In the same way, a rhetorical interaction does not lose all its suasive power as soon as the 
                                                      
30 Michelle Ballif also notes the limitations of Aristotle’s theory and, in her Derridean articulation of rhetorical 
historiography, argues that rhetorical temporalities “can only be constructed outside of Aristotelian 
conceptions of the past, present, and future” (54). 
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moment passes. Rather, traces of each persuasive encounter linger and bleed into various rhetorical 
futures.31 
Collectively, these examples raise the question: what is time’s role in rhetoric? In this 
chapter, I mobilize rhetorical theory, history, and pedagogy in an effort to respond to this thread of 
inquiry. Ultimately, I seek to trace the material-discursive entanglement of humans, nonhumans, and 
time as they collectively contribute to the exertion and reception of suasive influence in a dense 
ecology of actants. As such, what I describe in this chapter is not a scientific, metaphysical, or even 
phenomenological picture of time. Instead, I aim to theorize a rhetorical understanding of time. Such 
a framework, I suggest, might help scholars better account for the accretive energy of rhetoric as it 
unfolds over time.  
 
Rhetoric and Non-Kairotic Time 
Rhetorical discussions of time often juxtapose the well-known idea of kairos with another 
Greek concept of time: chronos. A commonplace of these studies involves foregrounding the 
quantitative elements of chronos.32 Accordingly, researchers describe chronos as a “measurable” (Peeples, 
Rosinski, and Strickland 58) entity that is often tied to calculating devices like “clocks and calendars” 
(Kelly, Autry, and Mehlenbacher 230). Other researchers also emphasize the linear aspects of 
chronos.33 Leveraging the etymological links between chronos and “chronological” (Ballif “Writing the 
Event” 244), these writers describe chronos as a kind of “historical progression” (McCormick 438) 
that often marks “lengthy time periods” (Walker 220). Taken together, this collection of research 
                                                      
31 To be clear, I do not debate the centrality of kairos for rhetoric; it is, undoubtedly, an essential concept for 
understanding persuasion. Instead, I simply suggest opening theories of rhetoric to consider additional ways 
that time may impact suasive ecologies. 
32 See, for example, Jack; Rivers and Derksen; Hawhee (Bodily); and Brooke (“Forgetting”). 
33 See, for example, Longaker (“Why History?”); McCormick; Foley; and Crosby (“Cathedral” and “Kairos”).  
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underscores two key attributes of chronos—its linearity and its quantitative nature. Both have 
important implications for rhetorical theories of time. 
The most common way to theorize chronos in rhetorical scholarship involves positioning it as 
the foil of kairos. Megan Foley, for instance, argues: 
[k]airos is the time of contingency; chronos is the time of history. Kairos is a sense of time as 
occasion; chronos is a sense of time as duration. Kairos figures time as an episodic point; chronos 
figures time in a sequential line. Kairos emphasizes that rhetoric hinges on timely opportune 
moments; chronos emphasizes rhetoric’s historical contextualization. (71)  
Similarly, Nathaniel Rivers and Maarten Derksen succinctly explain: “Whereas chronos is a 
quantitative understanding of time—how much or how long—kairos is a qualitative understanding 
of time—is this moment opportune?” (639).34 In highlighting the differences between kairos and 
chronos, this research tends to stress the subjective and flexible nature of kairotic timing as the more 
salient concept for rhetorical theory. Doing so has, in turn, led to an important outpouring of 
research about kairos, stretching from James Kinneavy’s “Kairos: A Neglected Concept in Classical 
Rhetoric” to Phillip Sipiora and James S. Baumlin’s edited collection, Rhetoric and Kairos: Essays in 
History, Theory, and Practice, and to a host of subsequent scholarly activity.35 
But if the clepdsdra in ancient Greece are any indication, I suspect that chronos, too, has a more 
important role to play in rhetorical theory. And despite the pronounced differences between kairos 
and chronos, they are similar in at least this one way: they both play an important role in rhetorical 
activity like Athenian trails and other civic interactions. Indeed, John E. Smith notes that, in certain 
circumstances, “the chronos aspect [of time] reaches certain critical points at which a qualitative 
                                                      
34 For additional examples of kairos and chronos positioned as foils, see Crowley and Hawhee (66) and Brooke 
(“Forgetting” 790-1).  
35 It is no coincidence, I think, that Kairos: A Journal of Rhetoric, Technology, and Pedagogy released its first issue in 
January 1996, in the middle of this surge of scholarly interest in the concept of kairos.  
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character begins to emerge” (48).36 In ascribing a “qualitative character” to chronos, Smith suggests 
that chronos may, like kairos, be important to rhetorical activity. Although I do not fully agree with the 
qualitative/quantitative distinction that Smith seems to see as analogous to rhetorical/non-rhetorical 
elements, I am nonetheless intrigued by the possibility of figuring kairos and chronos as imbricated 
and complementary rather than as contradictory concepts. Thus, while the rhetorical nature of kairos 
has been thoroughly explored, I seek to shift the spotlight of theoretical inquiry toward the enticing 
rhetorical possibilities of chronos. As such, in this chapter, I ask: in what ways might chronos also be 
rhetorical?  
Although thinkers across a variety of disciplines, historical periods, and cultures have 
theorized temporality in many different ways, Aristotle’s description of chronos in the Physics proves 
significant to rhetoric because it emerges from a similar historical and cultural moment as the 
sophistic idea of kairos.37 Indeed, the centrality of kairos to rhetoric makes its counterpart, chronos, all 
the more valuable to rhetoric. The Physics offers, moreover, the oldest and most thorough 
description of chronos remaining from antiquity. Aristotle’s definition of time, in fact, prefigures the 
aforementioned rhetorical understandings of chronos as sequential and quantifiable. Furthermore, 
Aristotle’s Physics—as a text that interrogates the workings of the so-called “physical” or “natural” 
world—is uniquely positioned to speak to contemporary scholarly concerns about the intersections 
between rhetoric, materiality, and nonhumans. Given these advantages, Aristotle’s Physics provides a 
productive point of departure for constructing rhetorical theories of non-kairotic time.  
                                                      
36 Specifically, Smith identifies the aging of wine as an instance when chronos displays a quasi-subjective quality. 
37 While turning to the Physics may seem like an unusual choice for a rhetorician, I find value in research like 
Debra Hawhee’s Rhetoric in Tooth and Claw that conducts rhetorical inquiry across the Aristotelian canon of 
texts. Such intertextual research helps to contextualize concepts within Aristotle’s larger system of ideas and 
reaches beyond artificial editorial boundaries erected between fragments in the Corpus Aristotelicum. In addition 
to Hawhee, I follow a handful of other scholars who have already begun to mine the Physics for rhetorical 
implications. John Muckelbauer, for instance, shows how Aristotle’s discussion of topoi in the Physics shifts 
how scholars conceive of rhetorical invention. And in Rhetorical Realism, Scot Barnett demonstrates how 
Aristotle’s Physics harbors the seeds of a realist philosophy that was important to ancient rhetorics.  
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Despite the importance of chronos for understanding rhetorical temporalities, I do not 
advocate the adoption of neo-Aristotelian ideologies wholesale. Aristotle is, undoubtedly, a 
complicated early rhetorical figure. He has been rightly critiqued by postmodernists and 
poststructuralists for his over-reliance on logos and dialectic (Vitanza; Ballif “Writing the Third”), by 
rhetoricians for his hostility toward democracy (Haskins), and by critical theorists for his classism, 
racism, and sexism (Neel; Atwill). My aim in this chapter, however, is not to rehabilitate Aristotle as 
a seminal rhetorical thinker. Instead, I intend to investigate how this idea of chronos might function as 
a productive starting point for considering the importance of non-kairotic time to rhetoric, while 
recognizing that any theory crafted from his works must also acknowledge the broader complexities 
of his embattled ideas about nature and culture.  
To that end, in the rest of this chapter, I analyze Aristotle’s articulation of chronos in the 
Physics and consider how its intersections with contemporary theories of materiality might have 
important implications for rhetoric. First, I reveal how chronos is not a static and objective concept 
but rather a dynamic and rhetorical force. I explain, for example, how this description of chronos in 
terms of kinesis positions time as something that emerges from the interactions of entities in an 
ecology, much like rhetoric itself. Then, I show how the definition of chronos as a “number” is less a 
process of quantification and more a subjective act of naming and outlining temporal periods. Next, 
I reveal how productive ambiguities in Aristotle’s language suggest that this theory of time is not 
limited to humans alone. In this way, I argue that chronos functions as an integrated material-
discursive force that shapes and is shaped by nonhumans and humans alike. Finally, I underscore 
how Aristotle’s articulation of chronos in terms of “before and after” figures time as something that 
accumulates force over the course of subsequent rhetorical engagements. Together, these elements 
construct a nuanced picture of chronos that aims to shed more light on the intricate relationship 
between rhetoric and time. For rhetoricians, failing to acknowledge chronos risks limiting our 
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understanding of rhetorical activity to discrete isolated encounters and missing the ways that 
rhetorical forces percolate from moment to moment, accumulating varying degrees of potency.  
 
Chronos as Rhetorical Time 
Although often viewed as a treatise on natural philosophy, Aristotle’s Physics—and especially 
his discussion of chronos—has profound implications for the study and practice of rhetoric. 
Composed of eight books, the Physics constructs a theoretical framework for understanding things 
that have a physis, or nature. At the beginning of Book III, Aristotle offers a provocative definition 
of physis in terms of kinesis, or motion: “Nature,” he claims, is “a principle of motion and change” 
(III.i.12).38 Interestingly, kinesis also functions as a crucial component of Aristotle’s theory of time: 
he explains later that chronos is “the number of motion in respect of ‘before’ and ‘after’” 
(4.II.219b1).39 This description of chronos in terms of kinesis and physis marks an important departure 
from earlier thinkers who wrote about time. Instead of situating time in the idealistic Platonic realm 
of the Forms,40 Aristotle’s chronos arises from the vitality of the natural world. And unlike the 
Pythagoreans who viewed time as an eternal construct, this description of chronos in terms of kinesis 
locates time in the muddled relations of quotidian life.41  
                                                      
38 Kinesis is an expansive concept that is interchangeably—and confusingly—translated into English as 
“movement,” “motion,” or “change.” While the Physics explores many different facets of the movements that 
comprise the natural world, at the beginning of Book III, Aristotle offers a broad definition of kinesis meant 
to encapsulate its remarkable variation. He writes: “kinesis is the actuality of that which potentially is, qua 
such” (III.i.201a10-11). And in Book V, Aristotle enumerates four different kinds of kinesis: changes in 
quantity, quality, place, and substance. 
39 Philosopher Tony Roark asserts that this definition “has been branded as patently circular by nearly every 
modern commentator.” But, in this investigation, I am less invested in Aristotle’s ability to establish non-
circular accounts of “before,” “after,” and “motion” and more interested in the rhetorical implications of this 
particular, if problematic, description of chronos. 
40 In the Timaeus, Plato uses a mythical narrative to articulate a philosophy of time that positions time as a 
supernatural—not a worldly—construct.  
41 Philosopher Chelsea Harry echoes these ideas and writes that Aristotle’s time is not “a natural subsistent 
being itself” (40) nor a “number in accord with a celestial standard” (59); instead, she claims, Aristotle’s 
chronos is “something derived from nature” (40). 
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This conception of time is, moreover, consistent with the ancient Greek usage of chronos. 
The Liddell Scott Jones Greek-English Lexicon (LSJ), for example, makes no reference to time as 
infinite, objective, or existing outside of worldly interactions. To the contrary, after the initial 
definition of chronos as “time,” secondary definitions identify chronos as “lifetime,” “age,” or “season,” 
all words that reiterate the emplacement of chronos within an ever-changing system of natural cycles. 
In sum, rather than theorizing a temporality that exists on a separate ontological plane, Aristotle’s 
time emerges from the kinetic interactions in the world, much like rhetoric itself. Neither chronos nor 
rhetoric exist in isolation. Instead, they emerge from the cohabitation, collaboration, and conflict 
between worldly entities.  
Despite the fact that kinesis, or movement, functions as the central organizing idea of the 
Physics, chronos is not—unlike other terms in the text—figured as a subset of kinesis.42 Rather, 
Aristotle contends that chronos “is neither movement nor independent of movement” (4.II.219a1-3). 
Time and motion are, for him, interwoven but distinct concepts, neither of which necessarily 
precedes or follows the other. Kinesis and chronos unfold together; they are co-constitutive. This 
overlapping relationship between chronos and kinesis proves important for constructing a rhetorical 
theory of time because Aristotle’s definition of motion shares a key word with his definition of 
rhetoric: dunamis.43 Kinesis, Aristotle writes, is the “actuality of that which potentially (dunamis) is” 
                                                      
42 For example, some auxiliary concepts in the Physics include “place” (topos) and “void” (kenos) (Book IV). 
And some subsets of kinesis include change in quantity, change in quality, change in place, and change in 
substance (Book V).  
43 Depending on the context of its classical Greek usage, dunamis can have a variety of meanings and, 
subsequently, English translations. When paired with entelecheia in a philosophical treatise like the 
Physics, scholars often translate dunamis as “potential,” “potentially,” “potentiality,” or “potencies.” 
Alternatively, when discussing issues in the Greek polis, Aristotle uses dunamis in a more vernacular 
manner to describe different kinds of “political influence” (Haskins 234). Meanwhile, theologians 
often translate New Testament usages of dunamis as the supernatural “power” of the Christian god 
(Sullivan 323). And in Aristotle’s famous definition of rhetoric, humanist translators typically render 
dunamis as “ability,” “capacity,” or “faculty.” 
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(III.i.201a10-11).44 And rhetoric, Aristotle states, is the “ability (dunamis) in each case to see the 
available means of persuasion” (Rhetoric, I.ii.1355a1). Thus, chronos and rhetoric have a shared 
inheritance that stems from their Aristotelian definitions. This interweaving of chronos, kinesis, and 
dunamis gestures toward a temporality that is not a definitive or measurable quantity but rather a 
potential temporal force that might be actualized in rhetorical engagements. Similarly, practicing 
rhetoric does not require that an audience be successfully or measurably moved; instead, rhetoric 
only requires the potential of persuasion. For Aristotle, both chronos and rhetoric are figured as 
potentials.  
Although positioning chronos as a potential force that arises from kinetic interactions gestures 
towards the rhetorical implications of Aristotle’s notion of time, conventional understandings of 
chronos as an objective and measurable quantity still seems at odds with the less prescriptive nature of 
rhetoric. Aristotle’s use of “number” (arithmos) in his description of time often leads to these 
misunderstandings of chronos as a quantifiable amount. And yet, his subsequent explanation of 
arithmos offers a more complicated portrayal of chronos. Later in the text, when explicating his 
definition of chronos as the “number of motion” (4.xi.219b1), Aristotle carefully explains that 
“number” can have at least two meanings: “what is counted” and “that with which we count” 
(4.xi.219a5-7). But he quickly dispatches with the latter and insists that chronos, as a number, 
“obviously is what is counted” (4.xi.219a7-8). This specific understanding of a number reveals, as 
philosopher Ursula Coope indicates, that “time’s nature as a metric or measure of change is secondary 
to its nature as something enumerated” (87).45 In other words, the enumerated entities matter more 
                                                      
44 Aristotle’s description of kinesis is complicated by the concepts of dunamis (“potentially”) and 
entelecheia (“actuality”) that comprise his definition. In philosophical circles, for instance, scholars 
disagree about whether entelecheia refers to a “process” of actualization or to a “state” of being 
actualized.  
45 Aristotle says as much himself when he asserts that “time is not movement, but only movement 
insofar as it admits of enumeration” (4.xi.219a2-3).  
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than the numerical signifiers attached to those entities. For Aristotle, then, numbering is a 
grounded—and not theoretical—act in which enumeration supersedes quantification.  
This depiction of numbering is also consistent with classical Greek understandings of 
numbers as “natural” rather than “abstract” entities. W. D. Ross writes, for instance, that the 
Pythagoreans “did not recognize the abstract nature of numbers” (541). Instead, he suggests that 
their identification of “real things with numbers” is best understood as an act of naming (541). 
Similarly, Chelsea Harry—following Jacob Klein and Joe Sachs—explains that numbers, in Greek 
mathematics, are “not symbolic expressions” but rather “names given to a discrete plurality of 
things” (59). This Greek view of “number” as an act of naming implies that chronos is more 
subjective than contemporary Western understandings of “number,” which would position chronos as 
a numerical and objective measure of time.46 Conceived in this way, Aristotle’s chronos is not an 
abstract and measurable quantity but rather a meaning-making act of enumerating a particular kinetic 
action.  
Although the water clocks used in Athenian trials appear to be objective measures of time, 
they actually make apparent the rhetorical nature of chronos. First, before the day of the trial, a 
judgment must be made about how much time to ascribe to each speakers’ speech. Although it is 
unclear how invested parties negotiated this number, evidence suggests that the amount of time 
allotted to a speaker varied depending on the severity of the alleged crime (Hill 6). This is, of course, 
a subjective decision that impacts the speaker’s persuasive tactics in the speech. According to the 
Athenian legal system, moreover, the water clock stopped for the examination of evidence and for 
the reading of laws. While these rules of operation seem relatively straight-forward, the haste (or lack 
thereof) with which the juror unplugged and re-plugged the clepsydra in these transitional moments 
                                                      
46 Aristotle gestures toward this subjective quality of chronos when he explains that time only ever “divides 
potentially” (IV.xiii.222a14). Here, he acknowledges that the segmenting of time can be potentially 
accomplished in a variety of different ways. 
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constitutes a small but important way that chronos was constructed during the trial. A particularly 
slow water clock operator, for instance, might be perceived as generously giving more time to the 
speaker, which, in turn, could have a minor but not insignificant rhetorical impact on the speaker, 
the jury, and the outcome of the trial as a whole. Furthermore, the clepsydra operator was tasked with 
watching the water clock and declaring when the orator must conclude the speech. But identifying 
the precise moment when a vessel is completely drained is not an easy task. Is it empty when the 
flow of water changes from a trickle to a drip? How far apart must the drips be to signify “empty”? 
These, too, are interpretive choices that hold important rhetorical stakes for the trial. Thus, although 
chronos is often signified with a numerical value (a twenty-minute speech, for instance), the use of 
water clocks during Athenian trials reveals how chronos also functions as a kind of ongoing 
negotiation and, thus, as a rhetorical force that emerges from the kinetic interactions of entities in 
the world.   
 
Expanding the Scope of Chronos in the Polis 
Highlighting the discursive ways that individual subjects divide time and leverage it for their 
own suasive advantage emphasizes the human elements of chronos as a kind of rhetorical temporality. 
Indeed, Aristotle’s verbs seem to limit chronos to human perception. When contrasting chronos with 
“infinite time” (aion), for example, he describes chronos as “time taken” or “apprehended” 
(4.II.218a1), implying a kind of intellectual—and human—understanding of time. Furthermore, 
Aristotle insists that chronos must be “counted,” (arithmeton), “measured” (metreton), and “marked” 
(orizei). Each of these verbs also gestures toward an autonomous rational human subject who does 
the counting, measuring, and marking of time. Although this evidence appears to align with typical 
views of Aristotle as humanist par excellence, this sketch of chronos is, I suggest, only partially 
complete. Following Debra Hawhee, I seek to suspend “received beliefs about Aristotle as the 
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champion of a decidedly humanist, rational rhetoric” (“Toward” 83) and, instead, to consider the 
ways that terminological flexibility in Aristotle’s description of chronos may make possible a more 
expansive understanding of this rhetorical temporality. 
The openness of Aristotle’s language elsewhere in the Physics, in fact, implies that chronos may 
not be limited to human subjects. In particular, the related concepts of psyche and nous play an 
integral albeit convoluted role in Aristotle’s description of time and his larger natural philosophy. In 
De Anima, for instance, Aristotle claims that humans, animals, and vegetation all have a soul, or 
psyche. Although he explains that the souls of these very different entities may share some 
overlapping characteristics—locomotion, desire, sensation, and nutrition, for example—he asserts 
that the distinguishing aspect of the human psyche is a rational mind, or nous (ii.3). Similarly, in the 
Physics, when Aristotle addresses the sticky question of whether chronos can exist without the psyche, 
he concludes, “if there cannot be someone to count there cannot be anything that can be counted, 
so that evidently there cannot be number [of motion]” (4.14.223a23). Aristotle subsequently clarifies 
that this act of counting time depends not just on the psyche but, more specifically, on nous: “But if 
nothing but soul, or in soul, reason (nous), is qualified to count, there would not be time unless there 
were soul” (4.14.223a25). While nous may, from this single passage, appear to be a necessary 
requirement for the apprehension of chronos, this is the only time that Aristotle uses nous to describe 
chronos. Elsewhere in the Physics, Aristotle employs only psyche—not nous—to outline the conditions 
for the emergence of time.47 This, in turn, suggests that soul alone may be sufficient for the 
apprehension of time. Moreover, Aristotle’s insistence elsewhere in the Physics that “time is 
                                                      
47 Psyche and nous are not the only instances of conflicting ideas residing in Aristotle’s extant texts. 
See, for example, the Rhetoric where Aristotle alternately—and confusingly—identifies logos and ethos 
as the most important aspect of rhetoric. But rather than seeing conflicting terminology in 
Aristotle’s description of time as an authorial failure, I view such inconsistencies as an 
acknowledgement of the complexities of chronos and, furthermore, as an opportunity for subsequent 
researchers to continue unpacking the nuances and implications of this theory of time.  
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perceived” (4.II.451a16-17) echoes his understanding of sensory perception as something that is a 
faculty of psyche, not of nous.48 Thus, insofar as animals and plants also possess a sensory apparatus 
and some qualities of the psyche, the ability to apprehend chronos might be extended to these entities 
as well as to humans.  
Other sources, too, corroborate this expanded understanding of chronos. Philosopher Chelsea 
Harry, for instance, contends that Aristotle’s occasional use of the verb orizei, or “mark,” implies a 
kind of “sensory marking” of time that can be accomplished by nonhuman animals (52). As an 
example, she explains how a dog can watch a human walk across the room and perceive both kinesis 
and chronos without an intellectual abstraction of that spatial and temporal change as a numerical 
quantity.49 Ultimately, Harry argues that some animals have a “weak sense of time” (67) made 
possible through the marking of time. Several additional definitions of chronos in the LSJ also suggest 
that the ancient Greek understanding of chronos may have involved nonhumans as well as humans. 
The terms “lifetime” and “age,” for instance, may have been used to describe humans, horses, 
houses, or habitats. Similarly, the word “season” typically refers to material forces that—while 
impacted by humans—foreground the role of nonhuman actants like soil, sunlight, and solar 
systems. Taken together, these varied definitions hint that, perhaps, any material entity may be 
implicated in chronos, not just the creatures that Aristotle identifies as being in possession of a soul. 
Given these complex ancient understandings of time, I propose understanding chronos as a rhetorical 
force that is not limited to human subjects alone. Rather, I suggest that chronos arises from the 
rhetorical interactions of humans, animals, plants, matter, objects, and machines.  
                                                      
48 For a detailed view of Aristotle’s views on sensory perception, see De Anima. 
49 Harry does, however, qualify her claim by concluding that larger changes in time, like days and months, 
necessarily require the numerical abstraction facilitated by nous to comprehend. 
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The use of water clocks in ancient Athens again offers a striking example of the imbricated 
relationship between nonhumans, humans, and chronos.50 Although the Athenians designed, built, and 
operated their own water clocks, humans were not entirely in control of the time that they purported 
to measure. For instance, unlike the ways that contemporary nation-states employ standardized 
clock time, the ancient Greeks observed solar time.51 Regardless of the season, the Athenians divided 
the daylight hours in twelve equal parts. This meant that the nominal length of one hour shifted 
every day.52 Although this may seem unusual today, the adoption of solar time allowed the majority 
of Athenian civic and economic life—in any season—to occur during daylight hours. To help 
citizens act according to solar time, the Athenians built a clock tower, called the Horologion of 
Andronikus of Kyrrhestes, in the center of the agora (Figure 2). Also known as the Tower of the 
Winds, this twelve-meter tall octagonal structure enclosed a giant clepsydra, fed by water from the 
acropolis, and featured sundials and friezes of the wind gods on each of its eight facades.53 More 
importantly, its position in the center of Athenian civic life underscored the prominent role that time 
played in ancient Greek culture. Solar time—derived from the motions of celestial bodies and 
measured by the dripping of water—impacted trade, education, economics, politics, cultural events, 
and social life in the polis.  
 
                                                      
50 Although many ancient cultures had water clocks (including the Babylonians, Egyptians, and Persians), the 
Greek term clepsydra itself gestures toward the entangled nature of nonhumans, humans, and time. Derived 
from Greek words for “water” (hydor) and “steal” (kleptein), clepsydra literally translates to “water thief.” The 
word “thief” appears to attribute agency to some entity—or, more likely, to a collection of entities—that stole 
the water. So, who or what stole the water? Was it gravity? Was it the lower water basin? Was it the humans 
who built and used the water clock? Or, perhaps, did time itself steal the water? 
51 Solar time is based on the shifting amount of daylight and depends on three factors: your location 
on the earth’s surface, the rotation of the earth on its axis, and the position of the earth relative to 
the sun in its annual revolution.  
52 In Athens, an hour on the summer solstice is more than 50% longer than an hour at winter solstice! 
53 For more information about the Tower of the Winds, see Noble and de Solla Price. 
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Figure 2: The Tower of the Winds in Athens.  
Like the clepsydra in Greek trials, the Horologion had a rhetorical impact on Athenian life. 
Solar time gave structure to activities in the polis, encouraging certain behaviors and discouraging 
others. For instance, a merchant, glancing at the Tower of the Winds, might complete a risky 
transaction in haste. A farmer might stop working in the fields and hasten to complete a religious 
ceremony not because he felt moved by some kairotic exigency but, instead, because an appointed 
time had been marked on the solar calendar. In this way, chronos, as a rhetorical force, functioned as a 
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daily temporal “grid” (Smith 49) that suasively shaped life in Athens.54 And although humans 
devised the tools for counting solar time, this temporal system was always entangled in the 
materiality of shifting seasons and the natural rhythms of sunrise and sunset. In other words, the 
machines that measure time and the humans who ascribe meaning to those temporal periods work 
together with the slow prograde rotation of the Earth to collectively give rise to chronos as a rhetorical 
force.  
Rhetorical time is not, however, just a social construct that influences human decision-
making. It also has a material impact on the world that extends beyond rational thought.55 For 
example, circadian rhythms—melatonin secretion, bowel movements, and shifting blood pressure 
levels—are endogenous processes that, after accumulated exposure to environmental conditions like 
daylight, become entrained to recur at regular intervals. Unlike the knee-jerk reflex, which is a direct 
and predictable response to a single external stimulus, circadian rhythms are suggestible. They can be 
fashioned and re-fashioned over time by material, cultural, and, ultimately, rhetorical forces. Part of 
overcoming jet lag, for instance, involves retraining the body’s melatonin secretion cycle to the local 
rhythms of day and night.56 In this sense, time as a rhetorical force arises from the material 
                                                      
54 Although he did not necessarily see chronos as rhetorical, John E. Smith was the first to describe it as a 
“grid.” He writes that chronos is a “grid upon which the processes of nature and of the historical order can be 
plotted” (49).  
55 Figured as a social construct, chronos becomes a concept that human agents inscribe with various 
meanings to assert rhetorical, ideological, and unequal power over each other. Emily Winderman, 
for example, offers an excellent feminist critique of the ways that discursive constructions of chronos 
have been used to discipline women’s bodies. Although the ways that humans attempt to leverage 
time for their own rhetorical ends marks a crucial area of research, I also want to consider the ways 
that rhetorical time has a material impact on the world. In doing so, however, I do not seek to erase 
the political and discursive dimensions of rhetoric, time, and human bodies. Rather, I seek to 
interrogate the ways that the human politics of rhetorical engagement with time are also entangled in 
material networks. In short, I suggest that time’s relationship to both matter and discourse holds 
important and imbricated implications for rhetoric.  
56 For detailed information about jet lag and circadian rhythms, see Waterhouse and Dijk & Lockley. 
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interactions of celestial bodies and impacts—in excess of rational activity—the earthly bodies that 
reside on its surface.  
Describing chronos as a rhetorical entity that emerges from the ongoing relations of humans 
and nonhumans appears to challenge notions of rhetorical agency. I am not, however, claiming that 
the earth functions rhetorically by itself, nor do I suggest that a water clock, on its own, is rhetorical. 
Instead, following Laura Micciche, I see agency as “distributed across things and people and 
structures, resulting in a kind of Dewey-inspired collective public” (490). Such a networked view of 
agency positions rhetoric not as something that resides in an individual subject but rather as 
something “emergent and enacted through a complex ecology of texts, writers, readers, institutions, 
objects, and history” (Rivers and Weber, 188). Given this ecological picture of rhetorical agency, I 
suggest that chronos, as a rhetorical force, shapes and is shaped by the collective interactivity of 
matter, machines, and human subjects as they negotiate the evolving dance of rhetorical 
engagement.57 Put differently, Earth, sun, clocks, and citizens are knit up in a series of ongoing 
relations from which rhetorical time emerges and—in conjunction with other nonhuman and human 
actants—contributes to the unfolding of events in the world.  
Based on this enlarged understanding of rhetorical time, in the following sections I extend 
this ancient picture of chronos with the help of contemporary rhetorical research. Specifically, I 
outline three key characteristics of chronos that make visible the extent and significance of its suasive 
impact. First, I sketch the ways that time manifests and exerts a combined material-discursive 
influence. Next, I demonstrate how evolving worldly relations contribute to the emergent nature of 
chronos. Finally, I explain how chronos functions as a cumulative rhetorical force over time. In the 
                                                      
57 This distributed picture of rhetorical agency does not, however, erase human agency and 
responsibility. Instead, it posits what Micciche calls “unstable configurations of blame and 
responsibility that make for less clear targets but more robust accounting for the interstitial qualities 
of any single problem” (491).  
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end, I aim to illustrate the crucial but often overlooked ways that chronos figures and, in turn, is 
figured by rhetorical encounters.  
Although I articulate these three elements of rhetorical time separately, they are not distinct 
or discrete. They are, instead, concomitant. To depict the overlapping relationship between these 
three aspects of time, I link their descriptions together with a single example about the effects of 
chronos in rhetorical education. After all, education—like rhetoric itself—is rarely instantaneous. In 
fact, as Wayne Booth noted years ago, rhetoric and education are intimately connected. He writes: 
“To become a teacher of any subject is already to aspire to skill in at least one kind of rhetoric, the 
kind that changes the minds and possibly even the lives of students” (xi). Today, his understanding 
of teaching as rhetorical is widely accepted, but rarely does scholarship consider the timeframe of 
education as rhetorical even though serialized learning poignantly disrupts kairotic theories of time. 
With these ideas about rhetorical education in mind, the following sections continue to scaffold a 
framework for comprehending the rhetorical work of chronos as a kind of accumulated time.  
 
1. Chronos as Material-Discursive 
Chronos is more than a rational, discursive, or human entity. It also has key material and nonhuman elements.  
In an effort to further explicate this sense of cumulative time for both nonhumans and 
humans, the ideas of Karen Barad provide a productive theoretical framework. In Meeting the Universe 
Halfway, Barad erects a theory of “agential realism” that, rather than opposing social 
constructionism, augments the power of discourse in the world by also considering the influence of 
matter on reality. She defines agential realism as: 
an epistemological-ontological-ethical framework that provides an understanding of the role 
of human and nonhuman, material and discursive, and natural and cultural factors in 
scientific and other social-material practices, thereby moving such considerations beyond the 
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well-worn debates that pit constructivism against realism, agency against structure, and 
idealism against materialism. (26) 
Viewed through the lens of agential realism, chronos becomes more than just the result of human 
knowledge systems. Instead, Barad’s agential realism positions rhetorical time as a material-discursive 
force that is equally impacted by epistemologies and ontologies.58 Building on the research of 
physicist Niels Bohr, she asserts that the “primary ontological unit is not independent objects with 
independently determinate boundaries and properties,” but rather “the ontological inseparability of 
agentially intra-acting components” (33). In other words, the relationship between entities defines 
their shape and their properties, not vice versa. For chronos, this means that humans do not exist 
apart from their relationship with time, nor do they operate separately from the material world that 
surrounds them. Rather than understanding rhetorical time only as a product of human knowledge 
systems or as something that exists on an altogether separate plane of being, Barad’s agential realism 
positions chronos as a rhetorical force that shares an ontological inseparability with humans, materials, 
ideas, and nonhumans alike. As such, humans may contribute to the construction of time but so, 
too, do other material forces. And, because the relationship is not unidirectional, chronos also 
partakes in the construction of human and nonhuman entities.  
In the humanities, this turn toward investigating nonhuman and material entities alongside 
texts has come from many directions, each with their nuanced and important differences.59 For 
scholars of rhetoric, Laurie Gries offers one of the best articulations of the stakes of this paradigm 
                                                      
58 My choice to hyphenate “material-discursive” follows Barad’s own usage of the term but also echoes a 
much longer tradition of feminist science studies scholars who regularly hyphenate theoretical terms, like 
Donna Haraway’s “nature-cultures.” These researchers leverage hyphenated terms to, as Rebekah Sheldon 
explains, “collapse hierarchical dualisms and insist on the materializing force of broadly circulating ideas” 
(196).  
59 Prominent theoretical threads include feminist new materialism, Deleuzian eminent materialism, Latourian 
Actor-network theory (ANT), and object-oriented ontology (OOO). See Rebekah Sheldon’s 
“Form/Matter/Chora” to better understand key differences—and the stakes of these differences—between 
some of these frameworks, especially between OOO and feminist new materialism.  
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shift. In her study of photographs in Still Life with Rhetoric: A New Materialist Approach to Visual 
Rhetoric, she writes: 
Rather than be certain that this thing is rhetorical in this way and this time and space, then, 
this new materialist rhetorical approach seeks to empirically discover how an image becomes 
rhetorical in divergent ways as it circulates with time, enters into new associations, 
transforms, and generates a multiplicity of consequences.60 (14)  
According to this view, the unfolding of time becomes the muddled and ongoing site(s) where 
rhetoric occurs. Rather than transitive models of communication that assume a unidirectional 
rhetorical exchange between a sender and receiver in a single kairotic moment, Gries invites scholars 
to reconceive of rhetoric as a perpetual negotiation of the shared—and fundamentally inseparable—
ontological status of matter, things, ideas, nonhumans, and humans as their relations unfold over 
time.61 As such, chronos functions not only as an interpretive lens through which scholars might study 
rhetoric but also as an active and material player in those rhetorical ecologies. Figured in this way, 
chronos becomes a central component of the dynamic, material-discursive process of rhetorical 
action.  
In the context of college-level writing and rhetoric classes, a syllabus with a calendar of 
deadlines offers a prime example of the material-discursive nature of chronos. One of the rhetorical 
                                                      
60 Based on this theoretical backing, Gries sketches another way of understanding rhetorical 
engagement called “rhetorical transformation.” This concept identifies the ways “in which things 
become rhetorical in divergent, unpredictable ways as they circulate, transform, and catalyze change” 
(“Still Life” 27). Although she limits the scope of her research to visual images, Gries’ notion of 
rhetorical transformation has much broader implications for rhetorical studies insofar as it implicitly 
underscores the importance of time as a material-discursive force that undergirds rhetorical 
interactions and lends an unexpected and amorphous structure to the perpetual relationality of 
entities in the world.  
61 Gries does, in fact, briefly outline two common models—"clock time” and “ICT time” (“Still Life” 30)—
that structure typical discourses about temporality. In her own work, she adopts the pluralistic view of ICT 
time, but temporality is not the primary focus of her research (31). In a way, then, my project aims to shed 
more light on the role of time in what Gries calls the ongoing process of “rhetorical becoming” (“On 
Rhetorical Becoming” 160).  
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goals of a syllabus involves persuading students to complete the readings and assignments that the 
instructor has selected to the best of their ability. But students are not asked to read the required 
texts only when gripped by a kairotic moment. Nor are they are allowed submit their written 
assignments whenever they are moved by some external exigency. Instead, in most composition 
classes, students complete their readings and projects at the same time according to a calendar 
devised by the instructor. Chronos, not kairos, drives these rhetorical situations.62 These chronos-based 
deadlines, moreover, can significantly impact the content and quality of student writing. As an 
instructor, if I sense that students are struggling with a theoretical concept or a composition 
technique, I sometimes extend the assignment’s due date by a few days, which alters—but does not 
erase—the rhetorical impact of time on their writing. These examples foreground the discursive ways 
that instructors manipulate rhetorical time to impact their writing and rhetoric classes.  
The same syllabus calendar can also illustrate the material nature of rhetorical time. 
Depending on the time of day that assignments are due, for instance, different material forces are at 
work on students’ bodies—and, by extension, on their writing—in the form of circadian rhythms. I 
often teach at 8:00am, a time when many human biological systems have only just stopped releasing 
melatonin and have not yet reached peak testosterone secretion. At this point in the day, my 
students and I are not usually functioning at top notch cognitive and physical performance, 
regardless of how much sleep we had the night before. In the past, I required my students to submit 
their papers at the beginning of these morning classes, but this policy often posed a number of 
issues. First, many students completed their papers late at night, when they were fighting increasing 
melatonin secretion (usually with the help of other chemicals like caffeine). Second, students often 
                                                      
62 Kairos, however, also typically plays an important role in shaping student writings. For instance, in classes 
where I allow students to choose a topic for their final project, they often select a theme related to some 
external exigency such as a timely political subject or an issue from another class they are taking that semester. 
In this way, kairos and chronos work together to influence students’ compositions. 
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got very little sleep that night, which rendered that morning’s class much less productive. In 
response to these concerns, I now ask students to submit their compositions online in the evenings, 
a time of day that, for most students, offers better material conditions for composing.63 In this way, 
my discursive construction of submission times is always already intertwined the materiality of time.  
 
2. Chronos as Emergent 
Chronos is not a predefined or stable entity. Instead, it repeatedly emerges from rhetorical encounters.  
In an effort to craft a non-circular definition of Aristotelian time, philosopher Tony Roark 
gestures toward an idea of chronos as emergent. He explains that humans apprehend time when they 
make “kinetic cuts” that divide up their experience of physical motion in the world. For example, 
saying that the trip from home to campus takes fifteen minutes is a kind of kinetic cut that ascribes 
spatial motion a temporal value. According to Roark’s reading of Aristotle, chronos emerges from 
these moments when humans divide up their experience of the world into spatio-temporal 
segments. While Roark’s theory makes visible the ways that chronos arises from kinetic interactions 
among humans, Karen Barad’s related idea of “agential cuts” (148) can extend Roark’s notion of 
“kinetic cuts” by acknowledging the centrality of both nonhumans and humans in crafting a sense of 
rhetorical time. In Meeting the Universe Halfway, Barad sketches a picture of a world that is composed 
of a perpetual set of relations and not of individual relata. She suggests that subjects and objects do 
not have pre-defined borders until agential cuts “produce determinate boundaries and properties of 
‘entities’ within phenomena” (148).64 Although phenomena often appear to be distinct, Barad claims 
that they are “ontologically inseparable” until their relations give rise to shifting ontological and 
                                                      
63 Incidentally, the ability to allow students to submit assignments outside of class has been made increasingly 
feasible due to the shifting material conditions in contemporary universities. Specifically, I refer to the 
mainstreaming of mobile computing, internet access, and learning management systems in higher education. 
64 Here, Barad echoes Bruno Latour’s idea of the “quasi-object,” which also subverts the traditional categories 
of subject and object. For more about Latour’s “quasi-object,” see We Have Never Been Modern (52-55).  
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semantic boundaries through agential cuts (175). For Barad, humans, nonhumans, and time as 
intimately intertwined. And through that entanglement, they co-produce each other.  
Barad further explains this complicated picture of relationality with her concept of “intra-
actions.” Because Barad’s definition of intra-action has important implications for a rhetorical theory 
of chronos, I quote, at length, her explanation of intra-action:  
Since individually determinate entities to not exist, measurements do not entail an interaction 
between separate entities; rather, determinate entities emerge from their intra-action. I 
introduce the term “intra-action” in recognition of their ontological inseparability, in 
contrast to the usual “interaction,” which relies on a metaphysics of individualism (in 
particular, the prior existence of separately determinate entities). A phenomenon is a specific 
“intra-action” of an “object” and the “measuring agencies;” the object and the measuring 
agencies emerge from, rather than precede, the intra-action that produces them. Crucially, 
then, we should understand phenomena not as objects-in-themselves, or as perceived objects 
(in the Kantian or phenomenological sense), but as specific intra-actions. Because the basis 
of this ontology is a fundamental inseparability, it cuts across any Kantian noumena-
phenomena distinction: there are no determinately bounded or propertied entities existing 
“behind” or as the causes of phenomena. (128)  
According to this logic, chronos is not a noumenon, beyond human knowledge. Nor is it a 
phenomenon, constructed by human experiences. When an entity apprehends time, neither chronos 
nor the subject pre-exist their relationship. Instead, both the one who counts time and chronos itself 
emerge from that intra-action. The numbering of time, in other words, does not involve only the 
strategic manipulation of a passive temporality for a subject’s own rhetorical ends; chronos also 
actively—and rhetorically—shapes the subject. In short, both time and those that intra-act with time 
share an ontological indeterminacy until, through their relations, they co-produce each other. 
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Pedagogy, again, demonstrates this emergent give-and-take relationship between chronos and 
the other actants entangled with time. When I make lesson plans for a class, for instance, I regularly 
assign different activities a certain time limit: fifteen minutes to discuss the readings, twenty minutes 
to complete a group activity, and ten minutes to provide peer feedback, for example. To ensure that 
I don’t lose track of time, I sometimes set an alarm on my phone to mark these transition moments. 
But when the alarm sounds, it often has unexpected effects on the class. Sometimes, it dissuades 
students from asking important follow-up questions. Other times, it rushes students and encourages 
them to haphazardly complete their peer review. A similar situation happens at the end of class 
when some students start packing their things a few minutes before the bell rings. Although 
officially scheduled from 8:00 to 8:50, the 8:48 minute-mark sometimes distracts students from 
thoughtfully finishing their work. In both cases, humans divide the day into specific segments of 
time, but that segmenting of time also impacts the human activity that occurs in those moments. 
Thus, while chronos appears to be a rhetorical device prefigured by humans before class starts, chronos 
emerges from those moments of division and segmentation, rhetorically shaping and re-shaping the 
human and nonhuman actants intra-acting in a university writing class. Despite human efforts to 
monopolize time, then, chronos still wiggles free of human manipulation and asserts its own force on 
us too.  
 
3. Chronos as Cumulative 
Although chronos is emergent, it is not always created anew. Instead, chronos marks the accumulation of rhetorical 
forces over time.  
In the Physics, Aristotle claims that “[w]hen we do perceive a ‘before’ and an ‘after,’ then we 
say that there is time” (4.ii.219a34). This description of time in terms of “before” and “after” 
positions chronos as a sequence: some kinetic intra-actions occur before or after others, and their 
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order can be enumerated. For Aristotle, one way of ordering these events involves counting 
subsequent “nows,” a system in which each present moment is positioned before and after other 
moments (4.xiii.222a). Rather than seeing “now” as a singular discontinuous event, however, 
Aristotle understands the present moment as “the link of time” that, in his view, “connects past and 
future time” (4.xiii.222a). Such an integrated view of time suggests that individual moments have a 
cumulative rhetorical impact that extends beyond their immediate kairotic influence. But, as 
philosopher Ursula Coope, in her reading of the Physics, asserts: “It does not matter how many nows 
we count; what is important is that we count a series of nows in a certain definitive order” (91). In 
other words, the duration of chronos does not dictate its cumulative rhetorical force. Instead, the 
ordering of temporal events matters more. A week-long seminar, for instance, might have a greater 
cumulative impact on a young scholar’s career than a whole year of graduate school, provided that 
the seminar occurs in the right sequence (perhaps after the demands of coursework and before the 
qualifying exam process). Although such a seminar may appear to be a timely—or kairotic—event in 
the life of the scholar, it also serves as an example of chronos insofar as the content of the seminar 
continues to shape the work of the scholar as it is recycled, reconsidered, and redeployed in 
subsequent papers, presentations, and publications.  
This picture of chronos as a cumulative force resembles other familiar rhetorical concepts. For 
instance, Cicero’s second canon of rhetoric, arrangement, emphasizes the sequential ordering of 
rhetorical elements within a single speech. Similarly, cumulative understanding of chronos might invite 
scholars to analyze the aggregated role of rhetoric over the course of a series of speeches. Thus, 
while Cicero’s arrangement refers to the internal sequence of a text, chronos gestures toward the 
external ordering of rhetorical interactions.65 This serialized depiction of chronos also echoes Jenny 
                                                      
65 Following Lucaites and Hariman as well as Finnegan, Gries, of course, encourages scholars to trace not 
only the internal relations of a photo but also its external relations. She writes, “In addition to acknowledging 
an actualized image’s interior relations (design, content, arrangement, etc.) then, simultaneously zooming in 
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Edbauer Rice’s idea of “distributed rhetorical ecologies” (20).66 Rather than assuming that speakers 
and audiences remain static as public discourse shifts over time, Rice urges researchers to 
acknowledge “the way rhetorics are held together trans-situationally” (20). In response to this call, 
chronos, as a cumulative force, offers one such theoretical apparatus for investigating the diachronic 
impact of rhetorical engagements. In this way, chronos is not a radical departure from existing ideas of 
rhetoric but rather an extension of existing concepts that might help researchers better trace the 
ebbs and flows of rhetorical forces as they transpire over time. 
  Rhetorical education in antiquity offers a telling example of this cumulative feature of chronos. 
In ancient Greece, students of rhetoric practiced the progymnasmata, a series of preparatory exercises 
that enabled them to develop specific speaking skills prior to composing and delivering their own 
speeches (Kennedy Progymnasmata).67 In the preface to the oldest extant progymnasmata handbook, the 
author Theon chastises students who give a declamation without first doing their preliminary 
exercises. For Theon, like other classical pedagogues, the sequence of rhetorical education mattered. 
Practicing preliminary exercises helped students develop a cumulative rhetorical competency that 
impacted their subsequent successes and failures when they later composed speeches on their own. 
While some scholarship dismisses the handbook tradition as vapid memorization and regurgitation, 
Jeffrey Walker argues that Isocrates’ techne handbooks, in particular, were instrumental in the 
development of successful orators over time. According to Walker, these handbooks helped 
students hone their speaking abilities through the repeated practicing of handbook exercises and the 
subsequent mobilization of those skills in the service of their own original oratory. Thus, while 
                                                      
on an image’s emergent exterior relations helps discover how something becomes rhetorical with time and 
space as it participates in a distributed dance of agency with other entities and alters collective life” (Still Life 
159). 
66 In this article, Rice complicates the traditional conceptualization of the “rhetorical situation” as outlined by 
Lloyd Bitzer and later augmented by Vatz and then Consigny. 
67 In imperial Rome, Quintilian developed similar preliminary rhetorical exercises called primae exercitationes. 
For examples of these exercises, see Quintilian.  
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successful speakers must attend to the kairotic exigencies of the moment, they also must leverage 
their accumulated rhetorical experience derived from serialized practice. In this way, chronos implicitly 
functioned as a central concept in the pedagogical strategies of rhetoricians in ancient Greece. After 
all, paideia was not the product of a single lecture but rather the cumulative outcome of a long and 
challenging process.  
Like their classical predecessors, contemporary college writing classes also display the 
cumulative rhetorical nature of chronos. Many American universities, for instance, require first-year 
students to pass a composition class as a prerequisite for other courses.68 Some universities even 
have a two-semester sequence of classes about reading, writing, research, and sometimes public 
speaking.69 Unlike other prerequisite courses that may be designed to eliminate struggling or 
uninterested students (so-called “weed-out classes”), these curricular writing requirements exist 
because scholars have long recognized that becoming a good writer takes time. Ideally, students will 
develop certain academic writing skills in their first year and then practice them in subsequent 
classes, developing a cumulative competency in composition over time. This process of repeatedly 
practicing writing skills is not, however, an entirely rational activity. As Casey Boyle argues, writing 
comprises “an embodied, materially mediated array of activity” (544). Boyle opposes metacognitive 
composition pedagogies and argues instead for a “serialized” approach that involves teaching writing 
“not through the traditional conception of rhetoric as critical reflection about an object but as an 
ongoing series of mediated encounters” (534). Effective writing, for Boyle, is more than just making 
a series of smart rational choices. It also requires allowing the cumulative power of rhetorical time to 
actualize—whether cognitively, intuitively, or accidentally—the stored experiences from previous 
                                                      
68 These curricular policies are based, in part, on the recommendations of the two largest organizations of 
professional writing educators in the United States: NCTE and CCCC.  
69 See, for example, the spectacular two-semester sequence of rhetoric classes designed by Roxanne 
Mountford at Oklahoma University.  
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writing engagements. In this way, the cumulative force of chronos drives writing practices and 
pedagogies at the curricular as well as the classroom level in many contemporary universities.  
 
Conclusion 
In the courts, the agora, and the classroom, the contours of rhetorical activity are molded by 
time. Although kairotic timing is central to rhetorical practice, so too are the larger temporal systems 
that structure sequential suasive encounters. In this chapter, I have tried to better account for this 
complex relationship between rhetoric and time by considering chronos as a temporal and rhetorical 
counterpart to kairos. As I have drawn it, chronos is not an eternal, mechanical, clock-like, or static 
entity that is tangential to the aims of rhetoric. It is, instead, a dynamic, evolving, and powerful force 
that is deeply intertwined with both nonhumans and humans. I have shown, moreover, how chronos 
comprises both material and discursive dimensions, how it emerges from the messiness of worldly 
intra-actions, and how it accumulates rhetorical force over time.  
For practitioners of rhetoric, the stakes of accounting for such a model of accumulated time 
are vital. Foregrounding the material aspects of rhetorical time can, for example, reveal the ways in 
which humans and nonhumans alike are enmeshed in an ongoing web of relations that distributes 
agency not only across networks of actants but also across temporal periods. For historiographers, 
chronos might provide a framework for tracing the suasive forces at work in our own disciplinary 
narratives and, correspondingly, aid us in imagining how more inclusive political futures might 
emerge from our present moment.70 Furthermore, understanding time as cumulative can help 
                                                      
70 Despite the disciplinary potential of crafting a rhetorical understanding of chronos as a cumulative 
force, it also presents some theoretical challenges. Michelle Ballif, for example, articulates the 
“impossibility” of tracking, however carefully, the contours of historical events. Looking through the 
lens of poststructuralism, Ballif asserts that “traditional historiographies impose temporal constraints 
on the happening—on the event” (“Writing the Event” 244), which render “every event significant 
insofar as it becomes evidentiary to and subservient to a satisfying narrative with a proper beginning, 
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scholars track the ways that phenomena accrue rhetorical force over time, whether in a series of 
face-to-face interactions or through the mechanisms of online circulation.  
For this project about character and time in particular, understanding chronos as a temporal 
mode of accumulation proves especially salient. While the material-discursive and emergent aspects 
of time are essential to notions of ethos, research has yet to fully explore the cumulative possibilities 
of ethos, a topic I take up in the next chapter. In sum, without chronos, scholarship risks overlooking 
the complexity of rhetorical forces such as ethos as they unfold in unpredictable ways over time. 
While kairos reinforces the importance of timing for rhetoric, chronos—whether in ancient Athenian 
trials or in twenty-first century classrooms—underscores the significance of accumulated time for 
rhetoric.  
   
  
                                                      
middle, and end—all of which follow, chronologically, in a logic of time” (243). For Ballif, tracing 
and recounting histories is subjective, strategic, rhetorical, and violent (244). While I share Ballif’s 
concern with the risks of serializing events, I nevertheless advocate for more trans-temporal 
rhetorical research, but only insofar as a wary eye remains fixed on the implications of these 
scholarly chronologies. To write a history, to analyze sequential rhetorical events, to invoke chronos 
are all rhetorical acts with their own political consequences. But perhaps those activities can be 
attempted, as Ballif suggests, with a Derridean “absolute hospitality,” in which rhetoricians and 
“historiographers writing the event can take no comfort, no moral gratification from the hospitable 
gesture offered” (254).  
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Chapter Two 
Accumulating Character Over Time: Socrates’ Cumulative Ethos 
 
In 399 BCE, Socrates was indicted and brought to trial.71 Meletus and Anytus, his principal 
accusers, brought two charges against the septuagenarian. In their affidavit, they allege: “Socrates is 
guilty of corrupting the young, and of not acknowledging the gods the city acknowledges, but new 
daimonic activities instead” (Apology, 24b). His accusers fail, however, to provide evidence of a single 
specific event when Socrates ostensibly engaged in either of these activities. Rather, they speak generally 
about his repeated behaviors in the polis. As proof of corrupting the young men of Athens, for 
instance, they identify the many dialogic lessons that Socrates held in the Lyceum. As an example of 
his irreverence to the gods, they point to the series of questions about wisdom that Socrates asked 
the politicians, poets, and craftsmen of Athens. And as an illustration of Socrates’ iconoclastic 
behavior, they claim that he has ongoing conversations with unknown spirits or demons. Strikingly, 
none of these pieces of evidence refers to one single moment when Socrates broke a law. Instead, his 
accusers identify an amalgam of events that, in their view, pose a cumulative threat to the social order. 
Furthermore, rather than registering this grievance as a private matter, Meletus and his conspirators 
file a public indictment of impiety (graphe asebeia) with the court.72 Doing so indicates that they see 
Socrates’ multiple displays of impiety not as a mere personal offence but as a much larger threat to 
                                                      
71 Two versions of Socrates’ trial survive to today: Plato’s Apology and Xenophon’s much shorter 
account, Socrates’ Defense to the Jury. Both authors were apprentices of Socrates, and both narratives 
were published after their mentor’s death. Plato claims to have witnessed the trial, while 
Xenophon—who was doing military service away from Athens at the time—identifies Hermogenes’ 
firsthand account as his source. Xenophon’s text is a third-person account that attributes some 
direct quotations to both Socrates and the jurors. And unlike the rest of Plato’s corpus, the Apology is 
a monologue given by Socrates to the jury. Aside from these points, the key difference between 
these two portrayals resides in the competing ways that each author represents Socrates’ character, a 
topic that will be taken up later.  
72 For more information about the conditions and stakes of a graphe asebeia, see Lanni.  
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the citizenry of Athens. In the end, the Athenian jury finds him guilty and sentences the philosopher 
to be executed.  
Unlike many contemporary legal cases where the details of a single kairotic event hang in the 
balance, Socrates’ accusers pin his alleged misconduct on a series of recurrent civic activities. They 
declare, moreover, that his ongoing behaviors not only violate the law but also endanger the youth 
of Athens. In this argument, his accusers eschew a kairotic notion of criminality and implicitly adopt 
a chronos-based notion of time that locates Socrates’ threat to the polis in the accumulated force of 
his repeated actions over time.73 In response, they aim to eliminate his time in Athens. In their 
arguments before the court, neither Socrates nor his accusers adopt a philosophical concept of time 
like eternity; nor do they point to a scientific or measurable notion of time. And although neither 
party explicitly mentions a rhetorical model of time in the extant accounts of the trial, the logic they 
employ to construct their accusations and defense belies a joint belief in the cumulative impact of 
rhetorical time on a community.74 This story of Socrates’ trial therefore suggests that an 
understanding of time as a rhetorical force was already circulating in Athenian culture, years before 
Aristotle composed his tacitly rhetorical theory of time in the Physics.  
More importantly, the accusations of impiety levied against Socrates underscore the ways 
that a cumulative notion of time can inform conventional notions of rhetorical character, or ethos. 
Socrates’ accusers do not view his irreverent character as merely a discursive fabrication; nor do they 
see his contemptuous character as an internal deficiency that affects only his own life. Rather, they 
                                                      
73 As stated in the prior chapter, though, chronos is not an independent rhetorical force working in 
isolation on Socrates or the citizens of Athens. Rather chronos functions as an important, albeit 
often overlooked, element of the larger ecology of evolving rhetorical engagements that comprise 
life in the polis. Time, in this sense, emerges from Socrates’ ongoing material-discursive 
engagements with the citizens of Athens, and it highlights how elements of these serialized 
encounters can accumulate force over time.  
74 Elsewhere, in the Timaeus, Socrates articulates a different philosophical conception of time as part of Plato’s 
cosmology.  
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fear that Socrates’ impious ethos has increasingly dangerous effects on the city and, further, that the 
longer Socrates spends teaching and questioning the citizens of Athens, then the greater influence 
his character will have over its people. If they give Socrates more time, the power of his character 
may grow. But if they limit Socrates’ time in the polis, they can minimize the rhetorical impact of his 
ethos on the youth. The trial of Socrates demonstrates, in other words, that the accumulated force 
of one’s ethos over time can become so powerful that it compels the leaders of a city to conspire 
against and, ultimately, to execute that figure.  
While such an accumulated sense of time may be applied to any number of rhetorical 
concepts, this idea of time suits ethos particularly well because—unlike other argumentative 
strategies that may be selectively deployed in response to specific exigencies—ethos is one of the 
only aspects of rhetoric that operates, at one level or another, in every rhetorical engagement. 
Although rhetors may appeal to emotions or logic at different times depending on local exigencies, 
rhetorical character is always present in rhetorical encounters. As Dana Anderson explains, “You’re 
always broadcasting on the ethos channel. You can’t turn it off” (“Capturing,” 2017). In other 
words, while ethos may be downplayed or masked, it cannot be erased. And as it seeps from one 
rhetorical situation to the next, that ethos has the potential to accumulate a powerful rhetorical 
force.  
The recognition that ethos bleeds from one rhetorical situation into another is not, however, 
a new idea. Isocrates gestures toward this accretive sense of ethos when he claims that “[A]rguments 
acquire more authority when they come from one’s life than from mere words” (Antidosis 278).75 
                                                      
75 Like most rhetoricians, Isocrates contends that ethos cannot be taught directly to students. But, unlike 
other thinkers, he believes that teachers—as the primary audience for their pupils’ speeches—should model a 
good ethos so that their students, in order to be rhetorically successful, would need to conform their own 
ethos to that of their instructors’ ethos. From a cultural studies perspective, however, this pedagogical 
modeling of ethos overlooks the challenges implicit in the hierarchical power relationship between teachers 
and students. 
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Here, he articulates an understanding of rhetoric as something more than individual speeches, texts, 
or rhetorical situations. Isocrates suggests, instead, that one’s life—as stretched over a series of 
imbricated rhetorical encounters, from birth to the present moment (and, perhaps, beyond)—
constitutes the best form of argument. Although Isocrates’ claim may seem hyperbolic, I suggest 
that rhetoricians take him seriously. Acknowledging the persistence of life’s rhetorical force prompts 
a shift in scholarly focus; rather than studying momentary displays of rhetorical character, 
researchers might also consider the ways that ethos also swells and fades over time, an idea that is 
often tacitly assumed but rarely examined in detail.   
Ultimately, the trial of Socrates highlights the incredible stakes of bringing a cumulative 
sense of time to bear on the idea of ethos. It positions rhetorical character as something that 
accretes or erodes over time as it slips from one rhetorical ecology to another. Unlike conventional 
understandings of ethos as something that is either momentary or fossilized, a sense of time as 
accumulation emphasizes the fluidity of ethos. It is, in a word, trans-situational. Ethos, as Nedra 
Reynolds explains, “shifts and changes over time, across texts, and around spaces” (326). But 
beyond Reynolds’ gesture toward this evolving sense of ethos, rhetorical scholarship has yet to fully 
articulate a way of accounting for this accretion of character over time. And while researchers have 
made strides unpacking the connection between ethos and concepts such as politics, power, and 
place, less attention has been paid to the complicated relationship between ethos and time. In 
response, I construct, in this chapter, a framework for better comprehending the evolution of 
rhetorical character over time. In the end, this theoretical perspective aims not only to reframe our 
understanding of the trial of Socrates but, more importantly, to provide a model for better 
understanding the remarkable—and dangerous—rhetorical work that ethos can accomplish over 
time.  
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In an effort to scaffold this theory, I first demonstrate how scholarship often focuses on two 
temporal poles of ethos: one ephemeral sense of ethos that is deliberately—and, following Aristotle, 
discursively—crafted for specific occasions; and a second static notion of character that derives from 
a speaker’s subjectivity and social position. I suggest, moreover, that a key difference between these 
two conceptualizations of ethos lies in their relationship to time. The first kind of ethos is a kairotic 
response to fleeting exigencies, whereas the second kind of ethos appears timeless and immutable. 
After this contextualization, I then recount how other contemporary theorizations of ethos 
implicitly complicate these dual temporalities. In an extension of this latter scholarship, I propose 
my own notion of cumulative ethos as a heuristic for attending to the ways that character accrues or 
dissipates in rhetorical force as subjects navigate a series of encounters over time. To explicate this 
relationship between chronos and ethos, I return to the trial of Socrates and show how a rhetorical 
sense of time underscores the ways that character is more than simply static nor transient. It is also 
something that emerges from and accumulates over time. The case of Socrates, I conclude, 
highlights the undeniable stakes that cumulative ethos can have for both a community and for an 
individual life.  
 
Temporally-Bifurcated Ethos  
Scholarship about ethos typically invokes time indirectly. In the temporal assumptions that 
these rhetorical theories make, ethos is often depicted in a binary yet complementary relationship 
with time: it is either fleeting or frozen.76 In its Aristotelian sense, ethos is a part of rhetorical 
                                                      
76 Given the importance of the rhetorical and ethical qualities of ethos, I use the phrase “rhetorical 
character” as a contemporary English approximation of ethos. “Character” gestures toward the 
ethical component of ethos, but it does not always make visible the suasive elements of ethos, so I 
append the adjective “rhetorical” to signify this element. Together these two attributes of ethos 
comprise its most essential characteristics.  
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invention and a product of discourse. Aristotle calls this ethos, “artistic” or “technic” because it is 
crafted by the rhetor or, as Ruth Amossy explains, “built at the level of uttering” (20).77 Students in 
introductory rhetoric courses often analyze or compose this “discursive” (Amossy) ethos in 
speeches. In their textbook Ancient Rhetorics for Contemporary Students, Sharon Crowley and Debra 
Hawhee provide heuristics that help us identify and examine what they call a speaker’s “invented” 
ethos. Together, this collection of terms—“artistic,” “technic,” “discursive,” and “invented”—
foregrounds the agency of the human rhetor and clearly distinguishes between the linguistic 
representation of ethos and the speaker’s ‘real’ ethos. In terms of time, this ethos is kairotic and 
momentary. Many thinkers, of course, have been uncomfortable with this temporary view of ethos 
because it allows for the possibility of (and perhaps even encourages) Machiavellian duplicity.78 
Feminist scholarship also criticizes Aristotelian understandings of character for aligning ethos with 
“the white male individualist” and failing to acknowledge how “women—particularly those who are 
not white, middle class, and heterosexual—face countless challenges in constructing an authoritative 
Aristotelian ethos” (RMJ vii). Scholarship on nonhuman rhetorics further critiques this view of 
ethos for overlooking the ways that nonhumans also contribute to the emergence of ethos in a given 
rhetorical situation. In other words, beyond being ethically dubious, viewing ethos only as 
“invented” risks reinforcing unjust cultural stereotypes and granting too much power to human 
subjects. Rhetorical character, in short, seems to be more complex than an ephemeral ethos can 
account for. 
                                                      
77 Aristotle’s concept of ethos has, of course, been thorough critiqued by cultural theorists for reinforcing 
hegemonic structures of power. See, for example, Coretta Pittman’s “Black Women Writers and the Trouble 
with Ethos: Harriet Jacobs, Billie Holiday, and Sister Souljah.” 
78 The list of people who hold some form of this position against a wholly “invented” ethos begins with 
Isocrates and Plato and extends to Quintilian and his famous dictum “the good man speaking well.” These 
ideas are then recycled in the Renaissance and reach into the contemporary moment via liberal humanism. 
See Nan Johnson for an excellent review of the history of ethos in Western thought.  
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In an acknowledgement these challenges, this same collection of scholarship also identifies a 
second kind of rhetorical character. Aristotle calls this other ethos “inartistic” or “atechnic,” 
meaning that it is not part of rhetorical invention. This inartistic ethos precedes the speech act and, 
Aristotle suggests, is beyond the control of the speaker (1355b). Similarly, Amossy leverages Pierre 
Bourdieu’s notion of the “habitus” to theorize her concept of a “prior ethos” that highlights the 
importance of social status and authority in ethos. She assigns this kind of rhetorical character the 
adjective “prior” because, in terms of time, this ethos prefigures any single rhetorical engagement. 
Crowley and Hawhee further describe this phenomenon as a “situated” ethos that derives from 
having “a good reputation in the community” (167). Crucially, they describe how a situated ethos 
necessarily invokes power relations (197). Race, class, gender, sexuality, ability and authoritative roles 
give shape—unjustly, in many cases—to a rhetor’s situated ethos even before communication 
occurs. As such, speakers have less control over their prior ethos, relative to their invented ethos.  
According to Amossy, moreover, these two kinds of ethos interact reciprocally in any given 
rhetorical encounter. Sometimes rhetors may foreground their “prior ethos,” and, at other times, 
they may privilege their “discursive ethos,” but at all times, “the influences between the institutional 
ethos and the discursive ethos are mutual” (21). In short, a tension always exists between a rhetor’s 
invented and prior ethos. And while they may be theoretically complementary, in practice, these two 
kinds of ethos compete with each other. A discursive ethos is constrained by parameters erected by 
a prior ethos, but a discursive ethos also pushes back against the limitations of that prior ethos in an 
attempt to redraw those boundaries.79  
These two conceptualizations of ethos also correspond to two understandings of time. An 
artistic or invented ethos is tied to kairotic notions of time. According to discursive models of 
                                                      
79 For examples of the push and pull between these two types of ethos, see RMJ.  
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rhetorical character, a rhetor crafts an ethos for a particular rhetorical situation. Like the kairotic 
moment itself, this invented ethos fades with the dissipation of the exigency that called for its 
crafting. The prior or situated ethos, on the other hand, is atemporal. This ethos appears to be 
outside of time because it typically exists without a clear antecedent event in the rhetor’s life.80 Even 
when a prior ethos seems to be based on previous historical events (e.g. being elected departmental 
chair), researchers often interpret the authority granted to that prior ethos as if it were a static 
component of the immediate rhetorical context rather than an active element of the interaction. In 
terms of its relationship to time then, ethos is often characterized as either ephemeral or fossilized 
but never liquid. Although this dual categorization of ethos provides a useful framework for 
attending to the temporal extremities of ethos as a momentary element or a static background 
component, it focuses less on the intermediary ways that rhetorical character operates between these 
two temporal poles.  
In other words, while rhetorical scholarship may tacitly assume that ethos accumulates over 
time, it is only just beginning to develop a vocabulary for attending to the impact of ethotic histories 
on present and future rhetorical engagements. Timothy Ballingall nevertheless argues that studying 
the relationship between time and ethos merits attention “because a rhetor’s relationship 
to/experience of time can function as a location from which she speaks, from which she dwells, a 
material resource that may or may not be available, and a material field that, like space, accrues 
meaning through its discursive invocation” (102).81 Here, Ballingall leans on the significance of space 
and place scholarship in rhetoric to argue for the importance of studying of ethos and time. In 
                                                      
80 Someone born as one of India’s Dalits, for instance, did not engage in a particular act that marked that 
person as ‘untouchable.’ Rather, they are unjustly ascribed this social position a priori to any social 
interactions.  
81 In using the term “dwells,” Ballingall invokes Michael J. Hyde’s Heideggerian notion of ethos. Hyde’s sense 
of ethos as “dwelling place,” however, does not refer to a specific physical location as much as it functions as 
a metaphor for an ontological state. For more about Hyde’s views of ethos, see the introduction to his edited 
collection The Ethos of Rhetoric.  
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addition to Ballingall’s research, our everyday cultural discourse identifies a similar relationship 
between character and time. For instance, people often talk about “developing” character, which 
suggests that ethos formation is a process that unfolds over time. Whether the setting is educational, 
athletic, military, religious, or otherwise, the idea of a series of events that “build” character is 
pervasive in Anglophone culture.82 And yet, rhetorical theory could still do more to attune to the 
trans-situational work of ethos. Currently, rhetoric provides the tools for understanding how 
subjectivity and social position constrain ethos formation. And on the other end of the temporal 
spectrum, rhetoric helps speakers and writers craft their character in individual moments. But 
scholarship could still work toward constructing a more robust framework for articulating the 
complex ways that ethos evolves over time and rhetorically shapes worldly interactions. Without 
such a temporally attuned model of ethos, rhetorical theory risks only being able to see the 
immediate imprint of character on a situation and, in turn, not fully understanding the ways that the 
rhetorical impact of ethos often builds over time. 
 
Temporally Complex Ethos  
In the work of articulating a more complex relationship between ethos and time, scholarship 
on ethos and location offers a fruitful entry point. Nedra Reynolds, for instance, defines ethos as “a 
rhetor’s acknowledgment of her social and historical locations” (7), and Judy Holiday calls ethos 
                                                      
82 In fact, contemporary culture tends to regard a person’s character in paradoxical terms: character 
seems to develop over time, but it also remains mostly consistent. After one encounter with an 
individual, that person’s character may be difficult to discern; but after repeated engagements, we 
often think that we know something more reliable about that person’s character. “She’s honest,” we 
say. Or, “He’s unfaithful.” We even use the textual metaphor, “Don’t judge a book by its cover,” to 
warn others not to evaluate the character of something or someone after just one meeting. And 
when people with whom we’ve interacted many times say something that doesn’t align with our 
understanding of them, it is common to regard those remarks as “out of character.” Together, these 
colloquialisms suggest a cultural assumption that character accumulates over time.  
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“habitual gathering places” (389). Their use of “historical” and “habitual” suggests that ethos arises 
not from one event but from repeated actions in a particular locale. Similarly, Michael J. Hyde asserts 
that ethos refers “to the way that discourse is used to transform space and time into ‘dwelling places’ 
(ethos; pl. ethea) where people can deliberate about and ‘know together’ (con-scientia) some matter of 
interest” (xiii).83 Although Hyde uses “dwelling places” as a metaphor for an ontological state, 
dwelling places nevertheless suggest sites where one lives for a long period of time, not a place that 
one visits on a single occasion. In using “dwelling,” Hyde further implies that ethos is somehow tied 
to recurrent rhetorical engagements with(in) a place over time. As a group, this location-based 
scholarship about ethos anticipates but does not explicitly describe a trans-situational picture of 
ethos.  
Feminist rhetorical scholarship begins to further explicate the relationship between ethos 
and time by tracing the evolution of ethos across multiple reprintings of the ‘same’ text. Vicki Tolar 
Burton, for instance, studies the shifting ethos of Hester Ann Rogers, a Methodist writer and mystic, 
in subsequent printings of her spiritual journal. To track these changes between different 
publications, Burton develops the idea of “rhetorical accretion,” which she describes as “the process 
of layering additional texts over and around the original text” (547).84 Using this concept, Burton 
reveals how Rogers’ authorial voice and ethos is co-opted, or “respoken” (547), by the men who 
compile, edit, and re-print her text. In another case study, Suzanne Bordelon leverages Burton’s 
notion of “rhetorical accretion” to show how teacher and author Genevieve Stebbins modifies her 
textual ethos between the first and last editions of her book about stage acting. Contrary to the way 
                                                      
83 Though Hyde’s definition includes a gesture toward time, his subsequent explication primarily focuses on 
furthering the metaphor of communal dwelling places as an ontological state.   
84 Burton contends that “rhetorical accretion” is a method for doing “material rhetoric” (“The Speaker 
Respoken” 546). But, in a formal reply in College English, Catherine Chaput and Danielle Mitchell challenge 
Burton’s assertion that her work is materialist because Burton’s primary evidence is, in fact, discursive. Burton 
responds by clarifying that her understanding of material rhetoric derives less from new materialism and more 
from scholarship on the history of the book.  
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that Rogers’ ethos is subsumed by male voices in Burton’s study, Bordelon highlights how Stebbins 
progressively builds a more authoritative ethos by critiquing her male competitors and “distancing 
herself from major male figures” (127). The concept of “rhetorical accretion” thus helps to 
foreground the ways that women’s voices are silenced or re-situated in the ongoing and gendered 
process of (re-)publication. As these examples indicate, the rhetorical evolution of a writer’s ethos 
often evolves with different printed editions of a text. Sometimes that ethos accretes, other times it 
erodes, and sometimes it is completely refashioned. But while this research illuminates the political 
and rhetorical stakes of attending to the ways a writer’s ethos shifts in subsequent publications, it 
foregrounds textual displays of rhetorical character and sidelines the ways that ethos emerges from 
larger networks of nonhumans, humans, matter, and machines.  
Other rhetorical theories gesture toward an even more entangled portrait of ethos, time, and 
materiality. Fleckenstein’s concept of “cyberethos,” for example, uses Gregory Bateson’s discussion 
of cybernetics to illuminate how, in the context of digital media, ethos becomes distributed across a 
network of actants. In this fluid context, Fleckenstein asserts that “ethos cannot be reduced to an 
essence or located in a single facet of any rhetorical act” (327). Instead, she continues, “[a]s a 
permeable ecology of information pathways, a cybernetic ethos, a cyberethos, emphasizes that a 
change in one loop of an ecology cannot be restricted to that single pathway. Rather it is dispersed 
throughout the ambient network” (331). Although such a distributed sense of character might seem 
to offload ethical responsibility from individual human agents, Fleckenstein asserts that cyberethos 
“offers a means to unite ourselves in an ecology of good character, reconfirming/recreating our 
identity and connectedness within the larger systems that offer us life, and assuming responsibility 
for that identity and that life” (342). In this sense, ethos arises from the interactions of human and 
nonhumans in a rhetorical ecology and likewise positions ethical responsibility as something that 
implicates all participants in the network. Crucially, Fleckenstein’s provocative description of 
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cyberethos hinges on a complex and nonlinear model of cybernetic time.85 According to this model, 
moreover, ethos is not located in a single moment in time but rather surges and swells, dissipates 
and disperses as it circulates over time in the larger ecology.  
Although this notion of cyberethos presents a complex portrayal of the evolution of ethos 
over time, its reliance on Bateson’s theory of cybernetic time positions it primarily in the domain of 
digital media and cybernetics.86 A rhetorical theory of accumulated time might, in turn, extend the 
reach of this temporally-situated and nuanced picture of rhetorical character. Because chronos arises 
from material-discursive interactions in the world, it impacts not only the machine-human ecologies 
that comprise new media technologies but also the nonhuman-human relations that exist outside of 
digital interactions. In the same way that building a theory of digital ethos with Batesonian 
                                                      
85 Fleckenstein’s description of cyberethos derives from a cybernetic view of time that echoes 
elements of the chronos-based time that I theorize in the previous chapter. By way of contrast, 
Fleckenstein first explains that Newtonian time appears to flow linearly with clear effects stemming 
from independent causes. Based on classical physics, this deterministic model of time mirrors the 
linear way that classical rhetoric presents ethos. Fleckenstein summarizes this straightforward view 
of rhetoric: “if we identify the initial cause or the starting point for good character, then we can 
predict and control its persuasive effect” (336). Cybernetic time, on the other hand, is nonlinear and 
probabilistic. Uncertainty complicates the simplicity of cause and effect, making it difficult to trace 
the rise of ethos in a system. “Cyberethos,” Fleckenstein suggests, “draws us into a cybernetic 
aesthetic, where beauty and goodness are implicit within the act itself, not in some intended effect” 
(340). Rather than situating ethos within any single human agent or online avatar, the unpredictable 
multidirectionality of cybernetic time repositions ethos as a component of the larger system.  
86 Batesonian cybernetic time functions similarly to quantum theories of time. Building on her work 
at the intersection of quantum field theory and humanistic inquiry, Karen Barad offers a succinct 
explanation of the ways that quantum physics “troubles” traditional conceptualizations of time. She 
writes: 
Quantum physics not only deconstructs the strict determinism of Newtonian physics, where 
the future unfolds predictably from the past, but it also blows away the progressivist notion 
of time—Benjamin’s ‘homogenous and empty’ time—disrupting first-world efforts to 
harness it as a totalizing system on behalf of universalism and its projects, such as 
imperialism. (“Troubling” 61) 
Like cybernetic time, quantum time disturbs linear notions of time by proposing an indeterminate, 
recursive, and unstable “model” of temporality that is always open to the radical “undoing of time 
(70). But while cybernetic time arises from and impacts digital networks, quantum time extends 
beyond the purview of new media and implicates not just human-machine relations but all human-
nonhuman interactions. 
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cybernetic time yields a nonlinear and networked cyberethos, I suggest that integrating chronos-
based rhetorical time with ethos produces a similarly complex and distributed model of rhetorical 
character.87 Thus, while cybernetic time and chronos time both yield robust models of ethos, the 
latter can extend the reach of Fleckenstein’s theory beyond cybernetics.  
In many ways, crafting a chronos-based and ecological model of rhetorical character 
resonates with the concept of “feminist ecological ethos” outlined by RMJ in the Introduction to 
their eponymous edited collection. Drawing on Lorraine Code’s theories of feminist epistemologies, 
RMJ suggest that the communal cognitive activity of “ecological thinking” comprises a foundational 
and subversive element of women’s ethos formation. Their theory of feminist ecological ethos 
makes visible the important ways that women rhetors resist dominant modes of ethos construction 
by leaning on their ecological interconnectedness. While RMJ emphasize the human elements of the 
ecology metaphor, linking their usage of ecology with broader understandings of ecology begins to 
build a theory of accretive ethos that acknowledges the ways that rhetors are always already knit up 
in networks of nonhumans and humans. Jenny Edbauer Rice, for instance, articulates a theory of 
“distributed rhetorical ecologies” that attempts to account for the amalgamation, transformation, 
and viral distribution of rhetorical forces across a variety of media, locations, and times. Thomas 
                                                      
87 At first glance, however, a complex nonlinear theory of time may seem incompatible with the 
picture of rhetorical time that I established in the first chapter. Chronos, as I outline it earlier, is 
both emergent and material-discursive, two qualities that align with the ways that Barad incorporates 
quantum theories into humanistic inquiry. But the cumulative element of chronos seems to imply a 
Newtonian, capitalist, and deterministic view of time as progressively moving forward. I contend 
nonetheless that the accretion of time need not be linear. Fibonacci sequences, for instance, grow in 
quantity without being linear. The natural accretion of a stone also occurs in an unequal and 
unpredictable manner that depends on the ongoing interaction of many different forces. In short, 
the accretion of rhetorical time does not require a linear sense of time. Furthermore, I do not claim 
that Aristotle’s chronos anticipates cybernetic or quantum theories of time. I simply suggest that 
chronos as an accretion of time is still compatible with nonlinear temporalities, especially those that 
emerge from nonhuman-human relations. I argue, moreover, that the accumulation of nonlinear 
nondeterministic time has important rhetorical implications for an ecological understanding of 
ethos.  
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Rickert’s notion of “ambient rhetoric” further extends Rice’s notion of rhetorical ecologies and, 
unlike Rice’s implicit acknowledgement of materiality, Rickert explicitly emphasizes the importance 
of matter in nonhuman-human rhetorical relations.88 Similarly, Laurie Gries erects a new materialist 
view of “rhetorical transformation” that underscores the deep “entanglement of human and 
nonhuman entities and other environmental factors, each of which is but a phenomenon of ongoing 
historicity” (68). Together, this body of scholarship points toward a more complicated picture of 
ecological rhetoric that—like a cumulative model of rhetorical time—puts into relief the imbricated 
nature of materiality and discourse as well as humans and nonhumans, in rhetorical activity. Thus, in 
an extension of this ecological model of ethos that foregrounds thinking subjects, I use the 
cumulative notion of rhetorical time that I crafted in the previous chapter as a lens through which to 
sketch a model of ethos that emerges from these ever-evolving material-discursive ecologies.89  
  
                                                      
88 As one example of this intertwined relationship between humans and matter, Rickert describes “choric 
invention” as a counterpoint to traditional “topical invention.” Where topical invention foregrounds the 
human agent in the creation of rhetorical arguments, chronic invention underscores the fact that arguments 
always emerge from a larger ecology in which they are “emplaced” (269).   
89 In positioning the ongoing accretion of ethos as a material-discursive phenomena, I do not, 
however, seek to completely erase the role of human agency in ethos formation. Instead, I follow 
Marilyn Cooper, who in her theorization of an “emergent rhetorical agency,” argues that 
“[r]hetors—and audiences—are agents in their actions, and they are responsible for those actions, 
but they are not the sole cause of what happens” (439). Ethos, like rhetoric itself, requires humans. 
But neither ethos nor rhetoric are limited to humans. As such, I seek to foreground the ways that 
ethos emerges from ongoing interactions between humans and other entities in the world, including 
nonhumans, other humans, and matter. In viewing agency as distributed I do not, however, adopt 
the postmodern perspective that Burton critiques with her opening line. She writes, “Postmodern 
indifference to who is speaking is a position authentically available only to those who already possess 
the authority to speak” (545). Instead, I view politics and inequitable power relations as equally 
important to the study of materiality as to the study of language. Agency, as Laurie Gries argues, “is 
a property neither of humans or things; it is not something, in other words, that humans or 
nonhumans have or even acquire. Agency is an act of change that arises from an entanglement of 
human and nonhuman entities and other environmental factors, each of which is but a phenomenon 
of ongoing historicity” (“Still Life” 68).  
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A Theory of Cumulative Ethos 
In an effort to build a framework that attends to the accretion and erosion of rhetorical 
character over time, I posit mapping a chronos-based notion of rhetorical time onto the concept of 
ethos. Integrating these two ideas yields what I call cumulative ethos and establishes a relationship 
between the two primary types of ethos: invented ethos and prior ethos. Cumulative ethos, I 
contend, denotes the nonlinear procedure by which an invented ethos in one moment may 
contribute to a subsequent instantiation of a rhetor’s situated ethos, and vice versa. According to this 
model, as each new invented ethos folds into the past, it jostles and redirects the evolution of the 
rhetor’s situated ethos, which is, itself, the accrual of prior figurations of the rhetor’s invented ethos. 
But this situated ethos is not passive or without suasive potential in present or future rhetorical 
interactions. Instead, it retains some degree of its rhetorical power by becoming both the constraints 
and the components for subsequent iterations of a rhetor’s invented ethos. In this way, cumulative 
ethos tracks the evolution of character across subsequent rhetorical situations. Cumulative ethos is 
not possible, however, without a rhetorical theory of time that reaches beyond single kairotic 
moments. Chronos, in other words, stitches together past, present, and future instantiations of ethos 
into a vibrant rhetorical force.  
Unlike prior theories of artistic and inartistic ethos, however, cumulative ethos does not refer 
to a single rhetorical strategy or to a feature that an agent possesses. Rather, cumulative ethos 
identifies an ongoing process of accumulation that shapes a rhetor’s ethos. Like the slow and uneven 
sedimentation of silt at the mouth of a river, cumulative ethos builds up over time. That steady 
accrual, moreover, is an active force, not a passive one. For the river delta, the accumulation of silt 
redirects the flow of water at the surface; and deep below ground, that same silt deposit puts 
increasing pressure on the sediment beneath it eventually leading to its petrification. Similarly, as 
cumulative ethos grows, it begins to ossify while also exerting greater force on external interactions. 
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And although both cumulative ethos and a silt sandbar may appear to change little over the years, 
they are both susceptible to significant erosion in response to sudden—or sometimes steady—
changes in the larger ecology. Furthermore, a growing silt deposit constitutes one small part of a 
larger river system that constantly redraws itself in response to the seasonal ebbs and flows of the 
river and its riparian zone. Likewise, cumulative ethos is not the sole construction of a human 
subject but rather a perpetually emergent property of human and nonhuman intra-actions in a 
rhetorical ecology. In this way, both the sandbar and cumulative ethos are better understood as the 
ongoing production of a larger ecology.  
Figured as such, cumulative ethos responds to two key problems posed by rhetorical 
theories of ethos. First, cumulative ethos resists simplified conceptions of ethos as a static entity. 
The Romans, for instance, believed that character was marked, in large part, by the immoveable 
force of one’s family name. A model of cumulative ethos, on the other hand, reveals how the 
perpetual accretion of rhetorical character may give the illusion of immobility but is, in fact, still 
vulnerable to alteration and atrophy. Second, cumulative ethos complicates postmodern 
understandings of ethos as something that is always in already splintered state.90 Although 
cumulative ethos is emergent and always shifting like postmodern theories of the subject, rhetorical 
character does not exist only as a series of fragments. Instead, cumulative ethos proposes that those 
disjointed displays of character accrete as they unfold over time, awkwardly settling one on top of 
the other. In this way, each instantiation of ethos is tied—with varying degrees of strength—to prior 
and subsequent manifestations of that ethos. Together, this accumulation of ethotic displays gives 
shape to cumulative ethos. And researchers can, in turn, trace the contours of this evolving ethos, 
however convoluted, as it surges and corrodes with time.  
                                                      
90 For more information about the problems that postmodernism poses to ethos, see Reynolds and Schrag. 
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In some ways, this temporally-situated model of cumulative ethos may sound a lot like a 
rhetorical theory of reputation. Reputation, like cumulative ethos, is trans-situational; it builds and 
erodes over time. Reputation and cumulative ethos are also shaped by politics and power relations. 
And both can have an impact on their rhetorical surrounds. Surprisingly, however, rhetorical 
scholarship about reputation is few and far between.91 Sociologist Gary Alan Fine, however, 
articulates a theory of reputations that appears tacitly rhetorical. In Difficult Reputations, he articulates 
an understanding of reputations as historical, discursive, and fundamentally social creations.92 For 
Fine, reputations do not flow simply from historical events; rather, they are carved and re-carved in 
a complex series of interactions that continually shift as they enter into dialogue with different 
sociocultural groups.93 In Sticky Reputations, Fine further demonstrates how “[r]eputations are not 
merely claims about others, but about selves, and, as such, they structure social order. These 
reputations are not merely claims that have the power to produce stigma, but in the long run, they 
also produce selves” (xvi). Reputations are, in brief, constitutive. To make a claim about another 
subject’s reputation contributes not just to the discursive formation of that subject’s reputation but 
also to the speaker’s reputation. Fine’s discursive and culturally-situated description of reputation 
evokes the theories of constitutive rhetoric as well as Anderson’s rhetorical theory of identity.94 In 
                                                      
91 In addition to being sparse, the rhetorical scholarship about reputation is also quite heterogeneous. 
Aragones and Postlewaite, for instance, consider the role of reputation in political campaigns, while Janangelo 
examines the recuperation of celebrity reputation in a case study of Judy Garland. Spencer Hawkins, on the 
other hand, examines the link between a Sophistic ethos and rapper Snoop Doggy Dog. Finally, Ihlen and 
Shanahan and Seele represent the small cohort of scholars who study corporate reputation.  
92 In taking this position, Fine aims to split the theoretical-methodical difference between two scholarly 
groups he identifies as historicists and social constructionists. For him, reputations are not solely the product 
of the socio-cultural moment from which they arise, nor are they just discursively constructed entities. 
Instead, he asserts, reputations develop based on elements of both these two dimensions.  
93 Again, Fine locates his theory in a middle ground that rejects a static view of reputation based on a rigid 
understanding of the past and, at the same time, dismisses a wholly fluid notion of reputation deriving from 
the whims of contemporary discourse. Instead, he charts a middle path that sees reputation as something 
formed through important interactions in the past and that follows a relatively consistent trajectory—but not 
one that is immune to divergences—into the present moment.  
94 For more information about constitutive rhetoric and rhetorical theories of identity, see Charland and 
Anderson, respectively.  
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this sense, building one’s reputation—like building ethos—is a rhetorical act that implicates self, 
other, and community.  
Although cumulative ethos and reputation have much in common, they appear to differ in 
relation to the ‘presence’ of the subject whose ethos or reputation is in question. While cumulative 
ethos is forged through direct repeated encounters between rhetors and their audiences, reputations are 
shaped through the circulation of discourse about someone. Put differently, a reputation appears to 
garner meaning outside of a direct rhetorical engagement with the subject in question, as in the 
colloquial phrase, “Your reputation precedes you.” Although reputation arises from others’ 
discourses about that subject, ethos, on the other hand, emerges from a subject’s immediate 
rhetorical encounters with others. Simply put, ethos—unlike reputation—is experienced directly. In 
other words, if you want to change your reputation, you have to change how people talk about you; 
but if you want to change your cumulative ethos, you have to change how you talk to people.  
These notions of immediacy and presence that contribute to distinguishing between 
reputation and cumulative ethos are nevertheless complicated by recording technologies such as 
writing. Humanities scholarship, after all, has long challenged the notion that a text provides “direct” 
access to the author.95 At best, texts serve as a Burkean terministic screen, selecting, reflecting, and 
deflecting certain aspects of the author’s ethos. Furthermore, scribes, translators, editors, and 
publishers often add further layers that contribute to the mediation of the author’s ethos. In sum, 
the difference between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ rhetorical engagement is too fuzzy of a line—especially 
when disrupted by time and mediating technologies—to distinguish between reputation and 
cumulative ethos. Recording technologies, as I will demonstrate, often render ethos and reputation 
                                                      
95 See, for example, Barthes.  
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as not just mutually informing but, as Barad would say, ontologically inseparable. They fold in on 
each other even as they unfold together.  
Despite these similarities, ethics marks a subtle but important difference between reputation 
and cumulative ethos. A reputation only sometimes conveys ethical content, whereas ethos always 
carries ethical implications. One teacher, for instance, may have a reputation for being loud, while 
another teacher may have a reputation for being unfair. The latter has clear ethical implications, but 
the former does not necessarily convey any judgment about the teacher’s character. A loud teacher 
may just as easily be fair as unfair. At the same time, however, reputation and ethos have a symbiotic 
relationship. A reputation for being loud, for example, may lead to a perception of that teacher’s 
ethos as draconian or domineering. Similarly, an unjust ethos may yield a reputation for being 
insensitive or “out of touch.” Cumulative ethos and reputation, in other words, often overlap; but 
even when they don’t intersect, they are mutually informing.  
In addition to ethics, cumulative ethos and reputation also differ in their relationship to 
nonhumans. Reputation, through its etymology, is tied to human thinking and discourse, but ethos is 
a more capacious term that remains open to include larger ecologies of humans, nonhumans, and 
matter. As a borrowing from Romance languages, reputation derives from the Latin verbs “putare” 
(to think) and “reputare” (to think over). This emphasis on “thinking” seems to limit the domain of 
reputation to beings capable of thought, an act that privileges humans. Ethos, on the other hand, is 
less bounded by human subjects. Its etymological links to location—especially to “habitual gathering 
places” (Hyde)—suggest a more ecological view of character. Rather than positioning ethos as only a 
trait of human subjects, a location-based view of ethos acknowledges the ways that character is 
nestled in larger networks of nonhumans and humans. Indeed, the materiality of the world plays a 
vital role in the co-creation of ethos, just as humans do. And unlike reputation, the etymological 
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roots of ethos make possible such an inclusive understanding of how character arises from 
nonhuman-human interactions and material-discursive phenomena over time.  
To further explicate this notion of cumulative ethos, I return to the case study of the trial of 
Socrates. In the following section, I examine Xenophon’s account of the trial as well as multiple 
Platonic texts about these events—including the Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, and Phaedo—with the aim 
of highlighting how Socrates’ cumulative ethos (more than his momentary discursive ethos in the 
trial) has a dramatic impact on the city of Athens. This analysis also sheds light on the ways that the 
related concepts of cumulative ethos and reputation often function differently but become conflated 
due to recording technologies such as writing. While cumulative ethos sometimes flies under the 
radar for long periods of time, the stakes of attending to the slow accumulation of character over 
time can, as Socrates’ case demonstrates, be a life or death matter.  
 
Tracing the Accumulation of Socrates’ Ethos  
Xenophon’s version of the trial of Socrates clearly contrasts the notion of cumulative ethos 
with a traditional Aristotelian model of discursive character. Interestingly, though, Xenophon and 
his protagonist Socrates appear to hold different views about the rhetorical impact of character and 
its relationship to the philosopher’s execution. Xenophon argues that the jurors condemn Socrates 
because his oral defense fails to persuade them. He asserts that “Socrates, by singing his own praises 
in court, then, brought the resentment of the jurors down upon himself and forced them to 
condemn him all the more” (32). Xenophon, in other words, positions the trial and its unjust 
outcome as the product of Socrates’ discursive ethos. But this Aristotelian logic gives too much 
weight to an individual rhetorical event. When Xenophon draws an artificial boundary around the 
rhetorical situation of the trial, he forecloses the possibility that elements of previous events might 
also rhetorically impact the trial. A chronos-based view of time, however, makes trans-situational 
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analysis central to rhetoric. And when mapped onto a concept like ethos, chronos offers a chance to 
see how things like Socrates’ previous displays of character accumulate force over time and may 
have a lingering influence on subsequent events such as this trial. When it comes to rhetoric, 
Xenophon—like most Athenians at the time—privileges the immediate discursive context over the 
shifting material-discursive ecologies that give rise to rhetorical interactions with lingering 
consequences.   
Xenophon’s Socrates, on the other hand, implicitly acknowledges the accumulated impact of 
his character on the trial. In the text, when Hermogenes asks Socrates why he is not preparing a 
speech for his defense to the jury, the philosopher responds, “I’ve gone through life without doing 
anything wrong, which I believe is the best way of preparing for my defense” (3).96 In this passage, 
Socrates tacitly dismisses the rhetorical import of speech-writing and, instead, claims that ongoing 
evidence of his character comprises a stronger argument. Crucially, Socrates does not point to a 
single discursive display of character but to the accumulated force of his ethos over his lifetime. 
Although Athenian orators often focused on crafting an effective discursive ethos when giving a 
speech, Socrates implies that his cumulative ethos makes a more powerful case than any speech 
could ever provide. Ironically, then, Xenophon believes that Socrates lived a life of virtue, but unlike 
his protagonist, Xenophon fails to acknowledge the cumulative rhetorical power of that life of 
integrity. Instead, Xenophon treats virtue like a static possession of an individual rather than as a 
rhetorical force that can be mobilized over time. In doing so, Xenophon overlooks the ways that the 
accretive force of Socrates’ character over time impacts the trial. Ultimately, however, the jury finds 
Socrates guilty, which seems to refute Socrates’ belief that his virtuous life makes the strongest 
argument. If his accumulated ethos was so persuasive, then why was he convicted? Despite this 
                                                      
96 Socrates echoes these sentiments again when he says, “I’ve known all along that I’ve lived my entire life 
piously and justly” (5).  
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outcome, I intend to show how the philosopher’s cumulative ethos played a crucial, albeit 
unexpected, role in both the immediate and distant events surrounding the trial.  
As a pedagogue, Socrates’ character derives primarily from his public lessons. His main 
educational tool, moreover, involves asking a series of difficult philosophical questions of 
interlocutors and then catching them when they claim to hold competing convictions. But this 
method of dialectic serves as a zero-sum game for Socrates’ character and his interlocutor’s 
character. At the end of a debate, Socrates always looks wise, and his interlocutors look foolish. 
Even though Socrates claims that he does not deliberately aim to undermine the authority of his 
conversers, the effect is the same at the end of a dialogue: Socrates gains credibility, and his 
interlocutors lose it. In this way, Socrates’ lessons contribute to the growing power of his character 
and subvert the character of the Athenian authorities who he questions, many of whom are active 
jurors. Sensing both the powerful force of Socrates’ cumulative ethos and their own precarity in this 
zero-sum game of character, these frightened members of the Athenian political establishment 
indict, convict, and execute him. Thus, although the philosopher’s character proves to be a 
formidable rhetorical force, it has the opposite effect that Socrates might desire. Socrates’ virtue 
pushes his audience to permanently eliminate his threat to their power. In other words, the jurors do 
not convict Socrates because he gives an ineffective oral defense or because his kairotic appeal to 
character fails in the trial itself. Instead, the jurors fear the aggregated effects of Socrates’ cumulative 
ethos so much that they have him put to death.  
Having distinguished Socrates’ discursive ethos and cumulative ethos, the opening of Plato’s 
Euthyphro helps to differentiate cumulative ethos from the related idea of reputation. This dialogue 
recounts a conversation that Socrates has with Euthyphro while on his way to a pre-trial hearing for 
his impiety at the court of Archon. In the discussion, the philosopher and his eponymous 
interlocutor interrogate different definitions of piety. Before they start their conversation about 
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religious virtue, however, the dialogue opens with a seemingly banal legal exchange. Euthyphro first 
expresses his surprise at meeting Socrates in front of the court: “What’s new, Socrates, to make you 
leave the Lyceum, where you usually spend your time, to spend it here today at the court of the King 
Archon?” (2a). He indicates in his first line that Socrates has a habit or custom of spending his days 
teaching at the Lyceum. Here, Euthyphro refers to Socrates’ reputed daily routine, without gesturing 
toward the ethical implications of those actions. In this sense, Euthyphro speaks of Socrates’ 
reputation, not his ethos.  
But in his second line, the prophet Euthyphro goes beyond Socrates’ daily actions and 
gestures toward his character. “Surely you don’t have some sort of lawsuit before the king, as I do” 
(2a). Euthyphro’s incredulous tone points to a syllogism about Socrates’ ethos that provides the 
foundational logic for this statement:  
People of good character do not belong at court. 
Socrates possesses good character. 
Therefore, Socrates does not belong at the court.97  
And yet, Socrates arrives at court not for a small lawsuit but for an indictment. Upon hearing this, 
the flummoxed Euthyphro exclaims, “What? Someone has indicted you, apparently, for I’m not 
going to accuse you of indicting someone else!” (2b). Again, the prophet makes assumptions about 
Socrates’ ethical comportment, suggesting that he refers to Socrates’ ethos not his reputation. 
Furthermore, this line reveals how Socrates’ character functions rhetorically by convincing 
Euthyphro that Socrates would never attack another citizen with an indictment. Rather than 
                                                      
97 In many contemporary legal systems, the defendant’s character is usually the only one in question. But in 
Athens, if a defendant was found not guilty, then the plaintiff was required to pay a fine for wasting the 
court’s time. In this way, a failed suit would besmirch the accuser’s character. Thus, the ethos of both the 
defendant and the plaintiff were at stake in any given Athenian trial.  
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depicting Socrates’ virtue as an interior trait, this line positions the philosopher’s ethos as an active 
force in the world.  
In this moment, however, Euthyphro’s language does not indicate that he is swayed by 
Socrates’ discursive display of ethos in this individual dialogue; nor does Euthyphro indicate that he is 
persuaded by Socrates’ reputation as an itinerant teacher. Instead, Euthyphro’s belief about Socrates’ 
character appears to have preceded this conversation. In this sense, Socrates’ ethos accrued power 
from his repeated rhetorical engagements with the citizens of Athens in which he displayed a 
similarly upstanding character. Euthyphro is not, I maintain, convinced by Socrates’ “invented” or 
“prior” ethos but rather by the cumulative force of his rhetorical character. Thus, although the 
opening lines of Euthyphro may appear insignificant, they emphasize the rhetorical, ethical, and 
accretive elements of cumulative ethos, which, in turn, highlight some of the modest similarities and 
differences between it and reputation.  
 While reputation remains tied human discourse, cumulative ethos makes explicit the 
interrelation of material-discursive elements, something underscored in Plato’s Crito. This text 
recounts the story of Crito’s failed attempt to persuade Socrates to escape jail before his execution. 
Upon first seeing Crito, Socrates exclaims, “I’m surprised the prison warden was willing to let you 
in.” Crito, in turn, confidently replies, “He knows me by now, Socrates, I come here so often,” 
(43a). Although it is unclear why Crito visits the jail so often, each repeated trip contributes to the 
accretion of his trust and rapport with the guard. And on this particular morning, the aggregated 
effects of his cumulative ethos convince the jailor to grant Crito illicit entrance to Socrates’ cell. But 
Crito’s prior discursive exchanges with the jailor are not the sole persuasive player in this vignette. 
After describing his regular visits, Crito adds, “And besides, I’ve done him a good turn,” (43a). 
While it is ambiguous whether this “good turn” is a friendly favor or a series of deliberate bribes, 
this line suggests that Crito’s cumulative ethos is not fully discursive but also bolstered by material 
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means.98 This opening exchange thus paints Crito’s ethos with the jailor as both cumulative and 
material-discursive.  
When Socrates and Crito begin to debate the virtue of escaping jail, Crito again makes a 
significant distinction between reputation and ethos. Crito begins his argument by claiming that if 
Socrates dies, not only will Crito lose a friend but also his reputation will be tarnished. Crito 
explains:  
many people, who don’t know you or me well, will think that I didn’t care about you, since I 
could have saved you if I’d been willing to spend the money. And indeed what reputation 
could be more shameful than being thought to value money more than friends? For the 
majority of people won’t believe that it was you yourself who refused to leave this place, 
though we were urging you to do so. (44b-44c) 
Here, Crito outlines what seems to be a key divergence between cumulative ethos and reputation: 
Crito’s ethos emerges from his direct interaction with Socrates in that moment, but his reputation arises 
from the circulation of discourse about his actions.  
Furthermore, the stakes of distinguishing between reputation and cumulative ethos, 
especially in a situation like this, are not minimal. In Crito’s case, he knows that trying to save 
Socrates displays his own good character; but Crito also recognizes that others who are not present 
to witness his ethos in this moment will assume that Crito did not try to save his philosopher friend, 
which will give him a bad reputation. In short, Crito fears the public consequences of developing a 
poor reputation despite having a good cumulative ethos. Socrates, on the other hand, only cares 
about his ethos. At one point, the philosopher disparagingly asks Crito about the value of a 
reputation: “[W]hy should we care so much about what the majority think?” (44c). To which Crito 
                                                      
98 Because Crito is notably wealthy and mentions bribery multiple times in the dialogue, it seems like this line 
does, in fact, refer to bribing the guards.  
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swiftly responds, “But you can surely see, Socrates, that one should care about majority opinion too. 
Your present situation itself shows clearly that the majority can do not just minor harms but the very 
worst things to someone who’s been slandered in front of them” (44d). Crito argues that Socrates 
has developed a good cumulative ethos with his pupils at the Lyceum but a bad reputation with the 
majority of Athenian citizens. And that bad reputation is, in Crito’s view, the primary cause of 
Socrates’ conviction and impending execution. Thus, Crito advocates maintaining both a good 
cumulative ethos and a good reputation. From his perspective, the stakes of doing so are nothing 
short of life and death: having both a good reputation and a good cumulative ethos yields a fruitful 
and long life, but having a good ethos and a bad reputation might lead to an early and unjust death.  
Despite these differences between cumulative ethos and reputation, the former can still 
easily transform into the latter. Plato’s Phaedo, a text also set in the Athenian jail, recounts Socrates’s 
last day of life and highlights the interweaving of cumulative ethos and reputation. When a 
representative of the government arrives and tells Socrates to prepare for his death, both Socrates 
and this messenger praise each other’s character. The official, trying to hold back his tears, addresses 
Socrates first: “During the rest of the time you’ve spent here, I’ve known you as the most decent, 
gentlest, and best man who’s ever come to this place” (116c). After he leaves, Socrates turns to his 
companions and says, “What a courteous fellow! During the entire time I’ve been here he’s come in 
and talked to me on occasion, like the excellent man he is. And now how decent of him to weep for 
me!” (116d). Both Socrates and the messenger seem genuinely moved by the other’s ethos and, 
moreover, they indicate that their good character emerged not from a single discursive exchange but 
rather accrued force over a series of daily engagements with each other. As such, they refer to each 
other’s cumulative ethos. But this exchange also points toward the ways that cumulative ethos 
begins to transform into a reputation. Although Socrates experienced the messenger’s cumulative 
ethos directly each day when he visited the philosopher in jail, Socrates’ colleagues were not present 
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for these encounters. So after the messenger leaves, Socrates recounts the nature of this man’s 
rhetorical character to his friends. While Socrates’ associates do not experience the messenger’s 
cumulative ethos directly, they learn of his good repute through Socrates’ explanation. The 
messenger, in other words, builds his cumulative ethos through repeated interactions with Socrates, 
but his reputation is constructed in his absence through Socrates’ retelling of the messenger’s 
character. In this way, cumulative ethos can develop into a reputation when it becomes detached 
from the subject’s immediate actions and begins to circulate independently.  
And yet, the unique narrative structure of the Phaedo complicates this preliminary distinction 
between cumulative ethos and reputation. Unlike most of Plato’s dialogues in which the characters 
speak directly to each other in first-person present tense, the Phaedo employs a frame narrative in 
which Phaedo acts as a narrator who recounts the events of Socrates’ death to his friend Echecrates. 
This framing device means that the Phaedo is composed in the past tense and only occasionally 
integrates first-person dialogue within the larger third-person narrative description. After the 
opening lines establish this framing conceit, however, Echecrates remains silent for the rest of the 
dialogue, leaving the text to be read as if written by a third-person omniscient narrator.99 This 
stylistic choice blurs the first-person dialogue and the third-person description in a way that reminds 
the reader that cumulative ethos and reputation are more similar than not. If ethos arises through 
direct engagement with a subject and, on the other hand, reputation operates in situations where the 
subject is absent, then this blended first- and third-person narration underscores the difficulty of 
trying to identify when a subject is present or absent. After all, even a first-person account of 
Socrates’ trial, like Plato’s Apology, does not provide an unmediated experience of Socrates’ ethos. 
                                                      
99 Occasionally, however, Phaedo uses Echecrates’ name in a direct address. This periodically reminds the 
reader that, despite the appearance of a third-person narration, Phaedo is still technically told from the first-
person viewpoint of the eponymous narrator. For examples of Phaedo addressing Echecrates by name, see 
117b and 118a.  
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Instead, the trial of Socrates is filtered through layers and layers of mediation: Plato’s memory and 
ideologies, ancient Greek manuscripts, medieval editors, English translators, contemporary 
publishers, and so on. These dense levels of mediation make it difficult to tell whether a reader 
engages Socrates’ cumulative ethos or his reputed character, which we might call his reputation.100  
In addition to blurring the divisions between reputation and rhetorical character, the 
technology of writing also makes visible the ways that cumulative ethos lingers beyond the death of 
the subject whose character it describes and, in so doing, becomes a contested rhetorical force. Two 
versions of Socrates’ trial survive to today. Beyond minor formal differences, the primary distinction 
between Xenophon’s brief account and Plato’s more famous version lies in their representation of 
the philosopher’s character. At the outset, Xenophon explains that he composes his narrative as a 
corrective to Plato’s account. In Xenophon’s eyes, Plato’s Socrates appears a bit too unhinged 
because the philosopher never rationalizes why he deliberately weakens his case in his speech.101 In 
Plato’s Apology, Socrates speaks defiantly before the court both in tone and in the content of his 
argument.102 But these aggressive tactics undermine the persuasiveness of his case and risk damaging 
his character. Unless these outcomes are desired for a specific reason, both of these results seem, as 
Xenophon notes, “ill conceived” (1). In response, Xenophon offers a justification for Socrates’ 
unusual behavior. He claims that Socrates deliberately subverts his case because the philosopher 
                                                      
100 While Plato’s text may appear as a representation of Socrates ethos, I contend that Plato does not 
have sole control over the representation of Socrates’ cumulative ethos or reputation. Nor do I 
believe that Plato and Socrates co-construct the philosopher’s ethos in this text. These two views 
privilege rational human activity over the nonhuman and material factors that also contribute to 
ethos formation. Instead, when viewed through the lens of chronos, I suggest that reputation and 
cumulative ethos are continually emergent and, further, that their emergence is always mediated by 
significant material factors.  
101 Admittedly, Socrates’s primary skill is in dialectic, not rhetoric, something that Socrates repeatedly reminds 
the jury in the opening of the Apology (17b). Still, from Xenophon’s perspective, it seemed strange for such a 
self-aware individual to craft an argument that further jeopardized his case.  
102 In terms of content, Socrates does not deny the accusation that he speaks with spirits. And in terms of 
tone, although it was common in ancient Greece to discount your accuser’s argument, Socrates goes further 
and publicly ridicules Meletus before a jury of five hundred of his peers.  
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“already believed he would be better off dead (1). For Xenophon, Socrates’ preparedness for death 
does not, however, derive from a morbid self-loathing or a passive acceptance of fate. Rather, the 
author positions Socrates’ willingness to seek out death as demonstrative of the “strength of his 
character” (33). Xenophon continues, “when he realized it was better for him to die than to carry on 
living, he showed no weakness in the face of death—any more than he turned his back on any other 
good thing—but accepted it, and went to meet it, in good spirits” (33). According to Xenophon, 
Socrates exemplifies courage, not fatalism; and his strategic insubordination during the trial is 
honorable, not miscalculated.  
Xenophon’s depiction of Socrates’ discursive ethos in this moment is, ironically, informed 
by the aggregated effects of Socrates’ cumulative ethos. I claim, in other words, that Xenophon 
justifies Socrates’ behavior in this way because the author himself has been so thoroughly persuaded 
by Socrates’ cumulative ethos that he can only view the philosopher’s trial and death through the 
lens of his accumulated character. Indeed, Xenophon closes his text with a paean to Socrates’ virtue:  
And myself, knowing as I do the man’s wisdom and nobility of character, it’s impossible for 
me to forget him or to remember him without praising him. And if anyone who seeks virtue 
has met with any more beneficial companion than Socrates, I consider him worthy of being 
called the most blessed of all. (34)  
Unlike Plato’s Socrates who appears to speak brazenly without reason in the court, Xenophon’s 
Socrates speaks defiantly with purpose. His picture of Socrates is rational, principled, and deliberate. 
And although Xenophon foregrounds a discursive presentation of character, his willingness to view 
Socrates’ actions through the lens of his accumulated character demonstrates how thoroughly 
Socrates’ cumulative ethos had already penetrated Greek culture.  
Together, these competing depictions of Socrates’ character demonstrate how cumulative 
ethos—through the technology of writing and its blurring with reputation—can exceed the lifetime 
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of the person to whom it is tied. This, in turn, renders cumulative ethos a site of contestation. From 
Xenophon’s perspective, Plato’s portrayal not only stains the image of Socrates’ character but also 
risks having a negative effect on subsequent students of philosophy. If successive pupils view 
Socrates’ teachings through the lens of this trial, then they might see his lessons as less credible. 
Recognizing that Socrates’ perceived character influences the persuasiveness of his teachings, 
Xenophon composes another account of the trial to alter the lingering effects of the philosopher’s 
character on later generations of students.103 Crucially, the technology of writing, makes possible this 
revision of Socrates’ character. The compositions of these two authors thus highlights the continued 
circulation and impact of Socrates’ cumulative ethos beyond his death. And even today, after 
navigating centuries of translations and reprintings, Socrates’ rhetorical character still ebbs and 
flows, gaining and losing suasive force over time as his ethos remains a contested but no less 
influential part of Western training in the humanities. The accumulated force of his ethos does not, 
however, reach us unmediated today. Instead, it is sifted through the sieve of culturally situated 
compositional tools and practices. Whether analog or digital, these technologies make possible the 
lingering existence of rhetorical phenomena, like ethos, beyond the life of any single individual.  
 
Conclusion 
In the end, a picture of rhetorical time as cumulative refigures the way we understand not 
only the trial of Socrates but, more importantly, the accumulated force of rhetorical character. 
Viewing the trial of Socrates through the lens of chronos emphasizes this point: rhetoric is always 
bigger than any individual encounter. No rhetorical interaction exists as an island. Rather, rhetorical 
                                                      
103 Much of Xenophon’s other writings extol the virtues of aristocratic men with the aim of training 
other young men to behave in a similar manner. In this vein, Xenophon’s retelling of Socrates’ trial 
allows him to wield Socrates’ character as an exemplary case study aimed at mobilizing Greek youths 
to virtue.  
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engagements function like a kind of interconnected honeycomb with porous walls that allow for the 
slippage of rhetorical elements from one encounter to the next. This entangled picture of rhetorical 
activity points, in turn, toward the need for more trans-situational rhetorical analysis, especially of 
rhetorical attributes that, like ethos, bleed from one rhetorical situation into another.  
Tracking the rhetorical accumulation of ethos underscores the fact that discursive displays of 
character are not the only kind of ethos that matters to rhetoric. The cumulative power of ethos as it 
moves from one situation to the next can also play an important role in ever-shifting rhetorical 
ecologies. As the trial of Socrates shows, rhetorical character is not just a momentary discursive 
display or static internal trait. Rather, ethos is forged over the course of a lifetime. This cumulative 
ethos is also, as Socrates’ story reinforces, deeply influenced by cultural norms and political systems. 
And when someone’s cumulative ethos grows so powerful that it challenges the status quo, the trial 
of Socrates highlights both the incredible power and the staggering consequences of cultivating a 
provocative cumulative ethos in a heterogeneous polis.  
Lastly, as the competing versions of Socrates’ trial demonstrate, even death does not appear 
to end the accretive impact of character. Instead, writing technologies perpetuate the rhetorical 
influence of ethos beyond the lifetime of individual rhetors. In Socrates’ case, his cumulative ethos 
lingers in the writings of his pupils long after his execution, influencing generations of students for 
centuries to come. And although writing can blur the boundaries between cumulative ethos and 
reputation, Socrates’ trial also makes visible the material and ethical components of rhetorical 
character that differentiate it from reputation. Ultimately, Socrates’s trial teaches us that cumulative 
ethos is a powerful and mobilizing rhetorical force that can—among other things—marshal the 
youth, threaten the authorities, and unite or divide a community.  
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Chapter Three 
Accelerating Character and Time Online: The Circulation of Kanye West’s Internet Ethos 
 
modest | magnanimous | likeable | corny | goofball | ignorant | pervy | self-aggrandizing ideologue | 
innovator | douche | genius | hero | horndog | goofy hack | sick fuck 
hyper-individualist | rebellious virtuoso | desperate troll | moneyed narcissist | deluded pillock thundering 
plonker | bizarro polemicist | unrepentant asshole | God 
 
The above words—in all of their inexplicable contrast—were penned by a bevy of writers 
attempting to describe the mind-boggling character of Kanye Omari West.104 As this list indicates, 
few people have had an ethos as conspicuous, conflicting, and complex as West. And even fewer 
people have had a character that has left such a profound imprint on an industry, a generation, and a 
culture. In an incisive Atlantic article about West, Ta-Nehisi Coates explains one reason why West’s 
celebrity ethos has such a monumental impact:  
humans were not built to withstand the weight of celebrity. But for black artists who rise to 
the heights of [Michael] Jackson and West, the weight is more, because they come from 
communities in desperate need of champions. Kurt Cobain’s death was a great tragedy for 
his legions of fans. Tupac’s was a tragedy for an entire people. When brilliant black artists 
fall down on the stage, they don’t fall down alone. 
Here, Coates highlights how West’s blackness augments the rhetorical imprint of his character on 
American culture and especially on the black community. Indeed, his endorsement of Donald 
Trump’s presidency rattled not just the hip-hop world but also the everyday lives of black Americans 
and other minorities in the United States. Furthermore, West’s parroting of conservative ideas on 
                                                      
104 These terms were pulled from individual sentences in online articles by the following authors: 
Charity; Coates; Fennessey; Garvey; Pearce; Peters; Petridis; Pytlik; and Sheffield. 
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social media has elicited vitriol and vocal condemnation from many of the vulnerable populations 
who are directly and negatively impacted by the discourses and policies of this administration.   
In addition to his status as a black celebrity, West’s cumulative ethos derives further power 
from its circulation, a process accelerated by the networked connectivity of online technologies. In the 
same Atlantic article, Coates describes this phenomenon by comparing West with Michael Jackson. 
From Coates’ perspective, both pop stars exhibit a complicated relationship with race that has had 
rippling repercussions for American culture.105 But while Jackson’s ethos circulated primarily via 
physical records, live performances, and mainstream media coverage, West’s ethos is amplified by 
Web 2.0 technologies and social media platforms that seem to have, Coates asserts, “a more direct” 
imprint on his audiences. If analog media contributed to the rapid growth and distribution of 
Jackson’s rhetorical character, then the machinery of twenty-first century digital networks have 
morphed West’s ethos into a careening centripetal cultural force. The circulation of media on the 
Internet, in other words, has augmented the impact of West’s rhetorical character in ways that are 
dramatically different than prior generations of celebrities.  
This process of circulation complicates the relationship between West’s rhetorical character 
and time. It is tempting, for instance, to draw a clear narrative arc that tells the rise and fall of West’s 
character: starting with his emergence as an unknown producer from Chicago, then growing into his 
own with the bildungsroman of his first couple albums, and rising to the top of the social world with 
his celebrity marriage to Kim Kardashian, and finally tragically falling prey to bankruptcy and mental 
health issues that coincided with his MAGA-hat-loving Trumpism. For a society that has long 
                                                      
105 Specifically, Coates contends that West, like Michael Jackson before him, seeks “white freedom.” 
He describes “white freedom” as the opportunity to pursue your own whims at the expense of 
others in your community whose lives may be shaped by your actions. White freedom is, in short, 
the luxury of ignoring the ways that we are all implicated in the larger communities in which we 
operate.  
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romanticized West as both a human deity and a troubled tragic hero, such a plot checks most of the 
boxes of a Hollywood film. And yet, such a linear narrative is too simplistic for a celebrity in the 
digital age. As Pitchfork reviewer Meaghan Garvey writes, “It remains unclear exactly when West lost 
the map: Perhaps it was recently, or perhaps he has always been an ideologue representing nothing 
more or less than the hyper-individualist.” The past, present, and future of West’s cumulative ethos 
appear scrambled, and the online platforms that circulate his rhetorical character play an important 
role in this puzzling process.  
But the mechanisms that facilitate online circulation not only jumble the temporal structure of 
West’s cumulative ethos, they also muddle the attributes that define West’s rhetorical character. To 
many of his fans and critics, West’s character is marked by an unwieldy mix of conflicting and 
confounding qualities. On his first few albums—the so-called ‘higher education trilogy’—West 
positions himself as a Jesus-loving social justice rapper, a stark contrast to much of the violent and 
overtly sexist “gangsta rap” that was popular then.106 At televised events, however, West often 
behaves like an unabashed narcissist and the “asshole” whom he shamelessly toasts in the chorus of 
his song “Runaway.”107 More recently, his enthusiastic support of President Trump on social media 
has further complicated West’s seemingly inscrutable character. As Micah Peters writes for The 
Ringer, “There is no thread connecting any of his provocations nor his unwieldy philanthropic 
ventures…Taken together, it’s not even possible to project a coherent message onto them. He’s not 
campaigning for anything, he’s just…campaigning.” In sum, West’s ethos has become so perplexing 
                                                      
106 NWA’s Straight Outta Compton is one of the earliest albums associated with gangsta rap, and its sound, 
aesthetic, and ethos left a lasting imprint on hip-hop. For more information about gangsta rap, see Chang 
(307-329) and Watts.  
107 In this song from My Beautiful Dark Twisted Fantasy, West metaphorically raises his glass to many kinds of 
people who have an unappealing character. He sings, “Let’s have a toast for the douche bags / Let’s have a 
toast for the assholes / Let’s have a toast for the scumbags / Every one of them that I know / Let’s have a 
toast for the jerk offs.” 
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that it appears incomprehensible and directionless, in large part due to the virality with which his 
words, songs, and videos circulate in online environments.   
 Despite the ways that Internet circulation seems to render West’s rhetorical character 
enigmatic, his cumulative ethos is not wholly unintelligible. Rather, the circulation of West’s 
rhetorical character is temporally complex, and better understanding how online circulation bends both 
time and ethos can help make sense of West’s rhetorical character. Furthermore, the temporal 
complexity involved in online circulation makes the dissemination of West’s ethos on the Internet a 
compelling case study for complicating linear assumptions about the evolution of rhetorical 
character over time. For instance, sometimes corporations such as NBC or Def Jam Recordings play 
a large role in the dissemination of West’s ethos, controlling the breadth, depth, and online archival 
of West’s rhetorical character with a top-down model of circulation that resembles traditional print 
distribution. In these situations, West’s ethos slowly but surely saturates these digital networks. Other 
times, West’s ethos zips around the Internet in an unpredictable, uncontrollable, and often 
unorganized manner facilitated by dense networks of social media users liking, re-posting, and re-
tweeting content in ways that disrupt the steady accretion of West’s online ethos. Unlike the model 
of circulation that leads to the saturation of ethos, these decentralized and nearly instantaneous 
interactions between different nodes in a social network lead to ruptures in West’s ethos. Together, 
these twin notions of saturation and rupture form a dynamic that helps makes sense of West’s 
perplexing rhetorical character as it circulates on the Web. More importantly, this dual framework 
articulates the uneven ways that ethos accumulates over time as it moves through some of today’s 
fastest moving rhetorical ecologies.  
To better illuminate these interlocked rhetorical processes, I first offer a detailed discussion 
of how character circulates in temporally complex ways in online environments. Next, I build on this 
understanding of circulation by developing the paired concepts of rhetorical saturation and rhetorical 
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ruptures, two ideas that function in ongoing tension with each other and shape the evolution of ethos 
over time in networked ecologies. To illustrate the workings of these interrelated concepts, I 
examine West’s ethos as it circulates through a series of digitally mediated moments surrounding the 
staggered release of his seventh studio album The Life of Pablo (TLOP). I use this analysis both to 
elucidate the complexities of West’s rhetorical character and, more importantly, to demonstrate how 
the circulation of Internet-mediated interactions contribute to dramatic fluctuations of ethos over 
time in a networked world. Without attending to this dynamic relationship between circulation, 
character, and time, West’s ethos might otherwise continue to appear incoherent and baffling. 
Moreover, failing to acknowledge the tension between these intertwined concepts risks depicting the 
accrual of character over time as a steady, linear, and evenly balanced process, an impression that 
glosses over the unbalanced and asymmetrical accumulations that give online ethos its rhetorical 
shape and force. 
 
Overlooking Time in Online Ethos 
Articulating the relationship between online networks and ethos is well-charted territory, but 
how those ideas connect with time is less apparent. In one of the earliest monographs dedicated to 
the rhetorical analysis of Internet discourse, Barbara Warnick examines the role of civic discourse 
online. Like Walter Ong’s study of the transition from oral to print culture,108 Warnick historicizes 
the shift from print ethos to digital ethos. She argues that, prior to the eighteenth century, authors—
in good Aristotelian fashion—constructed their credibility primarily within the text itself. Warnick 
continues to explain that authorial strategies shifted as literacy rates in the West began to climb, and 
writers began to lean more on the durability of name recognition than on their discursive ethos for 
                                                      
108 Ong situates many of his boldest claims about orality, media, art, and pedagogy in Western culture in his 
seminal work, Ramus: Method and the Decay of Dialogue. 
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credibility. But online texts, she explains, put pressure on both of these methods of ethos 
construction. As a holdover from print culture, many webtexts still fail to explicitly establish their 
credibility within the hypertext itself. And yet, unlike print, these same webtexts abandon name 
recognition as a model for building trust. Many websites, in fact, deliberately obfuscate the identities 
of their authors, and frankly, very few websites are composed by a single writer. In the end, these 
apparently authorless webtexts exhibit, in Warnick’s view, dubious credibility. Ultimately, Warnick’s 
two-fold picture of online ethos—as a discursive construction or as a static background component 
like name recognition—echoes the bifurcated view of rhetorical character that I discussed in the 
previous chapter. And like that binary sense of ethos as either “invented” or “prior,” Warnick’s 
model leans on a dualistic understanding of the timeframes that impact rhetorical character. For her, 
online ethos is either kairotic or permanent but only implicitly fluid. The online context, therefore, 
seems to reinforce a temporal dichotomy that struggles to account for the ways that rhetorical 
character builds over time.  
Such a bifurcated sketch of the temporalities that figure online ethos is complicated, though, 
by scholarship about the simultaneity of online identities. In Life on the Screen: Identity in the Age of the 
Internet, sociologist Sherry Turkle asserts that the imbricated networks of humans and computers 
that comprise the Internet extend postmodern theories of identity. According to Turkle, the Internet 
contributes to the fragmentation of the self and encourages the simultaneous existence of multiple 
identities. Although Turkle does not leverage rhetorical scholarship, the connection between her 
understanding of digital identities and this growing picture of digital ethos is clear: where scholars 
once imagined that shifts in ethos only occurred one at a time in a linear sequence, Turkle’s research 
suggests that Internet users maintain and manipulate many instantiations of their online ethos at the 
same time. Like Warnick’s work, Turkle’s scholarship underscores another way that digital 
technologies complicate classical notions of rhetorical character. In addition to attending to the 
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accretion of ethos over time, networked technologies require a model of ethos that accounts for the 
simultaneous operation of multiple—sometimes competing, sometimes complementary—iterations 
of rhetorical character.   
Still, any framework that theorizes multiple simultaneous instantiations of ethos needs a way 
of articulating the relationship between those instantaneous variations. In Remediation: Understanding 
New Media, Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin develop an understanding of new media that 
attends to the connections between the plurality of mediated selves propagated by networked 
technologies. Their theory rests on the idea that so-called new media are the “remediation” of old 
media. They contend, for example, that “the heterogeneous ‘windowed style’ of World Wide Web 
pages, the desktop interface, multimedia programs, and video games” is not a novel design but 
simply a remediation of “earlier ‘multimediated’ spaces of Dutch painting, medieval cathedrals, and 
illuminated manuscripts” (31).109 Bolter and Grusin then mobilize this theory of remediation to study 
the relationship between new media and the self, claiming that “[w]e understand our mediated selves 
as reformed versions of earlier mediated selves” (232).110 Although they discuss subjectivity rather 
than ethos, their understanding of digital selves as always “remediated” suggests that each 
instantiation of a mediated ethos does not exist in Aristotelian isolation but rather recycles aspects of 
                                                      
109 Bolter and Grusin add, moreover, that remediation entails two paradoxical yet key processes: immediacy 
and hypermediacy. Immediacy attempts to eliminate all traces of mediation in an effort to provide “a more 
immediate and authentic experience” (19). The invention of linear perspective in Renaissance painting and 
contemporary virtual reality games both serve as examples of “a medium whose purpose is to disappear” (21). 
As the counterpoint to immediacy, hypermediacy involves the foregrounding of the act of mediation. The 
“windowed style” of the World Wide Web or a computer interface is an example of media that “does not try 
to erase itself” (33). Together, immediacy and hypermediacy constitute the “double logic of remediation” (2-
15) that describes how new media oscillate between revealing and obfuscating their mediation.  
110 This process of remediated selves, in turn, complicates the phenomenological difference between subjects 
and objects. For Bolter and Grusin, humans are always both the subject and object of their mediation. Bolter 
and Grusin are careful, however, not to fall into the trap of technological determinism. The do not hold, for 
example, that new media act as the sole or even primary factors in the creation of the self. Instead, they 
acknowledge new media as one of many actants involved in the formation of the self. 
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other mediated selves.111 Crucially, however, Bolter and Grusin deny that the process of remediation 
involves “a historical progression, of newer media remediating older ones and in particular of digital 
media remediating their predecessors” (55). Instead, they describe remediation as “a genealogy of 
affiliations, not a linear history, and in this genealogy, older media can also remediate newer ones.”112 
An Instagram user’s ethos, for example, may derive in part from their earlier Facebook ethos, but 
their Instagram ethos may impact their Facebook ethos in return. And, as is often the case, both the 
Facebook ethos and the Instagram ethos may operate at the same time and mutually remediate each 
other. In this way, the theory of remediation provides a way to stitch together the many fragmented 
and simultaneously active online selves that Turkle describes in her sociological research. As such, 
Bolter and Grusin create a more complicated picture of the connection between multiple 
simultaneous instantiations of ethos on different online platforms. 
Despite the versatility of these theories for understanding the relationship between 
networked technologies and rhetorical character, they all emphasize the internal and relatively static 
aspects of new media texts, which makes it difficult to attend to the complex changes in ethos over 
time that we see in a figure like Kanye West. Bolter and Grusin, for instance, account for macro-
level alterations in digital texts over time, but the examples that they investigate foreground the 
discrete, rather than continuous, iterations of those websites, computer applications, and video 
games.113 While such studies prove fruitful for tracing generic and cultural trends in new media, 
Collin Gifford Brooke offers another method that attends to nuanced local fluctuations in rhetorical 
                                                      
111 Bolter and Grusin go on to connect “immediacy” and “hypermediacy” to the concepts of the “virtual self” 
and the “networked self,” respectively. For more information about these dual aspects of remediated selves, 
see Chapter 15 “The Remediated Self,” Chapter 16, “The Virtual Self,” and Chapter 17 “The Networked 
Self.” 
112 As examples of this nonlinear process of remediation they explain: “Television can and does refashion 
itself to resemble the World Wide Web, and film can and does incorporate and attempt to contain computer 
graphics within its own linear form. No medium, it seems, can now function independently and establish its 
own separate and purified space of cultural meaning” (55).  
113 See, for example, their discussion of the “windowed style” of the World Wide Web (33). 
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aspects of new media. He advocates disbanding textual analysis of online spaces and, instead, 
conducting rhetorical analyses of dynamic interfaces as sites where multiple media intersect.114 In Lingua 
Fracta: Toward a Rhetoric of New Media, Brooke argues that scholars “must begin to move from a text-
based rhetoric, exemplified by our attachment to the printed page, to a rhetoric that can account for 
the dynamics of the interface” (26). To accomplish this paradigm shift, Brooke leans on an 
ecological understanding of digital rhetoric as “vast, hybrid systems of intertwined elements, systems 
where small changes can have unforeseen consequences that ripple far beyond their immediate 
implications” (28). For ethos, this interstitial and ecological understanding of new media means that 
rhetorical character does not reside alone in the alphabetic text or photographic visualizations on 
any single webpage. Instead, an online ethos is, as Jimmie Killingsworth attests, “distributed” across 
the bodies, machines, and networks that comprise these digital environments (2010).115 In other 
words, new media reposition ethos not as a locatable attribute but rather as a quality infused in the 
system. A user’s Twitter ethos, for instance, emerges not only from the discursive content of the 
tweets but also from the affordances and constraints of the interface that makes possible those 
tweets as well as from the algorithms that disseminate those tweets. Online ethos, in this sense, is 
not just the remediation of other forms of ethos but also deeply entangled with the technologies that 
make those mediated and remediated instantiations of ethos possible. Unlike a static understanding 
of online rhetorical character, this dynamic model makes space not just for an emergent ethos but 
also for one that accumulates over time.  
This dynamic view of online activity does not, however, immediately make visible the 
mechanisms by which rhetorical character accrues force over time. Kristie S. Fleckenstein, in fact, 
contends that the distributed nature of “cyberethos” is so deeply entangled with its network that it is 
                                                      
114 For a more detailed account of Brooke’s critique of Bolter and Grusin, see Lingua Fracta (16-19). 
115 Killingsworth’s research specifically investigates online identities, but his conclusions about the distributed 
nature of digital identities extends, I believe, to online ethos.  
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impossible to isolate and trace any single instantiation of rhetorical character from moment to 
moment. She asserts that “[w]e cannot point to any one part of the array of pathways and say, ‘here 
lies good character’ because it is a property of the entire configuration, situated only in its own flow 
and traceable back to no single causal force” (329). Although I share Fleckenstein’s hesitancy to 
pinpoint ethos at any individual node in a network, I nonetheless suggest that researchers can still 
examine specific displays of online ethos precisely because rhetorical character is cumulative. Despite the 
emergent, multiple, and intertwined nature of online ethos that she describes, it still accumulates. 
And the way that ethos accrues force as it circulates and constellates around particular online nodes 
makes those nodes worth investigating. Put differently, online ethos may be ever-present in the 
network, but it is not always salient; rather, its salience emerges from the accretion of online ethos in 
particular moments. Given this understanding, I argue that researchers can still investigate how 
certain nodes function as beacons around which an online ethos periodically swells and dissipates 
while also maintaining conceptual complexity, provided that scholars treat the online interactions 
from which ethos emerges as an ongoing process rather than as a single static entity. And on the 
Internet, the primary mechanism that impacts this buildup of ethos over time at certain points in 
online networks is circulation.  
 
Using Circulation to Foreground Temporality in Online Ethos 
Although rhetorical scholarship has developed a variety of ways of conceptualizing online 
ethos, those theories do not yet fully account for time in part because they do not often explicitly 
engage the concept of circulation.116 In fact, until the past couple of decades, circulation has played 
                                                      
116 Originally, circulation studies emerged as a subfield of mobility studies. But today, circulation studies is 
marked by its scholarly heterogeneity. Gries summarizes mobility studies as “sociological concerns about 
collective formation, spatial-temporal concerns about scale and flow, new materialist concerns about matter 
and agency, and cultural concerns about images, representation, and subjectivity” (Gries and Brooke 7). For 
more information about mobility studies and circulation, see Sheller.   
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only a minor role in rhetoric and its related fields. Nonetheless, in her introduction to Circulation, 
Writing, and Rhetoric, Laurie Gries illuminates the ways that circulation “has always been important to 
studies of rhetoric and writing” (1),117 and especially in its relationship to the last canon of classical 
rhetoric, delivery.118 While some scholarship in rhetoric and writing examines the delivery of print 
texts, theories of rhetorical circulation gain temporal complexity when considered in the context of 
online media.119 Jim Ridolfo and Danielle DeVoss, for instance, coin the term “rhetorical velocities” 
to describe how “acts of delivery cascade and ripple across digital space” (“Composing”).120 For 
them, digital technologies increase the speeds at which discourses circulate, which also typically 
increases their cultural significance. Rhetorical velocities, they suggest, track the relationship between 
circulation, time, and the rhetorical impact of digital discourse. Theories like this emphasize the 
importance of temporality when considering the online circulation of rhetorical elements such as 
ethos.  
Many theories of digital circulation, however, preserve implicit assumptions about 
temporality from print culture that problematize their relationship to online ethos and its digital 
development over time. Michael Warner highlights these differences between print and online 
circulation when he argues that the term “circulation” emerges from a print economy and, as such, 
presumes a centralized institution such as a television station or a newspaper company that 
                                                      
117 Gries identifies the classical concepts of endoxa, commonplaces, and delivery (and their contemporary 
reworkings) as examples of “implied” circulation that have long been significant to the fields of rhetoric and 
writing.  
118 For more information about the relationship between circulation and delivery, especially in the context of 
new media, see Chapter 7 “Performance” of Brooke’s Lingua Fracta.  
119 For scholars of rhetoric and writing, the concept of circulation often invokes both Marxist and 
cultural studies frameworks. Viewed as a whole, this scholarship depicts circulation as the process by 
which texts accrue value, cultural meaning, and affective energies as they move throughout the social 
milieu. For more information on these topics, see Trimbur; Chaput; Lee and LiPuma; and Eyman. 
120 Elsewhere, Ridolfo and DeVoss contend that “one may understand and analyze the rhetorical velocity of a 
piece of digital rhetoric based on its short and long-term positive, negative, and neutral rhetorical 
consequences in relationship to the orienting author(s) and their intentions” (“Remixing” 66). 
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disseminates texts at standard times.121 In terms of temporality, he insists that this print-based model 
of transmitting discourse implies a kind of “punctuality” that is unfit to describe the spread of digital 
texts that “are increasingly organized as continuous (‘24/7 instant access’) rather than punctual” 
(97). For Warner, print circulation is standardized to be released, en masse, at specific time intervals, 
but Internet discourse exists as a constant stream that seems so ubiquitous that it appears to 
function outside of time. On the contrary, Dale M. Smith and James Brown Jr., argue that, in 
addition to the always-available content that Warner describes, Internet communication is also 
marked by key moments of aggregated dissemination, akin to print circulation. They explain that the 
“Internet is not without temporality, and the timestamping of nearly everything online (Facebook 
and Twitter status updates, news stories, blog posts) indicates that the Internet does in fact exhibit 
the punctuality discussed by Warner” (214). Thus, while Warner articulates a difference between 
print and digital circulation that lies in their relationship to time, Smith and Brown demonstrate how 
online communication exhibits elements of both print-based temporalities as well as digital 
temporalities. Put differently, Internet interactions—including the accumulation of online ethos—
are defined by their relationship to timeliness and timelessness. This dualistic perspective begins to 
enrich our understanding of online temporalities by depicting a temporal dialectic that underscores 
the kairotic and fixed elements of ethos in online spaces. In this chapter, though, I wish to turn the 
spotlight of inquiry to the interstitial conceptual territory between these two temporal extremities 
and consider, in more detail, how an online ethos might evolve over time.  
To better comprehend how Internet circulation gives rise to the irregular accumulation of 
rhetorical character over time therefore requires a model that situates the temporal poles of online 
                                                      
121 Similarly, DeLuca and Wilferth (2010) claim that visual rhetoric scholars who analyze the 
circulation of digital images are simply re-inscribing static print-based ideas on digital photographs 
and, in so doing, obscuring the dynamism of digital circulation. As an alternative to studying 
circulation, DeLuca and Wilferth propose analyzing a photo’s “eventfulness.” 
  
 
99 
activity in a dialectical relationship. Building on Alexander R. Galloway’s theorization of Internet 
protocol, Smith and Brown propose the “event” and the “archive” as just such a framework.122 They 
theorize that the “event”  
is paradigmatic of the horizontal nature of protocol: nodes light up, and each node is part of 
a flattened space. Twitter and Facebook experience high traffic during events (from the 
Super Bowl to the protests during the Arab Spring). Information is distributed nearly 
instantaneously from node to node, and it becomes difficult to locate any kind of central 
hub. (215)  
For them, “events” describe the unorganized and decentralized communication that seems to flow 
perpetually and, as such, lacks the “punctuality” that Warner believes is indicative of circulation. By 
contrast, they explain that the “archive” refers to  
                                                      
122 In Protocol: How Control Exists After Decentralization, Alexander R. Galloway posits “distribution” 
and “circulation” as two complementary forces that govern the dissemination of media in online 
environments. He contends that all interactions on the Internet are marked by a tension between 
centralized and decentralized forces. For him, “networked distribution” denotes the autonomous 
interaction that can occur between any two (or more) nodes in the network. Such a model of 
networked communication is made possible because each node functions as both a sender and 
receiver of information. “Circulation,” on the other hand, describes the vertically-oriented forces 
that simultaneously disseminate specific digital content to passive online recipients. “Circulation in 
this sense,” Smith and Brown summarize, “requires hierarchy. It relies on hubs that move 
information at predictable intervals. These rhythms don’t go away in the realm of [Internet] 
protocol; rather, they are complemented by the more horizontal, peer-to-peer nature of networked 
distribution” (211). Together, the concepts of circulation and networked distribution highlight the 
competing power dynamics that govern Internet communication, including the dissemination of 
rhetorical components such as ethos. As an example of this duality, Galloway analyzes the reciprocal 
relationship between TCP/IP and DNS (domain name system). TCP/IP is the protocol that 
facilitates the horizontal communication between different nodes on the Internet. While the DNS is 
a giant database that takes on the hierarchical role of transposing specific IP addresses into URLs. If 
the URL is omitted from that database, then webpage is disconnected from other nodes on the 
Internet. In the end, Galloway concludes that “understanding these two dynamics in the Internet 
means understanding the essential ambivalence in the way that power functions in control 
societies…to grasp ‘protocol’ is to grasp the technical and the political dynamics of TCP/IP and 
DNS at the same time” (2004, xv). Galloway thus elucidates the tension between horizontal and 
vertical power dynamics at play in Internet discourse but spends less time considering this model’s 
relationship to online temporalities.  
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the vertical order imposed upon the horizontal mess of events. The archive imposes 
temporal order on the event—it solidifies it on hard drives, securing it, even guarding it. This 
is hierarchical end of protocol. In theory, the archive means that the event can always 
potentially be excavated—that materials posted to the Internet on the fly can always return 
from the dead. (215-216)123  
Unlike events, which are spontaneous and nearly instantaneous, archives only come to exist over 
time. Archived materials are timestamped and organized into threads, stories, and timelines that 
systematize information and control the mechanisms of its delivery. According to Smith and Brown, 
the event and the archive outline the inherent temporal tensions of communication on the 
Internet.124 As such, events and archives provide an apt model for investigating the relationship 
between the circulation and accumulation of online ethos.  
Event and archives, moreover, may sometimes appear stable or singular, but they actually 
denote an ongoing series of interactions that are governed by competing forces and that compile at 
different speeds. The Super Bowl, for example, may occasion a vast array of simultaneous and 
imbricated conversations on Twitter, but rather than thinking of any one tweet about the Super 
Bowl as a single viral event that moves independently, it is more useful to think of that tweet as an 
ongoing record of a rapidly unfolding dialogue that comprises growing numbers of likes, retweets, 
and comments. Similarly, a YouTube archive of highlights from the Super Bowl is not fixed either. 
                                                      
123 Because Smith and Brown are concerned, in part, with ethics, they caution that the temporal durability of 
the archive also allows it to “be monitored, isolated, and preserved for future functionality by institutional and 
bureaucratic procedures” (216). As examples of this archival behavior, they point to the Internet Archive and 
also the Library of Congress’ archive of Twitter tweets that has yet to be opened to the public for mining.  
124 Few online activities, of course, can be categorized solely as an event or an archive. Rather, most 
online activities exhibit elements of both events and archives in tension with each other. 
Furthermore, it seems as if online rhetorical interactions that begin, primarily, as events can later 
become archives, and vice versa. Although Smith and Brown do not explicitly note this possibility, it 
appears likely, if networked activity is shaped by the dialectical relationship between events and 
archives, that those dominant forces can shift over time, leading to the archival of events and, 
conversely, to the eruption of events from within archives.  
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Although it serves as a record of a specific occasion that occurred a one moment in time, it too can 
be liked, shared, commented on, and embedded in other webpages. In this sense, both events and 
archives function as “medial interfaces” (23) that Brooke suggests are central to understanding 
online rhetorical encounters. Rather than treating Internet-based activities as static texts, Brooke 
advocates analyzing the interstices of networked interactions; and events and archives, as Smith and 
Brown have theorized them, seem to provide just such dynamic sites for examination. Given how 
events and archives describe the temporal and political relations that shape online rhetorical activity, 
these twin concepts also provide an integral framework for investigating the constellations afforded 
by online circulation.  
In this chapter I aim to extend this event-archive dialectic to account not just for online 
temporalities but also for ever-present rhetorical phenomena such as ethos that ebb and flow with 
circulation over time. As I outlined in the previous chapter, rhetorical character challenges notions 
of temporality because it is always present but not always prominent. Thus, although the event-
archive model sketches the temporal tensions that structure distinct online interactions, the concept 
of ethos begs for an expanded framework that explains how omnipresent rhetorical phenomena rise 
and fall in salience as they seep or burst through the online ecologies that manifest them.  
Based on the event-archive framework for digital circulation, I propose a parallel dialectic 
that explains how ever-present rhetorical phenomena such as ethos accrete as they circulate online. 
This model theorizes two complementary processes—rhetorical ruptures and rhetorical saturation—
that describe the uneven swelling of ethos at certain nodes in networked interactions. Like Smith 
and Brown’s “events,” rhetorical ruptures mark the rapid accrual of ethos that arises immediately 
and often unexpectedly from decentralized online interactions. And like Smith and Brown’s 
“archives,” rhetorical saturation describes the elongated process of a centrally-circulated ethos 
permeating a larger network of Internet communication. If events and archives elucidate the 
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relationship between online circulation and temporality, then rhetorical ruptures and rhetorical 
saturation illuminate how the time-sensitive distribution of digital media contributes to the swelling 
influence of omnipresent rhetorical forces, such as ethos, at certain localized points in the network.  
To further explicate this process of rhetorical saturation and rupture, I return to Kanye West 
and an example from his career that is especially notable for the temporal complexities involved in 
the online circulation of his variegated ethos. Specifically, I analyze an evolving series of interactions 
that center on the release of the a capella track “I Miss the Old Kanye” from West’s album TLOP.125 
As the song title suggests, the lyrics recount the change in West’s ethos over time, from the “old 
Kanye” to the “new Kanye.”126 Its minimalist audio production, too, highlights West’s ethos. The 
song features only West’s vocals; no backing tracks, no audio samples, not even a beat—just West’s 
voice. In short, no other track in West’s oeuvre is so deeply and openly concerned with his ethos. 
Additionally, this song stands out due to the staggered timeline of its release. Traditionally, artists 
release hit singles one time. But West released “I Miss the Old Kanye” multiple times, at different 
points in its development, and on different media, all over a period of several months in 2016.127 
                                                      
125 As an album, TLOP did not have a standard release. TLOP was the first of West’s albums to be released 
fully online. But unlike other artist’s albums that were released online on a single date, TLOP was released 
multiple times, on multiple platforms, and with different content each time. For more information about its 
release, see Petridis and C.M.  
126 90% of the rhymes in this song involve the tautological act of rhyming “Kanye” with “Kanye,” an identical 
rhyme. This, too, is evidence of the centrality of West’s ethos on this track. To see the lyrics to this song, see 
Appendix A.  
127 An early draft of “I Miss the Old Kanye” first appeared on Feb 13, 2016 during a Saturday Night 
Live (SNL) skit called “Kyle vs. Kanye” that featured cast member Kyle Mooney competing against 
West in a rap battle. After airing on national television, NBC then uploaded this video to its website 
and to other social media sites such as YouTube and Facebook. At the same time, on Valentine’s 
Day, West released the whole album TLOP, including the track “I Miss the Old Kanye,” for 
streaming and downloading on his website and on Tidal.com. The album was available for download 
for a few hours and then subsequently limited to streaming only. Despite this initial Internet-only 
release, West continued to work on the album over the next months, updating, remixing, and adding 
tracks to the album even as listeners were already streaming it. During this period, West did not 
modify or update “I Miss the Old Kanye.” Then, on March 30, West tweeted the lyrics to “I Miss 
the Old Kanye,” one line at a time, on Twitter, but many fans and critics mistook the lyrics for West 
“ranting about himself” (Capital FM). Only when West subsequently tweeted a link to 
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This song’s elongated transition from circulation via a centrally-organized media organization like 
NBC to an Internet-based distribution across a variety of digital platforms makes “I Miss the Old 
Kanye” an excellent case study for exploring how ethos develops in different ways depending on the 
nature of its circulation. As such, each of these mediated moments—live television, internet videos, 
social media blasts, and streaming audio recordings—contributes not just to the evolving release of 
this song but also to the push and pull of rhetorical ruptures and rhetorical saturation that shape the 
accumulation of West’s online ethos over time. In what follows, I use the event-archive dialectic to 
show how the circulation of “I Miss the Old Kanye” on each of the aforementioned media 
contributes to the rhetorical rupturing or rhetorical saturation of West’s ethos, an imbricated and 
cumulative process that has left a powerful impact on his listeners and on American culture in ways 
that can still be felt today.128  
 
  
                                                      
www.ilovekanyesong.com did many of his followers realize that West’s sequence of tweets were 
lyrics to “I Miss the Old Kanye.” Two days later, when West released another version of TLOP to 
other streaming services including Apple Music, Spotify, and Google Play, the track “I Miss the Old 
Kanye” remained exactly the same as its earlier release, but the title of the song had officially 
changed to “I Love Kanye.” Together, this array of events charts the sequential roll out of West’s 
only a capella song across a variety of media and networked platforms.  
128 Although I discuss these moments in chronological order—the live TV skit on SNL, its YouTube 
circulation, the a capella version of the song on the initial album release, and the subsequent Twitter 
blast of its lyrics—I emphasize that the order is, at best, ancillary to the analysis. After all, in 
networked environments, the tension between the event and the archive disrupts notions of 
linearity. Events happen at certain times, which archives then preserve, but these events and archives 
circulate and surge in different ways depending on the nature of their mediation and other cultural 
factors. Furthermore, my analysis sometimes focuses on one end or the other of this dialectic, but in 
online environments neither rhetorical saturation nor rhetorical ruptures operate totally in isolation. 
While one may dominate certain scenarios, the two always function in tandem on the Internet. That 
being said, offline media—such as network television stations—are not necessarily governed by the 
same online distribution mechanisms. The centralized circulation of network and cable television, in 
fact, renders many TV programs vulnerable, primarily, to rhetorical saturation.  
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Establishing the Conditions for Rhetorical Saturation 
Rhetorical saturation occurs in situations when an ever-present rhetorical phenomenon such 
as ethos is circulated through networks by centralized forces that prioritize the archive as the primary 
means of interacting with content over time. Archives amass mountains of content and make those 
materials available to users in a specifically curated fashion that often foregrounds certain rhetorical 
attributes—such as ethos—and downplays others. This practice of privileging certain rhetorical 
elements at the expense of others through their juxtaposition in the archive (one after another after 
another) is rhetorical saturation.  
The earliest iteration of the song “I Miss the Old Kanye” demonstrates this process of 
rhetorical saturation. “I Miss the Old Kanye” first circulated on live television as part of a comedy 
sketch called “Kyle vs. Kanye” on NBC’s Saturday Night Live (SNL).129 This four-minute skit pitted 
cast member Kyle Mooney in a hip-hop battle against celebrity rapper Kanye West. But before its 
debut on February 13, 2016, the prior dissemination of three other types of media created an 
archival environment primed for saturation by West’s cumulative ethos. Together, the centralized 
circulation of earlier SNL sketches, previous hip-hop battles, and West’s former television 
appearances comprised a curated, but unbounded, triptych of archived content that established the 
foundational conditions that would eventually lead to West’s ethos completely inundating this skit 
on live television.130 The following paragraphs examine, in more detail, how the circulation practices 
of each of these three media contribute to the rhetorical saturation of ethos over time.  
                                                      
129 SNL is a weekly 90-minute variety show performed on Saturday nights before a small live 
audience in New York City and simultaneously broadcasted to the nation on NBC. A single episode 
of SNL typically includes several comedy skits performed by the regular cast members, two songs 
performed by a guest musician, and a celebrity host who delivers an opening monologue and 
participates in some of the skits.  
130 Although Smith and Brown theorize the archive as one end of a dialectic that describes the 
circulation of online media, they suggest that the concept of the archive derives from the ways that 
media circulated prior to the Internet. Large hierarchically-driven organizations, like network 
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One of the most common comedic strategies employed by SNL involves mocking the 
perceived ethos of popular figures.131 But the deeply intertwined relationship between SNL and 
ethos is not just a product of this genre of sketch comedy; it also derives from the way that network 
television stations circulate both SNL and the daily news about celebrities and politicians. For instance, 
large broadcasting companies like NBC use the standardized timing of television programs to curate 
the news that viewers imbibe. Then, using the same systematic mechanisms of circulation, NBC also 
disseminates a comedic television show that mocks the news that their viewers watched earlier. In 
this way, the daily news programs on the NBC network provide much of the cultural content for 
SNL cast members to spoof, including gaffes that implicate the character of politicians and 
celebrities. Although ethos appears to play a subdued role in the relatively matter-of-fact 
presentation of the evening news, after circulating on television for a few news cycles, the ethos of a 
public figure—like the president, for example—begins to seep into the network. By the time that 
SNL hits the airwaves at the end of the traditional work week, the ethos of many of these public 
figures has saturated the broadcast, making it difficult to evaluate their actions without viewing their 
ethos as the dominant force in that interaction. Furthermore, the flood of political mudslinging that 
circulated on network television in 2016 meant that the archive of SNL episodes was already 
overflowing with rhetorical character before “Kyle vs. Kanye” and its mockumentary rap battle 
further submerged that season of SNL in issues of ethos.132  
                                                      
television companies, governed the timing, duration, and characteristics of the content that they 
circulated. These corporations also, as Smith and Brown explain, stored and guarded the distribution 
of this media, making it available to users only on certain terms. This is also the case with “Kyle vs. 
Kanye” and its airing on NBC.  
131 Sometimes the SNL cast members accomplish this task by impersonating the ethos of famous 
people in skits like the weekly “Cold Open.” Other times, cast members make discursive jokes about 
the character of luminaries on regular sketches such as “Weekend Update.” And typically, the 
opening monologue relies on celebrity hosts making fun of their own character.  
132 During SNL’s 41st season—which ran from October 3, 2015 to May 21, 2016—various actors portrayed 
Hillary Clinton, Bill Clinton, Bernie Sanders, and Donald Trump many times, and each time, cast members 
mocked some aspect of their character. In addition, both Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders made celebrity 
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Although SNL’s sketch comedy is a markedly different form of entertainment than the hip-
hop battling that comprises the primary plot device in the “Kyle vs. Kanye” skit, rap battles also 
foreground ethos, in part, due to the ways that they circulate. Hip-hop battling began at live shows 
in the 1970s when MCs began to engage each other in lyrical competitions, or battles, that involved 
trying to improvise the best verses while DJs mixed beats in the background.133 Crucially, sparring 
MCs earned praise not just for impressive displays of lyricism but also for building up their own 
ethos and tearing down their opponent’s ethos with their improvised lines. The goal was not just to 
spit dope lyrics but also to disrespect, or “diss,” the other rapper more than they dissed you. Like 
hand-to-hand combat, rap battles were a zero-sum game: one rapper’s character was exalted and the 
other’s character was trampled. The more powerful and more persuasive ethos won the rap battle, 
and the live audience held the power to determine the champion by cheering the loudest for the best 
rapper.134 While this process for determining the winner of the rap battle was more or less 
democratic and horizontally organized, the circulation of the MC’s ethos was still governed mostly by 
vertical mechanisms of dissemination. Audiences could cheer for whoever they preferred, but they 
could only do so at live shows. In this way, the MC’s ethos was limited by the circuit of live 
performances an MC participated in; it could not go viral. Later, MCs would extend their rap battles 
beyond live shows by recording “diss tracks” on studio albums.135 As their name indicates, diss 
tracks are studio recordings that denigrate the ethos of other rappers in an effort to build up the 
                                                      
guest appearances on the 41st season of SNL, and Donald Trump even hosted the fourth episode, exactly one 
year and one day before he would go on to win the 2016 election. Each of these cameos involved the 
politicians engaging in some form of self-deprecating humor about their ethos.  
133 For more information about the role of MCs, DJs, hype men, and rap battles see Forman and 
Neal; Chang; and Banks. 
134 While the impromptu battle between Craig G and Supernatural at a 1994 live concert served as 
one of the most prominent examples of battle rapping for a large audience, Eminem further 
popularized the form in the film 8 Mile.  
135 Although rappers popularized diss tracks for late twentieth century music fans, the genre did not originate 
in hip-hop music. In fact, artists from a variety of genres have recorded tracks that diss the ethos of other 
musicians, including The Beach Boys, John Lennon, Queen, and Bob Marley and the Wailers.  
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ethos of the MC who recorded the song. But diss tracks, like rap battling at live shows, were also 
circulated by centralized institutions, namely the record labels that distributed the album. Thus, 
ethos not only provided integral content for rap battles and diss tracks but, through their standardized 
and regulated circulation, ethos also began to saturate these experiences. Given this history of the 
importance of ethos in battle rapping, its use as a plot device in SNL’s “Kyle vs Kanye” adds to the 
over-determination of the sketch as an ethos-saturated occasion.  
Lastly, by 2016, a dozen years into West’s rap career, the centralized circulation of West’s 
hip-hop albums as well as his television appearances established an archive of music and public 
appearances that further contributed to the inundation of his ethos. But this level of saturation 
required years of centralized circulation to build an archive of content capable of exuding ethos like 
this. Early in West’s career, without the Internet as the primary vehicle for the networked 
distribution of his music and public appearances, West’s ethos circulated—more or less below the 
surface—by way of both mainstream television and the major record label Roc-A-Fella.136 On his 
first two albums, for example, West’s ethos was relatively subdued, especially when compared with 
the hyper-masculine, violent, and misogynistic ethos that was popular for “gangsta rap” in the late 
90s and early 2000s.137 At that time, many reviewers focused their appraisal of these first two albums 
on West’s sound, style, and lyrics, rather than on his character.138 Then, in March 2006, West 
appeared on PBS supporting a fundraiser for Hurricane Katrina victims, and instead of reading from 
the teleprompter, he spoke off-script, saying that then-president “George Bush doesn’t care about 
                                                      
136 To be clear, West’s early career interactions—including his music and media appearances—were not 
wholly removed from Internet distribution. Indeed, many writers posted online-only reviews of his albums, 
and pirated copies of his music were also made available for illegal download on the Internet. Despite this 
modest online presence in the early years of his career, the mainstream media nevertheless served as the 
dominant force in the circulation of his work and his ethos at that time. 
137 For more information about gangsta rap, see Chang (307-329) and Watts.  
138 For examples of reviews that emphasizes West’s sound more than his ethos, see Fennessey and Sheffield.  
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black people.”139 This clip of a young, clean-cut, polo-wearing Kanye West quickly circulated via 
mainstream television media. First, it aired for free on PBS to live viewers. Then other network 
television news stations circulated the video clip on their evening news. West’s outburst even made a 
few print newspapers including the New York Times (Bumiller). In this way, the hierarchically 
constructed network television system began to erect an archive of West’s public interactions that 
foregrounded issues related to his ethos.140 This cumulative process, in turn, created a situation in 
which West’s subsequent television appearances—which were also governed by these same 
centralized circulation processes—were immediately juxtaposed with a whole pre-curated archive of 
West’s actions that were already permeated with his rhetorical character.  
In sum, before “Kyle vs. Kanye” aired on television, West’s ethos was already 
overdetermined to saturate that video skit because his performance was part of a much larger and 
imbricated set of mediated archives that, through their centralized circulation over a long period of 
time, became drenched with the concept of ethos. The systematized television broadcasting of both 
SNL and West’s prior public engagements coupled with the concentrated circulation of ethos during 
rap battles established an overlapping set of audiovisual archives that were permeated by issues of 
rhetorical character. In other words, because “Kyle vs. Kanye” drew on ethos-related elements that 
already circulated via a collection of centralized hubs, this video sketch was predisposed to be 
flooded with West’s character. Thus, the deeply intertwined relationship between “Kyle vs. Kanye” 
and ethos is not just a product of this genre of sketch comedy; it also derives from a variety of 
imbricated and centralized circulation practices that contributed to the steady saturation of West’s 
                                                      
139 Contrary to popular belief, this statement did not go viral. At the time, YouTube and Facebook were only 
one and two years old, respectively; and Twitter would not be founded until later that month. Thus, the social 
media mechanisms were not yet fully in place for content like this to “go viral” in the way that we colloquially 
understand that phrase today.  
140 Three years later, for example, both network and cable news stations again circulated clips of West 
interrupting Taylor Swift at the VMAs, adding to the centrally-curated archive of West’s interactions that 
implicated his ethos. 
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ethos over time. In this way, the compounding effect of the archive transforms an otherwise 
subdued but omnipresent rhetorical entity such as ethos into a gestalt that saturates the network 
with its force.  
 
From Rhetorical Saturation to Rhetorical Ruptures 
While the television circulation of “Kyle vs. Kanye” on SNL functioned like part of a centrally 
organized archive leading to the rhetorical saturation of West’s ethos, the Internet distribution of 
“Kyle vs. Kanye” rendered West’s ethos susceptible to both saturation and ruptures. Rhetorical 
ruptures correspond to the way that Smith and Brown conceive of the event. Events grow 
unpredictably as users share, like, and re-post content on the Internet. Unlike archives which have a 
clearly defined structure determined by a centralized entity, events lack a standardized arrangement 
and instead propagate suddenly and in unanticipated ways. And while the steady and deliberate 
organization of archives leads to the saturation of ever-present rhetorical phenomena such as ethos, 
the speedy and unexpected distribution of events contributes to rhetorical ruptures that interrupt the 
regular accretion of ethos over time. The dialectical relationship between these two rhetorical 
processes is especially apparent in the online circulation of the “Kyle vs. Kanye” video.   
On Valentine’s Day 2016, the day after SNL aired on television, NBC uploaded “Kyle vs. 
Kanye” to the SNL page of their website and also to their customized SNL pages on the social 
media sites YouTube and Facebook.141 Shortly thereafter, other Internet users uploaded “Kyle vs. 
Kanye” to additional popular websites, including Vimeo, Metatube, and even the Washington Post.142 
Each of these cases demonstrates a subtle but important shift in the Internet dissemination of this 
                                                      
141 NBC: https://www.nbc.com/saturday-night-live/video/kyle-vs-kanye/2985371  
YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sgs81IOU0m4  
142 Vimeo: https://vimeo.com/201081284  
Metatube: https://www.metatube.com/en/videos/297506/SNL-Kyle-vs-Kanye/. See also Contrera.  
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video and, more importantly, in the accumulation of West’s ethos. At first, NBC appeared to retain 
full centralized control over the circulation of “Kyle vs. Kanye.” After all, NBC owns and operates 
its own website, and its employees determine how videos like this fit into their larger archive of SNL 
content. NBC also regulates how and when content is posted to its personal YouTube and 
Facebook pages, which indicates an important degree of power over the circulation of their videos. 
But, NBC does not fully determine how “Kyle vs. Kanye” fits into a social media archive. Instead, 
YouTube and Facebook automate much of the archival process and only offer users a handful of 
boilerplate ways to organize videos. NBC also does not control the algorithms that populate this 
video in other users’ Facebook timelines or YouTube autoplay queues; those processes, too, are 
governed by the social media companies. In this way, NBC relinquishes some of its centralized 
control over the circulation and archival of videos such as “Kyle vs. Kanye.” Furthermore, when 
users unaffiliated with NBC later uploaded this video to other popular video sites like Metatube, that 
marked a clear turn away from centralized circulation and more toward networked distribution. 
These shifts in the circulation of “Kyle vs. Kanye” also have a parallel impact on the celebrity’s 
ethos. For example, the centralized circulation of this sketch on NBC’s website and, to some extent, 
on YouTube and Facebook juxtaposes the video with a larger archive of materials, which creates the 
conditions for West’s rhetorical character to saturate users’ engagements with the video on these 
sites. But the decentralized circulation of this video on other websites and the unpredictability of the 
social media algorithms makes possible the sudden forming of events and the subsequent rupturing of 
West’s ethos.  
To further understand the implications of rhetorical ruptures for the circulation of ethos 
requires taking a closer look at the specific aspects of the digital interfaces that give rise to 
decentralized circulation. For instance, although each of the aforementioned websites employs the 
exact same cut of “Kyle vs. Kanye,” that video does not exist as a static object on the Internet; nor 
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does West’s ethos simply ‘reside’ in the “Kyle vs. Kanye” video as if it were a fixed component. 
Instead, West’s ethos emerges from users’ interactions with the interface that distributes the video. 
Moreover, subtle differences in how these interfaces structure user engagement contribute to the 
video’s online circulation, which in turn impact how West’s ethos develops over time. NBC’s 
proprietary website, for example, only allows users to watch “Kyle vs. Kanye” and to either browse 
or search for other archived SNL skits. Like the television circulation of this video, this well-
structured and centrally-organized online context creates a dense archival environment that 
predisposes West’s ethos to saturate users’ experiences of the video on NBC’s website. YouTube, on 
the other hand, allows—even encourages—users to interact with “Kyle vs. Kanye” beyond simply 
viewing it. For each video, YouTube users can publicly like, dislike, share, and comment on 
videos.143 They can also like and reply to other users’ comments. Furthermore, the quantity of views 
and likes that a video receives is taken into account by the algorithms that recommend videos to 
subsequent users. In this way, the interactivity of social media sites like YouTube can quickly 
transition a relatively stable video archive into a rapidly circulating and decentralized event.  
In these situations, rhetorical character may rupture and exaggerate one aspect of a figure’s 
ethos at the expense of other qualities. On YouTube’s “Kyle vs. Kanye” webpage, for example, the 
comments section serves as a record of momentary ruptures in West’s ethos. While some of the 
comments pertain to West’s ethos, many of them address other aspects of the video or West’s 
career. In this context, West’s ethos does not fully saturate the YouTube webpage. Rather, his ethos 
erupts momentarily in specific comments. Theo P, for instance, calls West an “arrogant douchebag,” 
a comment that received likes by several other users and that highlights one specific—and 
negative—aspect of his perceived character. This is another feature of rhetorical ruptures that 
                                                      
143 As of January 2019, “Kyle vs. Kanye” had received 5.6 million views, 58k likes, and 2.6k dislikes on 
YouTube.  
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distinguishes them from saturation. Event-based ruptures of ethos tend to foreground one particular 
valence of a figure’s ethos over all others. Saturations, on the other hand, blur many qualities of one’s 
ethos in the haziness of the archive. Because the archive is defined by the depth of its holdings, the 
nuanced characteristics that describe a particular ethos often become overshadowed by the sheer 
magnitude of their rhetorical saturation.144 Rhetorical saturation thus overemphasizes the importance 
of ethos within an archive while simultaneously obfuscating the individual qualities of that ethos. 
And on the other hand, the centrifugal rhetorical force of an online event may lead to an abrupt 
rupture of that ethos that prominently emphasizes one aspect of it above all else.  
 But just as quickly as a rupture circulates by earning likes and foregrounding one part of that 
ethos, that very same event may lose momentum and dissipate. In the case of the “Kyle vs. Kanye” 
YouTube video, for instance, Theo P’s comment is now buried in an old comment thread. And 
while “arrogant douchebag” may describe one part of West’s ethos, that specific quality does not 
deeply permeate YouTube’s archival and online circulation of his character. Rather, West’s 
douchebag ethos momentarily ruptured in this online encounter and, just as quickly, faded into the 
background. In this way, social media sites such as YouTube demonstrate how the dialectical tension 
between the event and the archive affect the ongoing evolution of an ever-present rhetorical feature 
such as ethos, sometimes rupturing and sometimes saturating the interaction with rhetorical 
character.  
While the Internet distribution of the “Kyle vs. Kanye” video contributed to both saturation 
and ruptures in West’s ethos, the online-only release of his TLOP album contributed to particularly 
                                                      
144 In kairotic situations, for example, the rhetorical effects of an ethos depend primarily on its 
characteristics (e.g. “Is this person trustworthy or not?”); but the archive, as a circulatory framework, 
renders those qualities less important than their sharp amplification (e.g. “Trustworthiness is the 
primary issue at stake here!”).  
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poignant rhetorical ruptures that further position West’s ethos as a remarkable rhetorical force.145 In 
particular, the TLOP track “I Miss the Old Kanye”—which is a revised version of West’s verses 
from his SNL rap battle with Mooney—lays the shaky foundation from which a series of ruptures in 
West’s ethos emerge. Unlike any other song that West has recorded, “I Miss the Old Kanye” is 
wholly a capella. While it is relatively common for hip-hop producers to incorporate other a capella 
pieces into their own music, rappers rarely release their own a capella tracks.146 Many hip-hop 
musicians do, however, release recordings of their songs without lyrics in hopes that other artists will 
sample their backing beats in future songs.147 But “I Miss the Old Kanye” flips this process on its 
head. Rather than making beats that subtly represent your ethos as a producer and distributing them 
without lyrics, West makes and circulates a track that unequivocally foregrounds his ethos in his 
words alone.148 At first glance, the act of writing a song about your ethos and recording it a capella 
may sound like an attempt to isolate one’s discursive Aristotelian ethos and to resist other mediated 
manifestations of ethos (musical, tonal, rhythmic, and so on). But the online circulation of this track 
                                                      
145 Unlike West’s previous album releases—which were available in mixed media, including CD, LP, 
and digital download—TLOP was available for only download and streaming. But even its online 
release was not traditional or, for that matter, smooth. For more information about the bizarre 
amalgam of events surrounding its release, see Petridis and C.M. 
146 Although slightly different than a capella tracks, vocal-only skits used to be a key fixture in hip-hop 
albums. But these short tracks function less as spoken word poetry and more as comedic sketches. De La 
Soul are often credited with introducing skits on their 1989 debut album 3 Feet High and Rising. As Evan 
Rytlewski notes, however, hip-hop skits became less popular in the twenty-first century as listeners 
increasingly listened to music as individual MP3 files rather than as whole albums.  
147 This process of “sampling”—playing pre-recorded music from other artists as part of a new piece 
of music—is integral to hip-hop music and especially to the meteoric rise of West as a producer-
rapper. West became famous for sampling sped-up versions of old R&B songs, a style that became 
known as “chipmunk soul” because that voices of the soul singers increases in pitch as the sample is 
sped up by the producer to match the faster pace of the hip-hop drum beat. West was not, however, 
the first or the only rapper to use sped-up R&B tracks as samples. Producer Just Blaze was doing it 
at the same time as West. And RZA, the primary producer for the Wu Tang Clan, used soul samples 
in songs such as “For Heavens Sake” years before West or Just Blaze. Put simply, West’s primary 
contribution to hip-hop is not his lyrics—which oscillate haphazardly between the grotesque and the 
sublime—but rather the innovative use of other artists’ work in his own music.  
148 To see the lyrics of “I Miss the Old Kanye,” refer to Appendix A.  
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has the opposite effect; it opens West’s lyrics—and, by extension, West’s ethos—to the 
unpredictable possibilities of remix culture. The widespread availability of affordable audio editing 
software has made it easy not only for professional producers to add backing beats to a capella 
tracks but also for everyday listeners to create their own musical mashup from spoken word 
recordings. Unsurprisingly, within the first week of releasing TLOP, people began to remix “I Miss 
the Old Kanye” with backing music and to upload that new content on the Internet for further 
circulation, a process that contributed to key rhetorical ruptures in West’s ethos.149  
Among the many remixes of “I Miss the Old Kanye,” Stefan Ponce’s stands out as a 
particularly salient example of the ways that the online distribution of content can yield rhetorical 
ruptures in an ethos that suddenly springs from otherwise ethos-saturated media.150 The day after 
West released TLOP, producer Stefan Ponce downloaded West’s track, layered The Dramatics’ 
Motown classic “I Dedicate My Life to You” behind it, and uploaded his remixed version to the 
Internet for further circulation.151 Ponce’s new song created a soulful and nostalgic feel that, as one 
writer for Hilly Dilly explained, “sounds like Kanye himself would have dropped back in his College 
Dropout days.”152 The relaxed rhythms and simple sound of this R&B love song downplayed the 
“rude” and “bad mood” ethos of the “new Kanye” and instead underscored the “sweet” 
                                                      
149 Eric Diep, in fact, posits that West recorded this track a capella with the deliberate goal of taking 
advantage of remix culture.  
150 Another excellent example of a rhetorical rupture emerging from this a capella track comes from 
the anonymous Twitter account @Seinfeld2000. This user composed a satirical remix called “I Love 
Seinye,” featuring the iconic bass guitar riff from Seinfeld in the background. Juxtaposing the Seinfeld 
music with this song yields a remix that foregrounds the so-funny-it’s-absurd egotism of both Kanye 
West and Jerry Seinfeld. Online writer Joe Blevins exclaims that this remix is “a whirlwind of 
narcissism,” a phrase that gestures toward the way that this remix contributes to the sudden and 
rapid rupturing of the self-centered part of West’s ethos.  
151 Although some websites have since taken down Ponce’s remix, it can still be accessed here: 
https://www.hillydilly.com/2016/02/kanye-west-i-love-kanye-stefan-ponce-version  
152 Ibid.  
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wholesomeness of the “Old Kanye.”153 Crucially, however, the simple act of remixing a song does 
not alone make it a rhetorical rupture. Rather, rhetorical ruptures emerge from the ongoing process 
of circulating and interacting with online content in rapid and unpredictable ways.  
In the case of Stefan Ponce, his remix immediately began to be circulated by online media 
outlets and social news aggregation sites. As Ponce’s remix navigated these online spaces, it 
continued to evolve, leading to the heightened rupturing of West’s ethos. In one instance, Vimeo 
user ashani allick composed a video montage of footage from West’s early days as a rapper in 
Chicago to serve as a visual background for Ponce’s remix of “I Miss the Old Kanye.”154 This video 
uses images of a smiling teenage West collaborating with other artists, composing beats with friends, 
and rapping on the south side of Chicago, all of which further amplify a nostalgic picture of West’s 
ethos as a dependable, fraternal, and community-centered artist. When coupled with Ponce’s remix, 
allick’s video and the flurry of online comments and other interactions circulating around these 
pieces contributed to an unanticipated yet powerful rhetorical rupturing of West’s ethos as a 
generous and soulful rapper. Crucially, unlike rhetorical saturation—which tends to blend the many 
facets of a person’s ethos together—rhetorical ruptures like this highlight and quickly re-distribute 
only certain aspects of West’s ethos. And the faster that media circulate online in a decentralized 
manner, then the more poignant that particular rupture in ethos becomes. But, in contrast with the 
steady offline accretion of ethos, rhetorical ruptures often dissipate as quickly as they arise. Indeed, 
in the weeks immediately following the release of TLOP, the circulation of these online media 
proved to be an important force in augmenting the more appealing sides of West’s ethos. But in the 
                                                      
153 Ponce further reinforced these qualities of West’s ethos by uploading this song with a photo of 
West as a young child wearing a clown’s birthday hat and smiling innocently at the camera.  
154 To view this video—called “I miss the old kanye ;)”—visit https://vimeo.com/157557964. 
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years since, West’s rhetorical character has again been overshadowed by the “bad mood Kanye” and 
the “always rude Kanye.”155  
Thus, while “Kyle vs. Kanye” originally premiered on network television, NBC’s uploading 
of the video to a variety of locations on the Internet began to impact the evolution of West’s 
cumulative ethos in different ways. Although the top-down circulation of “Kyle vs. Kanye” on late 
night television cultivated a rhetorical environment in which West’s ethos saturated the medium, the 
online distribution of “Kyle vs. Kanye” began to contend with Web 2.0 technologies that 
increasingly shifted the power of propagation away from large corporations and more toward 
individual users. While the controlled circulation of “Kyle vs. Kanye” on television functioned akin 
to Smith and Brown’s notion of the archive, its subsequent online distribution rendered the same 
video open to influence from both the archive and the event. And although the controlled television 
circulation of “Kyle vs. Kanye” gave rise to an archival environment in which West’s ethos 
rhetorically saturated the performance, the Internet distribution of this video and of West’s 
cumulative ethos became susceptible to both rhetorical saturation and to rhetorical ruptures over 
time.  
The dialectical tension between both rhetorical ruptures and rhetorical saturation therefore 
unsettles the ways that an ever-present rhetorical feature such as ethos accumulates or erodes over 
time in networked environments. In hierarchically structured rhetorical ecologies, which tend to 
treat all rhetorical interactions as temporal equals, the circulation of cumulative ethos often saturates 
its ecosystem. But in networked ecologies marked by the swift emergence of events, the 
dissemination of cumulative ethos often ruptures the steady accrual of ethos in rhetorically salient 
ways. Together, these processes of rhetorical saturation and rupture create an imbalanced process of 
                                                      
155 For evidence of this recent recalibration of West’s ethos, see Charity and Coates.   
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accumulation. Sometimes rhetorical character pools slowly, and other times it erupts unexpectedly; 
and the relationship between the two poles depends on the shifting temporalities that govern that 
particular circulation online. In the end, this framework of rhetorical saturation and rhetorical 
ruptures aims to describe a dialectical tension that outlines the competing forces that contribute to 
the uneven accumulation of ethos as it circulates in online ecologies.  
 
Temporal Challenges for Online Researchers  
Despite the ways that this saturation-rupture model helps account for the online circulation 
of ever-present phenomena such as ethos, it nevertheless presents challenges to scholars whose 
digital research itself unfolds over time. Researchers who study social media platforms such as 
Twitter, for example, must contend with the complicated ways that the entities they study exhibit 
elements of both archives and events. The ability to like, re-tweet, and comment on tweets renders 
each individual tweet a kind of event that can quickly and unexpectedly whip around the Internet in 
a decentralized manner generating a rupture in the user’s ethos. On the other hand, the way that the 
Twitter API successively stores each tweet in a user’s timeline and uses an algorithm to populate 
tweets into others’ timelines resembles the centralized circulation practices of an archive and 
engenders a saturated ethos. But for scholars, this balance between events and archives is disrupted 
by the fact that users can delete tweets, leading to the unequal elimination and/or preservation of 
certain ruptures of an ethos in the Twitter archive.156 Furthermore, researchers themselves operate in 
time, which means that scholars’ relationship to the online media they study shifts over time. After a 
long period of time has passed, the momentousness of certain digital events begins to fade in 
relation to the growing shadow of the online archives these researchers study. This slow assimilation 
                                                      
156 According to the current Twitter API, when a user deletes a tweet, all retweets of that tweet are also 
deleted. For retweets with a comment, the deleted tweet is removed but the comment remains. And although 
individual replies to a deleted tweet are not deleted, they are only searchable—not browsable—later.  
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of online events into a swelling archive, in turn, has the potential to render even the most radical of 
rhetorical ruptures vulnerable to becoming overshadowed by the increasing rhetorical saturation that 
accompanies a growing online archive.  
The online circulation of West’s tweets surrounding the release of TLOP serves as a prime 
example of the temporal challenges that the networked distribution of online media pose for 
contemporary researchers. West has always had a hot and cold relationship with social media: he 
often composes a flurry of posts in swift succession, and then follows that period of heightened 
activity with a long stretch of silence.157 On Twitter, West is especially active in the period of time 
leading up to album releases.158 West, for instance, flooded Twitter with album updates prior to his 
2016 SNL performance and the initial release of TLOP on Valentine’s Day. Afterward, his tweets 
tapered a bit, but he still remained relatively active on Twitter, in part because he needed to explain 
the peculiarities of the elongated timeline of this album release.159 Then on March 30, West 
tweeted—one line at a time—all the lyrics to “I Miss the Old Kanye.”160 Each line that he tweeted 
                                                      
157 On October 4, 2012, for instance, West deleted all of his earlier tweets. After seven months of inactivity, 
he started tweeting again on May 18, 2013, shortly before the release of his sixth studio album, Yeezus. West’s 
Twitter account briefly disappeared again in August 2016. Then he joined Instagram in September of 2016. 
But on May 5, 2017, West closed both his Twitter and Instagram accounts (Strauss). In 2018, he opened both 
accounts again prior to the June 1 release of his 8th studio album Ye. And on October 6, 2018, West again 
closed his Twitter and Instagram accounts. Thus far in 2019, his Twitter and Instagram accounts are again 
both open and active.  
158 West joined Twitter in July 2010, four years after the platform’s initial release. Like many 
celebrities, including his wife, West has millions of followers worldwide, but their numbers have, of 
course, fluctuated over time, especially as West shifts in and out of periods of activity. In early 2016, 
West had 20.4 million followers on Twitter. And in early 2019, West had 29.4 million followers, 
despite closing down his Twitter account for several months between these two dates. For more 
descriptions of West’s tweets, see Moore and Skelton. 
159 On February 14, for instance, after thousands of people had already downloaded the album and thousands 
more were streaming it live, West tweeted, “ima fix wolves,” hinting at his plans to modify the song “Wolves” 
on the subsequent release of the album. And the following day, West joined the public conversation about 
future distributions of TLOP, stating that the album “will never be for sale.” Tweets like these emphasize not 
only the evolving nature of TLOP’s release but also West’s intimate relationship with the public during its 
reworkings. 
160 When he tweeted the first line of this song, “I miss the old Kanye,” it quickly became one of his most 
popular tweets. Within days, it earned over 92k likes, 84k retweets, and more than 1,500 replies. Clearly many 
fans also shared the nostalgia for West’s older ethos. For more information about these tweets, see Skelton.   
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received thousands of likes and retweets, creating mini-events out of each one.161 And because every 
line in that song also trades prominently in West’s ethos, each circulating tweet-event contributed to 
a rupture of West’s ethos that foregrounded particular aspects of his rhetorical character. Sometimes 
a tweet underscored the ethos of the “old Kanye;” other times a tweet emphasized the ethos of the 
“new Kanye.” But by the time that West tweeted the final line of the song and a link to 
www.ilovekanyesong.com, some followers already began to refer to the collection of these individual 
tweet-events as part of a larger tweet-archive of lyrics to “I Miss the Old Kanye.” And of course, this 
miniature tweet-archive of lyrics was, itself, part of a much bigger collection of West’s Twitter 
correspondence up to that point. Thus, the events and rhetorical ruptures that accompanied the 
circulation of each individual tweet quickly began to be overshadowed by the larger online archive of 
West’s Twitter presence and his saturated ethos therein.  
Favoring an archival perspective like this, however, diminishes the significance of any single 
rhetorical rupture that may have manifested as each lyric of the song zipped through the eventful 
Twitter-sphere. Instead, the ruptured elements of West’s rhetorical character quickly became 
subsumed by the archives in which they functioned and saturated by the complexities of West’s 
larger Twitter ethos. Such ruptures were not, however, completely erased in their archived state. For 
a period of time, researchers could still click on a single line that West tweeted and read the slew of 
responses and retweets that it engendered in an effort to better understand this particular rupture in 
West’s ethos. And yet, despite the preservation of many of these rhetorical ruptures, it is nonetheless 
tempting for researchers to spend more time analyzing an archive—which is often easier to 
outline—than tracing the contours of eventful ruptures. Scholars must thus recognize that 
                                                      
161 Many Twitter followers and online media sources, however, did not initially realize that West was 
tweeting a series of lyrics. Instead, in the context of the rest of his social media discourse, they 
interpreted these tweets as West’s own direct communication of his thoughts to the public. For an 
example of this behavior, see Capital FM.  
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privileging the social media archive over the circulation of discrete elements has consequences for 
how we understand the evolution of ethos and other ever-present rhetorical phenomena on social 
media.  
The preservation of online archives and events, moreover, is not guaranteed to last forever. 
For instance, five weeks after tweeting the lyrics to “I Miss the Old Kanye,” West deleted all of his 
previous tweets and closed his Twitter account. Although West later opened a new Twitter account, 
scholars and followers were no longer able to directly access this earlier collection of tweets from the 
Twitter API. Many of his tweets were nevertheless preserved elsewhere in other archives, especially 
in online news articles; but those sources often recounted only West’s own tweets without retaining 
his followers replies or comments on their retweets. As such, these other online sources 
foregrounded the overall saturation of West’s ethos in the larger Twitter archive and minimized the 
imprint of rhetorical ruptures in West’s ethos that had previously emerged from these events. Due 
to online conservation constraints like these, researchers who stumble upon an assemblage of digital 
materials at a later date are unlikely to be able to track down all of the significant ruptures that an 
individual’s ethos endures as it circulates online. Instead, the blurred nature of online archives often 
predisposes scholars to fixate on the more readily available content of an already saturated archive.  
In response, online researchers might craft a temporally-situated research agenda that 
acknowledges how past events and their associated rhetorical ruptures are often archived unevenly, 
if they are archived at all. Such a time-centered research plan might also recognize that the ongoing 
accumulation and circulation of digital archives continues to shift our own relationship to the 
networked interactions that we seek to understand. And instead of presuming that online archives 
are stable and static, this kind of research plan might seek to understand how the addition of new 
events to an online archive alters our relationship to the existing content. Finally, foregrounding the 
dialectical elements of this framework encourages scholars to locate elements of both rhetorical 
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saturation and rhetorical ruptures that arise from the networked distribution and online circulation 
of ever-present rhetorical phenomena.  
 
Conclusion 
 As the examples in this chapter demonstrate, the mechanisms of circulation have a profound 
impact on the accretion of character and its cumulative rhetorical influence. The shifting 
temporalities of online circulation highlight how—rather than unfolding in a steady manner—
cumulative ethos accretes unevenly and nonlinearly over time. In particular, mapping the event-
archive framework onto the online circulation of character makes visible the ways that omnipresent 
rhetorical forces like ethos are governed by competing temporal forces. This relationship between 
the circulation and accumulation of online ethos can, moreover, be understood as a similar kind of 
tension between rhetorical ruptures and rhetorical saturation. Rhetorical ruptures are powerful but 
fleeting forces that offer only a limited glimpse of certain aspects of a much more complex ethos. 
Rhetorical saturation, on the other hand, has a tendency to foreground, above all, the role of 
rhetorical character in any given setting. Ironically, at the same time, saturation can obfuscate the 
nuances of that ethos against the larger backdrop of the archive. This model attempts to account for 
the peculiar ways that an influential ethos like West’s can, on one hand, seem overdetermined to 
dominate a collection of online interactions and, on the other hand, careen unexpectedly out of 
control through the Internet. 
Furthermore, as West’s story indicates, the rhetorical stakes of comprehending the ways that 
his ethos circulates and accumulates force on the Internet can be remarkably high. In the Atlantic 
article where Coates discusses the formidable impact of West’s character as it ebbs and flows on 
social media, he laments that 
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It is the young people among the despised classes of America who will pay a price for this—
the children parted from their parents at the border, the women warring to control the 
reproductive organs of their own bodies, the transgender soldier fighting for his job, the 
students who dare not return home for fear of a ‘travel ban,’ 
Here, Coates explains how the megaphone of social media dangerously extends the rhetorical reach 
of West’s character. The online propagation of his ethos perpetuates toxic cultural discourses that, 
when internalized and institutionalized by the politically empowered classes, jeopardize the day to 
day existence of marginalized Americans. Likewise, this expanded understanding of online 
temporalities illuminates how the list of descriptive terms for West’s character that open this chapter 
are not simply journalistic name-calling or the product of celebrity whimsy. When viewed through 
the lens of circulation, this seemingly incomprehensible collection of words increasingly comes into 
focus as the complex and fluid manifestations of West’s cumulative ethos. And whether we like it or 
not, the continued circulation and accumulation of that character online can function as a potent 
and dangerous rhetorical force, amplified by the digital networks through which it moves.  
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Chapter Four 
Approximating Character Without Time in (Crypto)Commerce 
 
On September 15, 2008, after over 150 years of business, the global financial firm Lehman 
Brothers filed for bankruptcy. Although the signs of a rapidly slowing economy had already been 
showing, the failure of the fourth largest investment bank in the United States sent much of the 
world spiraling into the Great Recession with guillotine-esque speed and severity. In addition to 
exposing the horrific reality of layoffs and foreclosures, this dark time also brought to the surface 
deeply rooted feelings of wariness and suspicion about commerce. Almost overnight, trust in 
financial institutions eroded, the credibility of mortgage-backed securities came under intense 
scrutiny, and the character of those at the top—the bank executives and the politicians who were 
supposed to hold them accountable—was called into question. Ben Bernanke, then-Chair of the 
Federal Reserve, gave voice to this sentiment when he said: “It seems like a lot of people who drove 
their companies into the ditch walked away with a lot of money and that’s not good capitalism—it’s 
not a good ethical outcome, either” (Clark). With this statement, Bernanke underscores the dual 
realities of the Great Recession. Not only was it a financial crisis; it also was a crisis of character.  
In the midst of this economic catastrophe and its concurrent ethical quagmire, an alternative 
form of commercial exchange arose. Three months after the Lehman Brother’s publicly declared 
their insolvency, a mysterious figure working under the pseudonym Satoshi Nakamoto released the 
open-source code for Bitcoin, and people around the world immediately began to buy, sell, and mine 
bitcoins.162 Prior to its release, Nakamoto circulated a white paper titled “Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer 
                                                      
162 For more information about Bitcoin, visit https://bitcoin.org/. 
  
 
124 
Electronic Cash System” (on a cryptography email listserv).163 In this document, Nakamoto 
articulates a vision for a digital medium of exchange—a cryptocurrency—that “would allow online 
payments to be sent directly from one party to another without going through a financial institution” 
(1). Given the public’s growing skepticism regarding the character of bankers, executives, and 
politicians at that time, the creation of a system of commercial exchange that circumvents the need 
for banks or governments marks a radical but not wholly unexpected departure. Trust in financial 
institutions and their leaders seemed at an all-time low, so Nakamoto developed “a system for 
electronic transactions without relying on trust” (8).  
And yet, Bitcoin does not eschew trust entirely. Instead, it shifts both the location and the 
timeframe of trust. Rather than depending on the character of those who operate the banks and run 
the country, Nakamoto’s system generates credibility through a combination of complex 
mathematical calculations, encryption protocols, and a public-facing record of transactions, all of 
which are dispersed across a vast number of networked machines. Bitcoin, to be clear, still needs 
trust; it just distributes the cultivation of that trust across a variety of computational and structural 
mechanisms. In his rhetorical analysis of Bitcoin’s circulation protocols, Gerald Jackson succinctly 
summarizes this change: “Trust, rather than an institution, is thus proceduralized” (229). But 
manufacturing this trust in cryptocurrencies is not an instantaneous procedure. Often it takes hours 
and sometimes days to validate the credibility of a specific Bitcoin transaction.164 This elongated 
timeframe for verifying the validity of crypto-commerce stands in stark contrast to the use of fiat 
currencies such as U. S. dollars in commercial interactions. While the credibility of a particular fiat 
currency can shift over time as confidence in its government waxes and wanes, the trust that 
                                                      
163 Nakamoto’s identity remains a mystery to this day. The author of the white paper consistently uses “we,” 
but it is unclear whether the first-person plural is a collection of authors using one pseudonym or a stylistic 
and rhetorical choice.  
164 For more information about Bitcoin transactions and processing times, see Buchko and Chizurum.  
  
 
125 
participants have in individual cash transactions is often instant.165 Fiat currencies are the oil that 
lubricates reliable, fast-paced commercial interactions. And although cryptocurrencies serve a similar 
function, they challenge the fundamental ways of begetting credibility in commerce by stretching the 
timeline for generating trust and by decentering that trust from individual human subjects.  
From a rhetorical perspective, the financial crisis of the late 2000s underscores the 
importance of developing a trustworthy ethos when engaging in commerce. At the same time, 
however, the simultaneous emergence of cryptocurrencies asks us to rethink foundational 
assumptions about the notion of rhetorical character itself. For instance, although ethos continually 
emerges from rhetorical ecologies that involve both humans and nonhumans, most scholarship—
including my research in earlier chapters—still positions rhetorical character as something that 
revolves around a single human subject such as Kanye West or Socrates.166 And yet, when mapped 
onto the study of cryptocurrencies, ethos lacks a human subject around which to constellate. To be 
sure, humans are always involved in the networks of computers and algorithms that take part in 
Bitcoin transactions. But unlike most research about ethos, the identities of the people who buy, sell, 
and mine bitcoins are completely concealed.167 Furthermore, no single human or computer has the 
ability to validate the credibility of a Bitcoin transaction alone. Instead, the blockchain protocol 
diffuses that power across many nodes in the network, leaving the ethos involved in a Bitcoin 
transaction bereft of a central point to orbit. Together, the anonymous and distributed elements of 
                                                      
165 Obviously, the size of a cash transaction impacts the time it takes for participants to trust in that 
transaction. Sometimes, for instance, cashiers will take a few extra seconds to hold a $100 bill up to the light 
and verify its security strip. But for small purchases, sellers rarely scrutinize bills.   
166 For examples of other scholarship that centers ethos on individual human subjects, see Burton; Bordelon; 
and Jack  
167 Even as researchers have extended the reach of rhetoric to include nonhumans, objects, and animals, they 
still typically study discrete identifiable entities. For salient examples of rhetorical scholarship that examines 
nameable nonhumans, see Rickert as well as Barnett and Boyle. 
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cryptocurrencies invite researchers to reconsider conventional understandings about the workings of 
ethos.  
In addition to these two elements, time is also integral to the challenges that cryptocurrencies 
pose to the idea of ethos. As the fallout from the Great Recession indicates, trust and character fuel 
a healthy economy; but in any given commercial transaction, participants rarely have enough time to 
develop or to evaluate the long-term character of those with whom they do business. When making 
decisions about who to trust in commercial transactions, time constraints force consumers to rely on 
momentary displays of a discursive ethos or, perhaps, on a notion of static ethos tied to authority 
positions. And yet customers are often wary of fleeting or fixed displays of character in business. We 
are suspicious, after all, of the slick-tongued salesman or of the executives who tenuously link their 
credibility to their position of power. Rather than kairotic or permanent notions of character, 
commercial transactions need character that is cultivated over time. They need, in short, cumulative 
ethos.  
But because the speed of commerce in the twenty-first century seldom allows enough time 
for participants to nurture rhetorical character, commercial transactions depend on surrogates to 
stand in for cumulative ethos. Banks and government-backed currencies now function as trusted 
third-parties that mediate commercial exchanges and attempt to provide credibility in commerce 
between strangers who are short on time. Likewise, cryptocurrencies also behave as proxies for 
rhetorical character, but in doing so, they test the limits of cumulative ethos by disrupting the 
timeline for its accretion and decentering it from human subjects. My analysis in this chapter 
therefore seeks to sketch the rhetorical and ethical implications of these dynamics. Specifically, I aim 
to cast light on the consequences of circumventing temporal constraints in commerce by relying on 
cryptocurrencies to mimic the work of cumulative ethos. Most importantly, this investigation 
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outlines how, in a world of accelerating commercial activity, Bitcoin complicates the ways that 
rhetorical character accumulates over time.  
To explicate this peculiar relationship between Bitcoin, character, and time, I first discuss the 
integral role that cumulative ethos plays in commercial activity. Next, I highlight how both fiat 
currencies and knowable identities function as modest approximations of cumulative ethos in fast-
paced commercial transactions. I then use this framing to put into relief the alternative ways that 
cryptocurrencies seek to resolve the problems caused by the shortage of time to develop trust during 
commerce. Here, I explain how Bitcoin preserves privacy and credibility by using the blockchain 
technology as a surrogate for rhetorical character. Despite the innovation of this solution, my 
analysis illustrates how cryptocurrencies reduce the nuances of rhetorically-inflected human 
interactions—including the concept of cumulative ethos itself—to binary economic outcomes. 
Without seeing Bitcoin through the lens of cumulative ethos, therefore, we risk neglecting the 
centrality of both character and time to commerce. We also risk overlooking the consequences of 
attempting to replace a complex rhetorical figure such as cumulative ethos with a mechanical 
facsimile like the blockchain protocol.  
 
The Need for Accumulated Character in Fast-Paced Commerce 
Commerce is not just an economic exchange. It is also a rhetorical one.168 Although it may 
be tempting to view the swapping of bills for produce at the grocery store as a strictly commercial 
encounter, rhetoric permeates that interaction. Shopkeepers, for instance, may hang signs with sale 
                                                      
168 “Economics” is, traditionally, the study of scarcity and value. “Commerce,” on the other hand, typically 
refers to the exchange of goods and services. Commercial activity nevertheless comprises an important part 
of the larger economy. Although my analysis in this chapter is primarily invested in the relationship between 
rhetoric and commerce as mediated by currencies, the imbricated relationship between economics and 
commerce means that economics is indirectly important to this project. For foundational texts that examine 
the relationship between rhetoric and economics, see McCloskey; Balak; Lanham (Economics); Longaker 
(“Adam Smith” and Rhetorical Style); and Schlachte. 
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prices to attract customers interested in saving money, or they may create special holiday displays 
that appeal to consumers’ emotions. Their advertisements, too, often rely on compelling visual 
designs to entice customers to shop at their store rather than a competitor’s.169 Furthermore, the 
physical layout of stores—akin to the arrangement of a particularly persuasive speech—is meant to 
lure shoppers into purchasing more, especially when waiting in line to check out. Together, these 
examples demonstrate the variety of ways that discursive, visual, and material rhetorics impact even 
the most quotidian of commercial interactions. Rhetoric is, in short, central to commercial activity.  
Of all the rhetorical concepts employed in commercial interactions, ethos functions at the 
root of commerce. Every commercial transaction—understood as the exchange of currency for 
goods and services—involves the risk that one of the participants acts duplicitously to cheat the 
other for their own personal gain. Before buyers hand over their money, they must be convinced 
that the merchant is trustworthy and not trying to deceive them about the quality of their wares. 
Similarly, sellers must be persuaded that the customer is truthful and not offering counterfeit tender. 
If, however, one of the participants in a commercial exchange appears to have a dubious character, 
the transaction may falter and fail. Both participants, therefore, need to employ an ethos that allays 
those fears and persuades the other that they behave honestly. A convincing display of rhetorical 
character in commercial exchange is thus a necessary precursor to commerce. Without an effective 
ethos, commercial activity risks becoming impossible.  
                                                      
169 Leaning on an Aristotelian understanding of persuasion, much scholarship about rhetoric and 
marketing asks some form of this question: how does an advertisement persuade its audience to buy 
that product? With this foundation, scholars have examined print, visual, and digital advertisements 
through a variety of critical lenses with an eye toward making visible their political, cultural, or 
ideological implications. Advertisements also often serve as useful pedagogical tools to help students 
in professional writing classes see the rhetorical stakes of billboards, T-shirts, and television 
commercials. For more information about the relationship between marketing and rhetoric, see 
Scott and Schroeder.  
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Commerce also sheds light on the dangers of understandings of ethos only as either kairotic 
or fixed. A used car salesman, for example, is someone who presents a momentarily smooth-talking 
ethos in an attempt to sell you a lemon. Commerce, in this case, makes visible the inherent risk of 
buying into only temporary displays of ethos. Likewise, commerce also underscores the problems 
with relying on notions of ethos as static. People are increasingly skeptical, for instance, of the figure 
of the investment banker or the corporate executive who derives credibility only from his subject 
position as a wealthy white man. Putting too much stock in this uninterrogated and fixed ethos is, as 
the Great Recession illustrates, risky business, too. On the other hand, the development of a long-
term commercial relationship with someone—an act that involves participating in the emergence 
and evolution of ethos over time—tends to create convincing trust in commercial activity. The 
dentist, for example, who has lived down the street for two decades, or the accountant who is an old 
family friend; these people have spent years cultivating a character in dialogue with their fellow 
community members, and that cumulative ethos often yields something more than merely credible 
commerce. In the best cases, it can also engender reliability, honesty, and loyalty.  
And yet, the speed of commercial activity in the twenty-first century rarely provides enough 
time for participants to sufficiently develop or evaluate the rhetorical character of those involved. 
When given the opportunity, for instance, I prefer to purchase mushrooms from Mr. Flynn at the 
farmer’s market because he is a dependable long-time friend who I entrust with the dangerous task 
of distinguishing edible from poisonous mushrooms in the wild. But when I want mushrooms out 
of season, I have to buy them at the grocery store where I have never encountered the farmer—let 
alone the ethos of the farmer—who harvested those mushrooms. Nor have I had the opportunity to 
engage the rhetorical character of the grocery store owner. And although I momentarily interact with 
the ethos of the cashier, that contact has little influence on the extent to which I trust the 
(cr)edibility of the mushrooms. Without enough time to assess the cumulative ethos of those 
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involved in this commercial exchange, how can I have confidence that I am buying chanterelles and 
not jack-o-lantern mushrooms?170 The lack of time to adequately cultivate ethos in contemporary 
commercial transactions thus presents a distinct challenge to commerce.  
 
Employing Intermediaries to Circumvent Accumulated Character in Commerce 
In an effort to respond to the risk that comes with conducting fast-paced commerce, many 
commercial interactions employ two specific intermediaries—identity and currency—aimed at 
approximating the trustworthiness generated by a good cumulative ethos.171 The first of these ideas, 
identity, is deeply intertwined with ethos in rhetorical theory. As stated earlier, Dana Anderson argues 
that identity, like ethos, acts as “a kind of persuasive strategy, as a means of moving audiences 
toward certain beliefs or actions” (4).172 And while ethos may be more closely linked to ethics than 
identity, both concepts are nonetheless powerful rhetorical forces tied to the words and actions of 
individual humans. Commerce similarly emphasizes this imbricated relationship between ethos and 
identity. For instance, knowing the identity of other participants in a commercial exchange may not 
alone craft a trustworthy ethos; but simply knowing the name of the seller—a modest 
approximation of identity—gives buyers confidence that they know whom to seek recompense from 
if they are wronged. Returning to the previous example, if I need to seek restitution for buying bad 
                                                      
170 Frankly, with something as cheap as mushrooms, the consumer often just accepts this risk. But 
with larger purchases such as cars and homes, the government usually steps in as a third-party to 
regulate and—in the case of a dispute—to arbitrate commerce. While the federal government may 
have both small- and large-scale goals when it intervenes in commerce, in most situations their aim 
involves continuing to lubricate, not to block, further commercial interactions. 
171 While individual businesses may use a variety of strategies to generate an institutional 
approximation of ethos that attempts to create a loyal customer base over time, the tactics employed 
by unique institutions are not the focus of this chapter. Rather, I am invested in examining the 
foundational processes that aim to generate baseline credibility in commerce itself, prior to the 
business strategies of specific organizations. I want to know, in other words, how trust in commerce 
is established a priori to specific commercial exchanges.  
172 For more information about the ways that Anderson understands the relationship between ethos and 
identity, see Identity’s Strategy (90-117).  
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mushrooms at the grocery store, I can contact the store manager because I know the name of the 
store. Knowable identities thus function as a kind of baseline agreement aimed at generating trust in 
commercial exchanges: if the identities of both buyer and seller are knowable, and if one tries to 
cheat the other, then the aggrieved party can track down and seek compensation from the other 
party through the law. Without enough time to foster cumulative ethos, identities therefore form the 
baseline conditions for trust in commerce. A concealed identity yields a shadowy—and, thereby, a 
dubious—ethos. But a known identity ostensibly holds its bearer accountable for their ethos as it 
emerges from the commercial activities that they engage in. 
The need for identities to function as credible intermediaries for cumulative ethos is further 
complicated by the high speeds of online commerce. For instance, online retailers often try to rush 
e-commerce by offering one-click purchasing, but the existence of fraudulent websites jeopardizes 
consumer confidence in such fast-paced business.173 These bogus websites try to mimic the identities 
of credible commercial websites and, in so doing, to cheat online shoppers out of their money. In 
response to these fake sites, online buyers now know to make purchases only on secure websites 
where its identity is verified by a trusted third party, such as Verisign.174 In another example, the 
TCP/IP protocol that governs Internet communication sends packets of identifying information—
including buyers’ credit card numbers, bank account numbers, and other data—through an 
unpredictable series of other nodes connected to the network based solely on which route is the 
fastest at the time. But because online buyers cannot anticipate whether their identifying information 
will be sent through malicious or benevolent nodes, they must ensure that they make purchases 
through websites with a secure connection that encrypts their transactions with an SSL or TLS 
                                                      
173 One-click purchasing, for example, was originally invented by Amazon. But after the tech giant’s initial 
patent expired, this mechanism for increasing the speed of e-commerce became ubiquitous (Wagner and 
Jeitschko). Now, it is even available on social media platforms such as Instagram (Bereznak).  
174 For more information about Verisign and their online security offerings, see 
https://www.verisign.com/.   
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certificate. In these cases, buyers’ identifying information becomes so closely linked to their 
credibility, or ethos, that their identities become valuable objects to steal. To trust in e-commerce, 
therefore, shoppers must protect both their identity and their ethos by encrypting their 
transactions.175 As these examples indicate, the generation of trust in the hurried world of e-
commerce depends on an impressive array of security mechanisms all aimed at verifying and 
securing the identities of those involved. Whether online or face-to-face, then, identities are essential 
to approximating the work of cumulative ethos in commercial transactions where time is a limited 
resource.  
In addition to identities, currencies also act as another stand-in for cumulative ethos in fast-
paced commercial transactions. Typically, currencies are viewed as a medium of exchange that make 
commerce possible in society. But more than a medium of exchange, currencies also establish a 
foundational level of confidence in commerce when buyers and sellers do not have sufficient time to 
develop or evaluate their rhetorical character.176 If, for instance, I offer a rhetoric lesson to a farmer 
in exchange for mushrooms, but the farmer doesn’t have enough time to assess my cumulative 
ethos, how could that person be sure that my rhetoric lesson would not turn out to be just 
demagoguery? By accepting U.S. dollars as a credible currency, sellers can be certain that what they 
receive in exchange for their goods is of much more value than a rhetoric lesson from a stranger. 
Without time to get to know each other, we need a trustworthy medium of exchange to participate 
                                                      
175 Although buyers and sellers may know very little about each other in online commerce, in most 
cases, their transactions are not wholly private. To buy goods online, most websites require that 
buyers have a user name and password. As with face-to-face commerce, having an online identity 
provides a last line of recourse should the commercial exchange prove fraudulent in any way. Even 
in online marketplaces such as Craigslist or eBay where the names of buyers and sellers are hidden 
for the sake of safety, each user still has a unique numerical identifier attached to their transactions 
so that the company facilitating the exchange can track and resolve disputes later if necessary.  
176 In Trust in Texts: A Different History of Rhetoric, Susan Miller makes a related argument about the shifting 
credibility of different media. She contends that, over time, media begin to be marked as more or less 
trustworthy and, further, that the credibility of the medium can often overwrite the credibility of the author. 
For more information about the nuances of this claim, see Miller (106-44). 
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in short-term commerce.177 In this sense, currencies, like identities, operate as a kind of surrogate 
cumulative ethos that attempts to provide a baseline level of confidence in commercial activity.  
Historically, the rhetorical work of cultivating credibility—and of approximating ethos—in 
fiat currencies depended on pinning those currencies to the gold standard.178 But because the gold 
standard no longer exists today, contemporary fiat currencies now derive their credibility from the 
governments and institutions that produce them.179 The trustworthiness of a national currency is 
therefore intimately yoked to the ethos of its government and its heads of state. Printed bills, for 
instance, often have the faces of national heroes on them. These images serve as a visual 
demonstration of the cumulative ethos of those leaders and, as such, they become rhetorical 
signifiers of a currency’s long-term viability and trustworthiness. If people have confidence in the 
leaders of the government, then that currency typically retains value.180 But without trust in the 
institutions that manage the economy and produce its bank notes, currencies quickly lose their value. 
Fiat currencies thus become the material manifestation of the character of a national government. 
                                                      
177 Furthermore, even when trading with long-time friends whose identity I know and whose ethos I trust, 
they may not want a rhetoric lesson in exchange for their mushrooms. In that situation, too, we would need 
to agree on a credible third item of value to exchange, namely a currency.  
178 Although gold may appear to offer an objective measure of a currency’s worth, from a rhetorical 
perspective, the gold standard is simply an argument about the value of a particular currency. Central 
governments that adhered to the gold standard claimed that their treasuries held an amount of gold 
equal to the exact amount of bank notes in circulation. Ultimately, however, a stack of bills is just a 
bunch of paper covered in machine-produced artwork, but a person’s ability to convince you that 
the same stack of bills is worth one or two ounces of gold is rhetoric. In this sense, the gold 
standard acts as a persuasive tactic designed to foster belief in the value of a currency.  
179 The long and tumultuous history of central governments abandoning the gold standard—sometimes 
slowly and other times abruptly—is a fraught yet fascinating narrative. For more information about the gold 
standard and its disappearance in the twentieth century, see Cassel; Drummond; Eichengreen; and Elwell.  
180 War, however, often disrupts trust in commerce. “wartime economies” are, at least in American history, 
moments of economic strength, they also present great risk to the values of the respective currencies of the 
nations involved in war. While the winner of the war may experience increased confidence in its currency, the 
currency of the losing nation state will likely be bereft of its credibility and deprived of much, if not all, of its 
value.  
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Moreover, fiat currencies act as an intermediary for the cumulative ethos of the participants in a 
commercial exchange who have too little time to build their own rhetorical character.  
To be clear, I do not claim that fiat currencies have an ethos. Instead, I suggest that ethos 
arises from the multifaceted rhetorical interaction itself, even if we typically yoke that ethos to the 
buyer. Doing business with a credible currency, for instance, is more likely to yield the purchaser a 
trustworthy ethos, whereas doing business with a specious currency may frame the buyer’s ethos as 
suspicious. As another example, paying for a meal with Monopoly money, with US dollars, or with 
an ounce of gold creates three very different pictures of the purchaser’s ethos in that particular 
commercial interaction. In the latter case, the gold does not have an ethos of its own; rather, paying 
with gold highlights one aspect—in this case, a boastful, or perhaps a foolish, valence—of the gold 
user’s ethos. As such, currency functions not only as a mechanism to facilitate the exchange of 
goods and services but also as a surrogate for cumulative ethos. Without enough time to properly 
evaluate the character of participants in an economic exchange, an intermediary—in this case, a 
government-backed fiat currency—intervenes and vouches for the baseline credibility needed to 
conduct commerce. Despite the inherent risks of doing commerce with strangers (or even with 
trusted friends), currencies facilitate confidence in trade with people who are short on time. 
Currency, in other words, acts as a time-sensitive proxy of cumulative ethos in commercial 
interactions. 
Thus, the possibility of speedy commerce—whether face-to-face or online—depends on 
identities and currencies acting as substitutes for cumulative ethos. Crucially, however, both alternatives 
rely on the intervention of a trusted intermediary. Currencies are printed by national banks, not by 
individual buyers and sellers; and known identities only improve the credibility of a commercial 
transaction if the threat of arbitration by an outside authority exists. Trustworthy third-parties, in 
other words, fill the void left by the lack of time to foster and appraise the accumulated character of 
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those directly involved in the commercial exchange. This, in turn, begins to stretch the concept of 
cumulative ethos. Rather than the original buyer or seller bearing the burden of demonstrating a 
convincing rhetorical character, that labor is outsourced to a third-party tasked with providing some 
fundamental, albeit threadbare, elements of ethos in order to bolster confidence in commerce. 
Buyers and sellers must, of course, still appear trustworthy in the moment, but the job of nurturing a 
foundational level of credibility that allows for the possibility of hastened commerce with strangers 
now shifts from an individual’s rhetorical character to an intermediary’s approximation of 
cumulative ethos.  
This transfer of responsibility, moreover, comes with great power. It lends those 
intermediaries an incredible amount of rhetorical influence to dictate what constitutes credible 
commerce and, in so doing, to shape commercial activity on a large scale. As the opening example of 
the Great Recession suggests, the abuse of that surrogate authority can have a monumental—and 
detrimental—impact on society at large. Indeed, this intermediary system for approximating 
cumulative ethos begins to show its cracks when a bank vouches for the credibility of a subprime 
mortgage and the government vouches for the credibility of that bank, and then the everyday 
citizens suffer when both that mortgage and that bank prove fraudulent. Unsurprisingly, this recent 
skepticism toward the authority of commercial intermediaries has led to the rise of alternative 
methods of generating trust in commercial transactions. Cryptocurrencies, in particular, pose a new 
set of solutions to the problem of generating credibility in fast-paced commerce among strangers. 
But these solutions also further complicate the temporalities that lend cumulative ethos its rhetorical 
force in commercial interactions.  
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Complicating Accumulated Character with Cryptocurrencies 
Unlike traditional commercial interactions, cryptocurrencies attempt to replicate the effects 
of cumulative ethos in commerce without the need for intermediaries. The self-identified 
“cypherpunks” who invented Bitcoin, B-Money, Hashcash, and other cryptocurrencies deliberately 
set out to create “anonymous, decentralized cryptography-based currencies that are completely free 
from government interference and manipulation” (Falkon).181 By combining encryption techniques 
with a new technology called blockchain, these technophiles fashioned cryptocurrencies that 
circumvent the need for third-party intercessors in commerce. Simply put, they erase the need for 
knowable identities and government-backed currencies. In doing so, these cryptocurrencies also 
offer a different set of responses to the challenge of quickly generating commercial credibility when 
deprived of sufficient time to fully develop a cumulative ethos. Thus, regardless of one’s adherence 
to the tenets of the libertarian ideologies that undergird cryptocurrencies, these alternative forms of 
online commerce nevertheless prove to be fruitful sites for rhetorical investigation. Through the 
questions that they pose about character and time, cryptocurrencies stretch the concept of 
cumulative ethos to its limits.  
Unlike the ways that traditional commercial activities rely on identities to provide baseline 
credibility in commerce, cryptocurrencies employ encryption techniques to make e-commerce 
anonymous. Bitcoin users, for instance, possess a ‘digital wallet’ that assigns them a unique node in 
the peer-to-peer (P2P) network, allowing them to participate in cryptocurrency transactions. But 
unlike an IP address, a digital wallet is not tied to any single hardware device; and unlike a web URL, 
                                                      
181 “Cypherpunks” are a group of people who promote cryptography as a way to advocate for political and 
social change. Famous cypherpunks include the WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange as well as John Gillmore, a 
founder of the Cypherpunk listserv. Wei Dai invented B-Money, and Adam Back invented Hashcash; both of 
these cryptocurrencies preceded Nakamoto’s Bitcoin. For more information about cypherpunks, see Eric 
Hughes’ “A Cypherpunk’s Manifesto;” Julian Assange’s Cypherpunks: Freedom and the Future of the Internet; and 
Falkon’s thorough Medium article. 
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a digital wallet is not linked to a virtual address on the Internet. Instead, the digital wallet simply 
marks a unique but anonymous node in the P2P network. Its online ‘location,’ therefore, is not tied 
to any identifying information. Furthermore, this wallet is secured with two keys. The private key 
gives owners access to funds, while the public key allows users to interact with other nodes in the 
network to make transactions. This dual key system enables Bitcoin exchanges to function like a 
stock exchange: all transactions are publicly recorded, but the identities of those involved in a 
transaction are protected. Bitcoin thus obfuscates the identities of both buyers and sellers, leading to 
complete privacy in its commercial transactions.182 But without identities, Bitcoin dissolves one 
essential way of generating baseline trust in commercial exchanges. This anonymity, in turn, forces 
other aspects of Bitcoin to take on the labor of acting as modest facsimiles of cumulative ethos in e-
commerce.  
To establish trust in its commercial system, Bitcoin employs a technology called 
blockchain.183 The blockchain is a public-facing ledger that records every single transaction in the 
history of a single bitcoin. Each subsequent and valid transaction is given an identifying number, 
called a block. This block is then added to the end of the chain of previous blocks that identify all of 
the prior transactions that specific bitcoin has participated in. Crucially, this blockchain is not stored 
on any single server; nor is the blockchain in the possession of any single individual. Instead, the 
blockchain is distributed across a vast P2P network and publicly available for any node in the 
network to query at any time. When a user makes a request for a bitcoin transaction, the blockchain 
technology broadcasts that request to each individual computer, or node, in that public P2P system. 
                                                      
182 Although banks provide their clients with some level of privacy in transactions, they do so only because 
the bank functions as a third-party institution that limits outsider access to their clients’ personal information. 
While such banking transactions may be nominally private, in practice, no banking transaction is wholly 
private because the bank itself also has access to those transaction records. 
183 For more information about Bitcoin and its blockchain protocol, see https://bitcoin.org/en/how-it-
works. 
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To verify that the user is not trying to spend the same bitcoin twice, multiple nodes validate the 
transaction using a mathematical algorithm—a process called ‘mining’—and compare their results 
with each other and with the existing blockchain. If the bitcoin transaction is valid, then it is time-
stamped at the moment of sale, and a new block is added to the chain to signify the completed 
transaction. Thus, rather than relying on a third-party financial institution to validate the transaction 
between participants, the blockchain technology allows users to have confidence in cryptocurrency 
exchanges despite their anonymity.  
Given the ways that cryptocurrencies eliminate the need for both identities and 
intermediaries in e-commerce, doing business with them requires—even more than in traditional 
commercial exchanges—some kind of surrogate for cumulative ethos. It is too risky to depend only 
on momentary or static configurations of ethos in online transactions with unnamed participants. 
And yet, in the fast-paced and anonymous world of cryptocurrency trading, participants do not have 
enough time build or to evaluate character over time. Cryptocurrencies therefore create an even 
greater need for alternative ways of approximating cumulative ethos in e-commerce. Together, 
Bitcoin’s encryption techniques and its blockchain protocol provide this trustworthy system; rather 
than relying on knowable identities and fiat currencies backed by central governments, Bitcoin 
outsources the work of generating credibility in commercial transactions to the system of machines 
and humans that comprise its P2P network. This new strategy, however, is not without rhetorical 
repercussions for the concept of cumulative ethos and for the trust that people put in 
cryptocurrencies. Indeed, Bitcoin presents three primary rhetorical ramifications for time, character, 
and their collective relationship to commerce. And although these challenges at first appear distinct, 
they are, as I will show, intertwined.  
 
Decentering Character 
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First, Bitcoin tests fundamental assumptions about the relationship between cumulative 
ethos and humans. Despite the fact that rhetorical character—as I have sketched it in the previous 
chapters—repeatedly emerges from the ongoing interactions of humans and nonhumans, it 
nevertheless tends to constellate around human subjects with knowable identities such as Socrates 
and Kanye West. Bitcoin, however, divorces identity from ethos; and without a specific human 
identity for cumulative ethos to encircle, rhetorical character becomes unmoored. This, in turn, 
jeopardizes faith in fast-paced commerce. Would you buy an expensive item from a nameless, 
faceless, and voiceless figure?184 And would you do so if you only had ten seconds to decide? 
Commerce becomes a dodgy prospect when deprived of the minimal credibility that comes from 
knowing who you are dealing with. Anonymity eliminates the opportunity to seek recompense from 
a specific individual for commercial wrongdoing, which ultimately inflates the risk involved in 
commerce and often dis-incentivizes it entirely.  
Despite the challenges of anonymity, cryptocurrencies do not totally erase cumulative ethos. 
Rather, the blockchain protocol distributes the burden of credibility—and, by extension, of a 
humble approximation of cumulative ethos—across a dense network of actants. To some extent, fiat 
currencies begin this decentering of ethos when they relocate trust from two strangers to a reliable 
third-party like a government or bank. But cryptocurrencies extend this process further by 
dislodging rhetorical character from an individual entity, whether human or institutional, and 
transferring it to the larger P2P network. With cryptocurrencies, a decentralized and perpetually 
shifting system of humans, computers, and algorithms is now responsible for cultivating trust in any 
given cryptocurrency transaction. While in other situations a complex model of cumulative ethos 
revolves around a single human subject, cryptocurrencies reduce credibility to a binary (e.g. valid or 
                                                      
184 For further research engaging questions of rhetoric and anonymity, see Chapter 7 “Performance” in 
Brooke as well as Hutchinson. 
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invalid) and scatter the responsibility for generating that bifurcated trust across a vast network of 
machines and humans.  
 
Material Costs 
Second, although the labor of approximating cumulative ethos is distributed across the 
whole P2P network, the process of mining bitcoins—of determining their credibility—often takes a 
long time to complete. The validation times for a single bitcoin transaction depends on the level of 
network activity and the value of the associated transaction fees. If the P2P network is inundated 
with traffic, then transactions will take longer to verify; and if the request has a low transaction fee, 
then cryptocurrency miners will prioritize other transactions with higher fees first.185 Given these 
variables, the amount of time it takes to determine the credibility of a bitcoin transaction varies 
dramatically. Some validations can happen in ten minutes, while others may take several hours or 
more to verify.186 Thus, although the blockchain technology attempts to act as a short-term 
substitute for cumulative ethos, the corroboration of its trustworthiness rarely happens in a timely 
fashion.  
Furthermore, the length of time that it takes to validate bitcoin transactions has significant 
material costs that can impact the perception of the cryptocurrency as a whole. Because Bitcoin 
verification involves solving complicated mathematical problems, it takes a substantial amount of 
computer processing power to complete these calculations. When specialized mining hardware is 
used at their maximum capabilities to validate bitcoin transactions, those computers consume 
incredible amounts of electricity both to power and to cool the machines. Many miners, moreover, 
                                                      
185 For an excellent and accessible description of Bitcoin mining, see 
https://www.bitcoinmining.com/.  
186 For more information about the processing times for Bitcoin transactions, see Buchko and Chizurum.  
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set up massive ‘mining rigs’ with the aim of validating thousands of bitcoin transactions each day.187 
The high energy costs of cryptocurrency mining thus become a substantial draw on the natural and 
environmental resources that power local mining operations. Some places, in fact, are beginning to 
outlaw cryptocurrency mining due to the resources that they consume over long periods of time. In 
Upstate New York, for instance, the town of Plattsburgh banned the mining of cryptocurrencies “to 
preserve natural resources, the health of its residents,” and, strikingly, “the ‘character and direction’ 
of the city” (Katz). While in other situations the material implications of cumulative ethos primarily 
impact those involved in the commercial activity, here the length of time that it takes to verify the 
credibility of cryptocurrency transactions increasingly shifts that material burden to whole 
communities and to the natural world.  
 
Temporal Chronology 
Third, although the length of time matters to bitcoin mining, the length of the blockchain 
itself does not impact the validity of a bitcoin transaction. A longer blockchain is not more credible 
than a shorter one. Unlike the ways that humans accrue a complex rhetorical character over time by 
compiling a series of complicated and subjective actions into an ethotic history that has an 
accumulated impact on present and future rhetorical interactions, the blockchain functions more 
simplistically. Each block in the blockchain only signals that—at a specific timestamped moment in 
the past—a verified transaction occurred, and that bitcoin ownership shifted to a new owner. Invalid 
transactions are not recorded in the blockchain. Furthermore, the validity of a particular bitcoin 
exchange simply depends on whether or not that bitcoin is currently in the possession of that 
anonymous owner, a process that involves only the last block in the chain. Consequently, although the 
                                                      
187 Experts estimate that 50% to 70% of cryptocurrency mining occurs in China. For more information about 
large mining operations, especially those outside the United States, see Tuwiner. 
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blockchain grows longer with each successful transaction, the older blocks have no influence on 
present or future transactions. In this sense, the blockchain, while still acting as a substitute for 
cumulative ethos, operates like a linear and verifiable catalogue of ownership. Put differently, the 
accretion of time-stamped blocks in the blockchain functions more as a chronology—as a sequence of 
discrete entities—and less like a fluid and ever-shifting accumulation.  
When figured as a chronology of credibility, moreover, the blockchain technology appears to 
build trust in ways that echo traditional views of ethos as either a kairotic or static entity. The validity 
of single bitcoin, for instance, is determined in the moment of its transaction by verifying that it is not 
being double spent. But after that transaction is validated and the block is added to the chain, the 
blockchain becomes immutable. In other words, the blockchain’s chronological model is composed of 
a series of distinct kairotic moments that quickly become fossilized. In this way, the blockchain 
technology seems to be governed by a combination of instantaneous validation and chronological 
permanent records, two processes akin to the paired notions of invented and prior ethos. While in 
other situations, cumulative ethos functions as an ever-shifting accretive force that unevenly impacts 
subsequent interactions, here the mechanisms that the blockchain employs to generate credibility 
more closely resemble a dialectical relationship between momentary and fixed ethos.  
In sum, Bitcoin’s effort to approximate the rhetorical role of cumulative ethos in commerce 
challenges the foundations of character itself. Without sufficient time to develop rhetorical character 
between anonymous actors engaged in cryptocurrency commerce, the blockchain protocol decenters 
cumulative ethos from human subjects, it extends the material burden of demonstrating credibility 
to a larger community, and its chronological organization emphasizes the instantaneous and 
stationary elements of ethos.  
While these implications may seem disparate, they are linked, as I show in the next section, 
through their relationship to the fact that the credibility of every bitcoin transaction is rendered as a 
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binary: valid or invalid. In other situations—even those involving fiat currencies as a substitute for 
cumulative ethos—rhetorical character is typically marked by its complexity; but with Bitcoin, the 
blockchain protocol so thoroughly stretches the concept of cumulative ethos that it makes visible its 
underlying dichotomies.  
 
Rearticulating Ethos’ Timeless Binary Foundations 
Unlike the deeply complex accumulation of character that I have sketched in previous 
chapters, Bitcoin presents a much simpler model of cumulative ethos. Bitcoins, for instance, cannot 
have degrees of trustworthiness. Slightly more or less credible bitcoins do not exist. Instead, the 
credibility of a particular bitcoin transaction rests on a dichotomy: either the bitcoin is in the owner’s 
possession, or it is not. There are no gradations of credibility to assess, and no other virtues that 
might emerge. The bitcoin transaction is either valid or invalid. These binary limitations, however, 
position the blockchain protocol as a threadbare substitute for cumulative ethos. Cryptocurrencies, 
in short, reduce ethotic complexity to a bifurcated result.  
With Bitcoin, the oversimplification of rhetorical character arises, in part, due to the 
decentering of ethos from individual humans. While rhetorical character does not ‘reside’ within any 
single human subject but instead emerges from human interactions with the world, cumulative ethos 
can nevertheless vary in its complexity depending on who or what it constellates around. When it 
revolves around an individual human, it often overflows with intricacies and nuance. But as 
rhetorical character becomes increasingly distanced from a single person, it can dwindle to a 
thumbs-up or thumbs-down dichotomy. In traditional commerce, for example, fiat currencies shift 
the burden of approximating cumulative ethos from individual humans to third-party institutions 
like governments. Although currencies allow for fluctuating degrees of credibility as faith in the 
central government ebbs and flows over time, currencies cannot be brave or honest; they can only 
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be credible or trustworthy (hence my repeated usage of these adjectives throughout this chapter). 
But in limiting the kinds of qualities that we ascribe to the character of currencies, we thus begin to 
limit the scope of cumulative ethos.  
Cryptocurrencies extend this process of attenuation one step further. Without a single 
human subject or a government-backed currency for ethos to orbit, the decentralized network of 
humans and machines that comprise the blockchain protocol becomes responsible for generating 
credibility. The blockchain protocol, however, ultimately renders each bitcoin transaction as either 
valid or invalid. Thus, to the extent that the blockchain protocol operates as a proxy for cumulative 
ethos, it does so by reducing it to a binary. The blockchain does not offer nuance in its 
approximation of character. In sum, while cumulative ethos embraces nonhuman-human relations, 
who or what operates at the epicenter of those relationships shapes the complexity of the cumulative 
ethos that arises from those contexts. If ethos constellates around a human, it tends to develop 
complexity. But if ethos, or its surrogate, is dispersed across a network of actants, it can become 
reduced to a simple dichotomy. 
In addition to decentering cumulative ethos from the human, Bitcoin’s reduction of 
rhetorical character to a binary also stems from the ways in which ethos is temporally bifurcated by 
the blockchain protocol. The blockchain first relies on kairotic notions of ethos to validate a specific 
bitcoin transaction. Then those momentary displays of character become ossified as subsequent 
blocks are added to the chain, lending credibility to the entire enterprise as a kind of prior ethos. The 
blockchain thus articulates a chronological relationship between kairotic and static ethos. Unlike the 
idea of cumulative ethos—which links kairotic and static character through a messy process of 
accumulation—Bitcoin’s chronology of credibility lends itself to binaries. The blockchain protocol, for 
instance, relies on precise notions of before and after to validate the credibility of a transaction. But 
this strictly linear understanding of time renders notions of character similarly bifurcated. In the 
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context of Bitcoin, therefore, ethos can only ever be valid or invalid because it depends on discrete 
lines of separation between the past, present, and future.  
Ironically, despite the fact that the blockchain protocol reduces issues of character to a 
binary, it often elongates, rather than reduces, the amount of time that it takes to evaluate the 
credibility of a commercial transaction. This extended timeframe, in turn, alters the rhetorical 
significance of the accumulation of time for character. While cumulative ethos describes how the 
amalgamation of prior instantiations of character impact subsequent accounts of ethos, the total 
length of time that it takes to process a bitcoin transaction does not influence its credibility at all. 
Although the mathematical calculations often take a long time to complete, the binary outcome of a 
bitcoin transaction—valid or invalid—is independent of that processing time. And yet, the time it 
takes to validate bitcoin transactions has a sizeable material cost in the form of electricity and of 
natural resources. The material implications of accumulated time thus reach beyond those directly 
involved with the cryptocurrency transaction and also affect others who share those resources. In 
sum, while the blockchain protocol disperses rhetorical character across a network of actants, it also 
distributes the material burden of processing time across a larger community of humans and 
nonhumans. Paradoxically, then, the seemingly oversimplified and binary ethos involved in the 
blockchain protocol extends the material reach of accumulated time beyond any single bitcoin 
transaction to the larger communities from which these technologies emerge.  
Although the blockchain protocol clearly highlights the binary aspects of character and time, 
such a dualistic picture of ethos is not limited to cryptocurrencies. Similar dichotomies also exist 
when discussing the character of human subjects. Socrates, for instance, developed a deeply complex 
rhetorical character throughout his time in Athens. And yet, when the chips were down, his 
cumulative ethos became condensed to a binary. Was Socrates good or bad for Athens? Did his 
rhetorical character contribute to the corruption of the youth of Athens, or not? Ultimately, the 
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outcome of Socrates’ trial and the shape of his life rested on a bifurcated—not a nuanced—
understanding of his character. In a similar vein, Kanye West’s cumulative ethos unfolds in wildly 
complicated ways on the Internet, but after embracing an openly racist and misogynistic president, 
his rhetorical character has emerged in a more binary light. Now people tend to gloss over the 
complexities of his cumulative ethos and instead to describe his character in black and white 
terms.188 Obama, for example, famously called West “a jackass” (Politico), while President Trump 
later described West as “a terrific guy” (“Trump”). Thus, while the blockchain technology appears to 
act as an oversimplified version of cumulative ethos, the same binary aspects of character underpin 
other rhetorical interactions too. Although Socrates’ character and Bitcoin’s blockchain appear to 
exist on different ontological planes, the lens of cumulative ethos makes visible the ways that these 
disparate displays of character can be understood as differences in degree. Some rhetorical ecologies 
reinforce the binaries that comprise a simpler model of credibility, while other rhetorical ecologies 
shed more light on the complicated and ongoing process of accumulating ethos over time.  
In fact, this tension between the binaries and complexities of character also aligns with 
traditional understandings of ethos and ethics. For example, the list of words that people use to 
describe someone’s ethos typically display this same dynamic. Honesty and bravery, for instance, are 
distinct qualities of an ethos that manifest and evolve over time in many different ways. They are, 
undoubtedly, intricate and multifaceted characteristics. And yet, honesty and bravery are both clearly 
virtues that can be contrasted with their vices, cowardice and deceitfulness. The former two 
represent elements of good character, while the latter two signify bad character. Binaries and 
complexities thus coexist when engaged—as cumulative ethos is—in questions of ethics. 
Furthermore, when viewed through the lens of ethics, the art of rhetoric itself reveals its ties to 
                                                      
188 Ta-Nahesi Coates offers perhaps the best example of painting a bifurcated picture of West’s ethos in his 
Atlantic article “I’m Not Black, I’m Kanye: Kanye West Wants Freedom—White Freedom.”  
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dichotomies. For millennia, rhetoricians have been concerned with the relationship between good 
rhetoric and good ethical behavior.189 Despite the complexities of rhetorical activity, scholars remain 
perplexed by this simple, and bifurcated, question: does rhetoric make us good, or not? Lanham calls 
this problem the “Q Question,” after Quintilian’s famous dictum, “the good man, speaking well.” 
And regardless of whether scholars side with Lanham’s “Weak Defense” or his “Strong Defense,” 
rhetoric nevertheless remains tethered to this underlying duality of good and bad.190 To be sure, 
there is room for nuance in rhetoric and issues of ethos, but ethical binaries still comprise a key 
component of both. And certain rhetorical ecologies—such as (crypto-)commerce—seem to 
highlight those bifurcated elements more than others.  
 
Conclusion 
In the first decade of its existence, Bitcoin has been transformative as a technology, a 
currency, and a rhetorical force. It has sparked the imagination of technophiles, disrupted the 
investment practices of venture capitalists, and mystified governments that stumble in their efforts 
to regulate cryptocurrencies. While many cryptographers, libertarians, and cypherpunks embrace the 
radical secrecy afforded by Bitcoin, others caution that the shadowy world of anonymous online 
commerce could lead to dangerous black markets and global financial collapse. For scholars of 
rhetoric, however, Bitcoin cuts to the very core of the field by challenging the way that researchers 
understand the fundamentals of rhetorical interactions.  
                                                      
189 An abbreviated list of rhetoricians overtly invested in the topic of rhetoric and ethics includes Isocrates, 
Quintilian, Lanham (The Electronic Word), and Brown. 
190 Lanham explains that the “Weak Defense” suggests that rhetors must first be good people and then use 
rhetoric for good ends. A bad person, on the other hand, may use rhetoric for bad ends. He then describes 
the “Strong Defense” as the belief that learning and practicing rhetoric does, in fact, make people more 
virtuous. Lanham discusses these competing views in the context of digital technologies. And although, for 
the most part, he embraces the possibilities of digital technologies to improve rhetorical education, he hedges 
a bit in his own response to the Q Question. Rather than arguing that digital literacies make us “better,” he 
suggests that they make us “more effective.”  
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Although commerce and cryptocurrencies do not immediately appear to be rich sites of 
rhetorical analysis, they nonetheless hold significant stakes for rhetorical theory and criticism. Using 
the concept of cumulative ethos as a lens through which to see these activities shed light on the 
significance of both character and time for commerce. Indeed, as I have shown, the very root of 
commercial exchange relies on the ability of participants to evaluate—or at least to approximate—
the rhetorical character and credibility of others involved in a transaction. But doing so requires 
time, and often commerce does not allow sufficient time to accumulate a compelling rhetorical 
character. Here again, the concept of cumulative ethos makes visible the ways that currencies 
function not just as a medium of exchange but also as a kind of ethotic substrate that, even if it does 
not illuminate the nuances of a person’s character in commerce, nevertheless gives participants a 
baseline confidence in the credibility of a commercial interchange.  
While fiat currencies function as a proxy for rhetorical character, cryptocurrencies use 
encryption techniques and the blockchain technology to validate exchanges, eliminating the need for 
credible intermediaries in commerce. Doing so decenters the notion of ethos from individual human 
subjects and instead disperses it across a vast public network of humans and machines. And 
although the blockchain protocol relies on an accretive notion of time to verify the validity of each 
bitcoin transaction, it nevertheless reduces the complexity of rhetorical character to a binary 
outcome: the transaction is either valid or invalid. Moreover, the process of authenticating each 
bitcoin exchange typically takes a long time to complete and draws excessively on natural resources. 
Indeed, the material costs of evaluating the credibility of each individual bitcoin transaction 
continues to jeopardize not only the future of digital commerce but also our own shared and 
rhetorical future as collaborative inhabitants of a planet with finite resources.  
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Epilogue  
Today, the rapid growth in the types, quantities, and speeds of twenty-first century 
technologies makes increasingly visible—and increasingly complex—the accumulation of character 
over time and its ongoing impact on the world. Television, the Internet, social media, and a variety 
of other digital devices all extend the temporal reach of character while also complicating the ways 
that character interacts with the shifting timescapes of these technologies. Of course, the accretion 
of character over time is not itself a new phenomenon. For centuries, language, speech, and writing 
acted as the primary technologies that facilitated the evolution of character from one moment to the 
next. While these technologies played an important role in shaping the ongoing development of 
one’s character, they also had a tendency to foreground momentary displays of character and, in so 
doing, to downplay the potent cumulative effects of character as it bled from one situation into 
another. But the emergence of new media technologies and their interweaving with the 
aforementioned discursive technologies gives rise to a contemporary cultural moment in which the 
circulation, saturation, and rupturing of character over time is both messier and more important 
than ever.  
The case of Adnan Syed highlights the stakes of tracing the fluctuating manifestations and 
implications of one’s character as it negotiates the technologies and temporalities that make possible 
its accumulation. Syed’s character did not, of course, need new media like the Serial podcast in order 
to accrue significant force over time. Indeed, high school gossip, the prosecutor’s attacks, and 
witness accounts all contributed to the perpetual refashioning of Syed’s character before, during, and 
after his first two trials, all of which occurred fifteen years prior to Koenig’s Peabody-winning 
podcast. And as the testimonies of his friends and family members indicate, the accrual of Syed’s 
character during that time had a profound impact on the Baltimore Muslim community and those 
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involved with Woodlawn High School.191 More recently, though, a preponderance of other 
technologies and their digital circulation have accelerated and warped the accretion of Syed’s 
character. Most visibly, the narrative of Syed’s character has been molded by the dissemination of 
the world’s most popular podcast, Serial Season 1. In addition, our sense of Syed’s accumulated 
character is figured by other media, including a website with millions of views, an HBO television 
series, and dozens of other print and online media.192 The dense web of today’s technologies thus 
augment both the visibility and the complexity of the ways that time gives shape to Syed’s character. 
Put differently, the complicated ways that Syed’s character evolves as it negotiates shifting 
temporalities is highlighted by the many contemporary technologies that contribute to the 
persistence, circulation, and accumulation of his character over time.  
For scholars and practitioners of rhetoric, the narrative of Syed and his ever-changing 
character helps to underscore the essential role that time plays in technologically-mediated rhetorical 
activity. Rhetoricians have long studied the ways that technologies shape rhetorical ecologies. This 
dissertation, and Syed’s story in particular, contributes to this scholarly conversation by emphasizing 
the temporalities that emerge from these technologies and highlighting their impact on rhetorical 
interactions. But because time, technology, and rhetoric together form a triptych of unwieldy size, I 
narrow the focus of this project to examine the impact of technologically-mediated timescapes on 
one particular facet of rhetoric. Specifically, I investigate how technologies contribute to the ways 
that character, or ethos, bleeds from one temporally-situated rhetorical encounter to the next, 
sometimes unnoticeably and other times with dramatic rhetorical consequences. The chapters of this 
                                                      
191 For more information about the impact of Syed’s character on local communities at that time, 
listen to Episode 1 “The Alibi” and especially Episode 11 “Rumors.” 
192 Here, I refer to www.serialpodcast.org, “The Case Against Adnan Syed: A New Documentary 
Series on HBO,” and news sources such as The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Guardian, 
The Huffington Post, Wikipedia, and Reddit.  
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dissertation are therefore stitched together by a shared interest in the technologies—water clocks, 
written records, digital videos, audio files, fiat currencies, and the blockchain protocol—that cast in 
high relief the remarkable ways that time contributes to the accumulation of ethos and its ongoing 
impact on the world.  
This accumulation of rhetorical character over time by way of technological mediation—a 
process that I call cumulative ethos—provides a way for scholars and practitioners of rhetoric to better 
understand the shifting imprint of ethos in ever-evolving rhetorical ecologies. In this sense, 
cumulative ethos functions as an analytical framework, not as a heuristic for rhetorical production. 
After all, cumulative ethos, as I have depicted it, is so deeply intertwined with larger networks of 
humans, machines, and materials that an individual subject has only a limited influence on the shape 
of their aggregated character. As such, it becomes nearly impossible to articulate a series of steps 
that could produce a certain kind of cumulative ethos. Although humans may work actively, 
consciously, and strategically toward cultivating their accumulated character, they will never be able 
to completely control it. To comprehend a richer picture of cumulative ethos, therefore, analysts 
must consider how the human aspects of ethos are always entangled with the technologies—which 
are, themselves, complex networks of nonhumans and humans—that circulate and perpetuate the 
rhetorical influence of that ethos over time.  
The case of Adnan Syed underscores how cumulative ethos operates as an analytical 
framework that highlights the relationship between technology, temporality, and character. It also 
foregrounds the limited agency that humans have over the accumulation of their own character. In 
Episode 11 “Rumors” of Serial Season 1, for instance, Koenig recounts a lengthy letter that Syed sent 
her expressing his dismay about the effects of her podcast on his character. In a moment of defeat, 
he writes, “It doesn’t matter to me how your story portrays me, guilty or innocent. I just want it to 
be over” (“Rumors). Syed’s language here belies a deeper frustration with his lack of control over his 
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accumulated character. He has spent the last fifteen years carefully working to improve his 
reputation from the confines of jail. Now, seemingly overnight, the worldwide circulation of a 
twelve-episode podcast jeopardizes a decade and a half of his conscientious labor. Although Syed’s 
active participation in the podcast grants him a modest role in contributing to the evolution of his 
character, he recognizes that he is only a small part of a much larger network of people and 
machines—including producers, listeners, computers, microphones, speakers, and so on—that 
collectively contribute to the accumulation of his character. And for Syed, the stakes of accounting for 
the distributed and layered constitution of his cumulative ethos are incredibly high: whether his 
accumulated character begins to bend more toward innocence or guilt could impact the outcome of 
the judicial appeals process that he is engaged in at the time of recording.193  
Such a model of cumulative ethos, of course, overlaps in many ways with the idea of 
reputation. But while reputation emphasizes temporality, longevity, and duration, it sometimes 
downplays the fluctuating impact of that reputation, which might be better accounted for by the 
rhetorical concept of ethos. The notion of cumulative ethos therefore functions both within and 
beyond the idea of reputation, foregrounding the rhetorical work of a reputation over time and 
tracing its cultural imprint as it swells and dissipates when moving from one rhetorical ecology to the 
next. In the case of Serial Season 1, for instance, it is easy for listeners to get swept away in debates 
about Syed’s reputation. Was he a good kid or a bad kid? Could the homecoming king who aged 
into the seemingly thoughtful young man on the podcast have really committed a murder? Although 
important, these questions about the status of his reputation put less emphasis on the rhetorical 
impact of Syed’s reputation; and his reputation plays an important role in the larger communities in 
which he operates. For example, Syed’s reputation as an active and dedicated member of the 
                                                      
193 In fact, some of Koenig’s reporting for Serial Season 1 is eventually cited by the judge who grants 
Syed a re-trial.  
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Baltimore Muslim community is crucial to bringing in donations that help the Syed family pay for 
his legal fees. At the same time, however, Syed’s reputation for duplicitousness leads other friends to 
be vocally skeptical of his innocence and to refuse to aid his family.194 In this way, cumulative ethos 
acts as an analytical framework that spotlights the complex and significant rhetorical work that a 
reputation accomplishes as it accumulates force over time within particular communities.  
While each chapter in this dissertation explicates some particular facet of cumulative ethos, 
the wide variety of illustrative anecdotes that comprise this project also work toward a collection of 
secondary goals. Situating the first chapter in ancient Greece, for instance, underscores the long 
implicit history of understanding chronos as a kind of accumulated time that is central to rhetorical 
activity in the polis. Positioning the second chapter about cumulative ethos in a similar Athenian 
context reinforces the fact that, like chronos, cumulative ethos is not a new phenomenon; in fact, the 
accumulation of character over time has such deep roots in the Western origins of rhetoric that 
many thinkers might consider it axiomatic. Given this history, the contribution that this dissertation 
makes to this scholarly conversation—and the idea that links Chapters Two, Three, and Four 
together—is its emphasis on how different technologies generate distinct but related temporal 
frameworks that influence the ways that character accretes over time. And because the discipline of 
rhetoric is particularly invested in the public and cultural work of phenomena, this project pays 
special attention to the aggregated impact that a cumulative ethos has not only on the individuals 
whose character is in question but also on the larger communities and cultures in which they move.  
Furthermore, the structure of this dissertation itself functions as a cumulative argument for 
more explicitly considering the ways that rhetorical forces accrete over time. Each chapter layers on 
top of the previous one, building—sometimes expectedly and other times unexpectedly—upon the 
                                                      
194 For more information about Syed’s reputation and its impact on his local communities, listen to 
Episode 11 “Rumors.” 
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previous chapters. Chapter One, for example, demonstrates the centrality of chronos to rhetorical 
activity in ancient Greece; but its importance for rhetoric comes increasingly into focus when 
Chapter Two shows how this chronos-based idea of accumulated time sharpens our understanding 
of the rhetorical workings of ethos. And while Chapter Two lays out a model for cumulative ethos, the 
significance of this concept is further highlighted when applied to the context of Internet 
communication in Chapter Three. Lastly, Chapter Three’s study of the accelerated circulation of 
online ethos takes on additional import when juxtaposed in Chapter Four with the challenges of 
accumulating character in cryptocurrency exchanges. Thus, while any given chapter might stand on 
its own, together they augment each other and comprise a more coherent and complete whole.  
As this diverse array of examples suggests, the idea of cumulative ethos capitalizes on an 
opportunity to see the temporally-situated rhetorical work of character in places where it is not 
always readily apparent: in criminal trials and the judicial system, in podcasting and nonfiction 
storytelling, in philosophy and pedagogy, in music and celebrity culture, in commerce and 
cryptocurrencies. In each of these contexts, cumulative ethos plays a central, albeit sometimes less 
obvious, rhetorical role. For example, even when we appear to be debating the factual evidence 
surrounding Syed’s case, the analytical framework of cumulative ethos emphasizes that the real 
stakes of that conversation lie in how we are also participating in the co-construction of Syed’s 
accumulated character. Moreover, cumulative ethos helps us see that those seemingly benign 
discussions about Syed’s reputation are not without a profound rhetorical impact on our larger 
American culture. In the first episode of Serial Season 3, for instance, Koenig explains that the 
impetus for the third season’s examination of the intricacies and injustices of the U.S. legal system 
arose from audience feedback to Syed’s story in Serial Season 1. She recounts how listeners routinely 
asked, “[W]hat does [Syed’s] case tell us about the criminal justice system?” (“A Bar Fight Walks into 
the Criminal Justice Center”). As the third season unfolds, it becomes clear that Koenig, like many 
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Serial Season 1 listeners, believes that the character of many incarcerated Americans—especially 
minorities like Syed—has been misconstrued over time by our legal system. Thus, with Koenig at 
the helm and with Syed’s character serving as the fuel, Serial Season 3 seeks not only to publicize 
these judicial injustices but also to agitate for political and social change that might rectify the 
problems with the United States criminal justice system. In this way, seeing the Serial podcast 
through the lens of cumulative ethos makes visible the ways that the accumulated character of 
someone like Syed can function as a powerful rhetorical force for change in the world.  
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Appendix A 
 
 
Kanye West’s lyrics from the rap battle on SNL’s “Kyle vs. Kanye” 
 
 
I miss the old Kanye, 
Chop up the soul Kanye, 
Straight from the 'Go Kanye, 
Ill with the flow Kanye, 
I hate the new Kanye, 
The always rude Kanye, 
The bad mood Kanye, 
Spaz in the news Kanye, 
I miss the old Kanye, 
Kickin’ the flows Kanye, 
Where all the [indecipherable] at, Ye? 
I miss the Os, Kanye 
You know we love Kanye, 
You used to love Kanye, 
You had the pink polo on, 
You thought you was Kanye. 
We still love Kanye, 
That’s all it was, Kanye. 
Well guess what? 
I love you like Kanye loves Kanye. 
[live SNL audience laughs] 
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Kanye West’s lyrics from “I Miss the Old Kanye” (Feb 14, 2016).  
This so was later retitled “I Love Kanye” (April 1, 2016) with no lyrical changes. 
 
 
I miss the old Kanye, 
Straight from the 'Go Kanye, 
Chop up the soul Kanye, 
Set on his goals Kanye, 
I hate the new Kanye, 
The bad mood Kanye, 
The always rude Kanye, 
Spaz in the news Kanye, 
I miss the sweet Kanye, 
Chop up the beats Kanye, 
I gotta to say at that time 
I'd like to meet Kanye, 
See I invented Kanye, 
Tt wasn't any Kanyes, 
And now I look and look around 
And there's so many Kanyes, 
I used to love Kanye, 
I used to love Kanye, 
I even had the pink Polo 
I thought I was Kanye, 
What if Kanye 
Made a song about Kanye? 
Called "I Miss The Old Kanye," 
Man, that'd be so Kanye! 
That's all it was Kanye, 
We still love Kanye, 
And I love you 
Like Kanye loves Kanye. 
[West laughs] 
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